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Abstract
The endurance of an aircraft can be increased in the presence of failures by utilising
flight control systems that are tolerant to failures. Such systems are known as fault
tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS). FTFCS can be implemented by develop-
ing failure detection, identification and accommodation (FDIA) schemes. Two of
the major types of failures in an aircraft system are the sensor and actuator fail-
ures. In this research, a sensor failure detection, identification and accommodation
(SFDIA); and an actuator failure detection, identification and accommodation (AF-
DIA) schemes are developed. These schemes are developed using the artificial neural
network (ANN).
A number of techniques can be found in the literature that address FDIA in
aircraft systems. These techniques are, for example, Kalman filters, fuzzy logic and
ANN. This research uses the fully connected cascade (FCC) neural network (NN) for
the development of the SFDIA and AFDIA schemes. Based on the study presented
in the literature, this NN architecture is compact and efficient in comparison to the
multi-layer perceptron (MLP) NN, which is a popular choice for NN applications.
This is the first reported instance of the use of the FCC NN for fault tolerance
applications, especially in the aerospace domain.
For this research, the X-Plane 9 flight simulator is used for data collection and as
a test bed. This simulator is well known for its realistic simulations and is certified
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for pilot training. The developed
SFDIA scheme adds endurance to an aircraft in the presence of failures in the
aircraft pitch, roll and yaw rate gyro sensors. The SFDIA scheme is able to replace
a faulty gyro sensor with a FCC NN based estimate, with as few as 2 neurons. In
total, 105 failure experiments were conducted, out of which only 1 went undetected.
In the developed AFDIA scheme, a FCC NN based roll controller is employed,
i
which uses just 5 neurons. This controller can adapt on-line to the post failure
dynamics of the aircraft following a 66% loss of wing surface. With 66% of the
wing surface missing, the NN based roll controller is able to maintain flight. This
is a remarkable display of endurance by the AFDIA scheme, following such a severe
failure. The results presented in this research validate the use of FCC NNs for
SFDIA and AFDIA applications.
ii
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“And, when you want something, all the universe conspires in helping you
to achieve it.”
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Endurance
Over the years, there has been a significant growth in the application of unmanned
aerial systems (UAS). UAS are also commonly known as unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). UAS are used in applications such as border security, reconnaissance, aerial
survey, search and rescue, to name a few, and military and scientific research. The
growth in these types of aircraft systems can be attributed to a number of benefits,
such as low cost, lack of risk to a human pilot in dangerous missions and the ability
to conduct lengthy missions which may otherwise be cumbersome for a human pilot.
In 2009, a strategic research partnership agreement was signed between BAE
Systems and the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan). As part of this part-
nership, the Centre for Energy and Power Management (CEPM) was setup and one
of the research objectives of CEPM was to achieve longer endurance in UAS [5].
Long endurance is not just defined in terms of longer flight durations, such as con-
tinuous flights for days or months. Instead, the research also focused on achieving
endurance from the following aspects:
1. Intelligent Energy Management Systems
In this aspect, the research focused on the development of intelligent manage-
ment algorithms/systems that could turn different parts of aircraft systems on
or off to maintain the current state of the aircraft with minimum energy re-
quirement. The goal here was to save energy by turning off systems that were
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otherwise not required during that time. The energy saved could later be used
to increase the duration of the flight, thereby adding endurance to the aircraft.
These algorithms/systems were to be designed for seamless integration with
existing aircraft systems.
2. Fault Tolerant Control
Aircraft systems like any other system are prone to failure. This aspect of
the research was to investigate the development of technology that can add
endurance to an aircraft in case of failure. For example, consider an extreme
case, where a section of an aircraft wing detaches from the aircraft body due
to structural failure or battle damage. In this case, endurance could be added
by developing systems that attempt to maintain flight following such a severe
failure. In general, the goal here was to increase the endurance of the aircraft
system in the presence of failures.
This thesis is part of the research effort by the CEPM in achieving longer en-
durance in UAS from the fault tolerant control aspect. To this end, this research
aims to add fault tolerance capabilities to flight control systems, in order to add
endurance to the aircraft in the presence of failures. In a nutshell, this research
investigates the development of technology to obtain fault tolerant flight control.
1.2 Research Overview
Fault tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS) have the ability to tolerate compo-
nent failures automatically while maintaining overall system stability and acceptable
performance in the event of failures [7–9]. Their purpose is to detect, identify and
accommodate any type of failure that may occur during flight [10,11]. Such systems
can be implemented by developing failure detection, identification and accommoda-
tion (FDIA) schemes. There are two parts to an FDIA scheme. The first part is the
failure detection and identification (FDI) and the second part is the failure accom-
modation (FA), where the necessary actions are taken to accommodate the failure.
Two of the major types of failure in an aircraft system are sensor and actuator
3
Chapter 1. Introduction
failures [10,12,13]. Therefore in this research, two schemes are developed:
• Sensor failure detection, identification and accommodation (SFDIA)
• Actuator failure detection, identification and accommodation (AFDIA)
A number of techniques exist in the literature that address fault tolerance issues
in manned and unmanned aircraft systems. These techniques are, for example,
Kalman filters [14], neural networks (NNs) [11], fuzzy logic [15] and a combination
of the previous techniques [16]. Over the past three decades there has been an
increasing interest in the application of NN for SFDIA and AFDIA [11,17–19]. This
can be attributed to the following two properties of the NN [11]:
• Learning ability and adaptation
NN can learn to represent a system using past data collected from the system.
This is very useful where the mathematical model of the system might be
limited. Furthermore, they have the added ability to adapt or learn on-line
using the current data of the system to improve its representation on-line [20–
22].
• Application to non-linear systems
An aircraft system can be significantly non-linear during various phases of
the flight. However, most of the solutions in the literature rely on a linearised
model of the aircraft for fault tolerant control applications [10]. NNs have been
shown to successfully represent highly non-linear systems, hence the suitability
for this research [12,23].
In this research, the developed SFDIA and AFDIA schemes are based on the
fully connected cascade (FCC) NN. In this NN architecture, all possible forward
connections are made, with the neurons arranged in a cascade. This architecture
has been studied extensively by Wilamowski [24–28]. Compared to the popular
NN architecture - the multi-layer perceptron (MLP) - the FCC architecture is more
powerful, compact and efficient. This thesis details the first attempts at exploit-
ing the benefits of the FCC NN architecture for SFDIA and AFDIA in aerospace
applications.
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The SFDIA scheme developed in this research addresses failures in the pitch,
roll and yaw rate gyroscope sensors of an aircraft system. The endurance of an
aircraft can be increased during failures of these three sensors, using the SFDIA
scheme. In total, 7 failure cases are considered over 105 failure experiments. In this
scheme, FCC NN based pitch, roll and yaw rate sensor estimators are developed
which replace the faulty sensor, once a failure is detected.
The AFDIA scheme developed in this research, aims to increase the endurance
of an aircraft following a 66% loss of wing surface. The scheme employs a FCC
NN based roll controller, which adapts on-line to control the aircraft, and maintain
flight with the wing surface missing. Due to the quick adaptation of the FCC NN
based roll controller, the controller is able to adapt to the post failure dynamics of
the aircraft and maintain flight. Note that the percentage of wing surface loss is
defined by the aircraft model used in the simulator. Further discussion on this is
presented in Chapter 5.
Table 1.1: Hardware specifications of the MacBook Pro laptop on which this research
was conducted.
MacBook Pro Laptop Specifications
Processor 2.3 GHz intel Core i7 Quad Core
Memory 8 GB 1333 MHz DDR3
Graphics AMD Radeon HD 6750M 1024 MB
For this research, the X-Plane 9 flight simulator is used for data collection and as
a test bed. This simulator was the main framework for testing the systems developed
by the CEPM research team. This simulator produces realistic flight simulations due
to which its professional version is certified by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) for pilot training [29, 30]. It is also used by the likes of NASA, Cessna
and Japan Airlines, to train pilots, develop concept designs and flight testing [30,
31]. This research was conducted on a MacBook Pro laptop, the specifications of
which are presented in Table 1.1. Additionally, the schemes developed here were
coded using the C programming language and the LAPACK library [32] was used
to implement the NN.
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1.3 Research Contribution
The main contribution of this research can be summarised as follows:
1. The overall objective of this research is to add endurance to an aircraft system
in the presence of failures. This is achieved by developing the FCC NN based
SFDIA and AFDIA schemes, and is the first reported instance of FCC NN
being applied to fault tolerance applications, especially in aircraft systems.
2. An SFDIA scheme based on the FCC NN is developed to add fault tolerance
to an aircraft following a pitch, roll or yaw rate sensor failure. This scheme
can add endurance to an aircraft system suffering said failures.
3. In the AFDIA scheme, the FCC NN is used to control the roll of an aircraft
after a failure, which adds endurance to an aircraft following a 66% loss of
wing surface. This is a severe case of failure where a major section of the
aircraft wing breaks from the main structure, resulting in an extreme loss of
lift. The scheme succeeds in flying the aircraft following a 66% wing surface
loss.
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis
In this section, the structure of the thesis is outlined to provide an overview to the
reader.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on fault tolerant flight control
systems (FTCS). This covers the industry wide practice and various relevant meth-
ods presented in the open literature.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature behind the decision for the selection of the FCC
NN architecture and the neuron by neuron (NBN) learning algorithm for this re-
search.
Chapter 4 presents the development of the FCC NN based SFDIA scheme. It
discusses the development process, experiments and the results obtained from the
SFDIA scheme.
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Chapter 5 discusses the challenges encountered while using the X-Plane simulator
for this research.
Chapter 6 presents the development of the FCC NN based AFDIA scheme. It
discusses the development process, experiments and the results obtained from the
AFDIA scheme.
Chapter 7 provides a conclusive summary of the research conducted followed by
proposed future work.
1.5 Publications by the Author
In this section, a list of articles published or submitted for publication is presented.
The articles are based on the research presented in this thesis.
1. “Sensor Failure Detection, Identification and Accommodation using Fully Con-
nected Cascade Neural Network”, Saed Hussain, Maizura Mokhtar, Joe M.
Howe. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics (Impact: 6.5) (Accepted
for Publication on 6/09/2014, In Process for Publishing.)
2. “Aircraft Sensor Estimation for Fault Tolerant Flight Control System using
Fully Connected Cascade Neural Network”, Saed Hussain, Maizura Mokhtar,
Joe M. Howe, International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN),
Aug 4-9, 2013.
3. “Adaptive and Online Health Monitoring System for Autonomous Aircraft”,
Maizura Mokhtar, Sergio Z. Bayo, Saed Hussain, Joe M. Howe, AIAA Guid-
ance, Navigation, and Control Conference, Aug 13, 2012.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Fault Tolerant
Flight Control
2.1 Overview
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with the necessary background
knowledge for the research presented in this thesis. In Section 2.2, the concept
behind fault tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS) is introduced. In Section 2.3,
an overview of the literature on FTFCS is presented. The view of the author on the
current industry practice is presented in Section 2.4 and finally the chapter concludes
with Section 2.5.
2.2 Fault Tolerant Flight Control System
Fault tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS) are systems that have the ability to
tolerate component failures automatically while maintaining overall system stability
and acceptable performance in the event of failures [7–9]. Generally speaking, any
fault tolerant control system (FTCS) can be divided into two categories: passive
(PFTCS) and active (AFTCS). PFTCS are fixed controllers that are designed to be
robust against a class of failures. This category of controller has limited fault toler-
ant capability and lacks any mechanism to actively detect and identify developing
faults [7, 33, 34].
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In contrast to this, AFTCS actively monitors the system for the presence of faults
and takes necessary actions to compensate for the failures [7, 33, 34]. The research
presented in this thesis falls under the AFTCS category of controller. In the liter-
ature, such systems are also known as self-repairing, reconfigurable, re-structurable
and self-designing control systems [7]. From the point of view of functionality, these
controllers are also known as failure, detection, identification and accommodation
(FDIA) schemes [7]. In this research, the FDIA schemes terminology is used to de-
fine the developed systems. Therefore, a FTFCS can be achieved by implementing
an FDIA scheme [11,13]. There are two part to an FDIA scheme [7,11]:
• Failure detection and identification (FDI), which detects significant ab-
normalities and identifies the cause.
• Failure accommodation (FA), which takes the necessary action to recon-
figure the control system to compensate for the impact of the failure.
Two of the major types of failure in an aircraft system are sensor and actuator
failures [10,12,13]. Therefore in this research, two schemes are developed:
• Sensor failure detection, identification and accommodation (SFDIA)
• Actuator failure detection, identification and accommodation (AF-
DIA)
The key ingredient in any FTFCS is the availability of redundancy in the system,
which plays an important role in the FDI stage [11, 34, 35]. There are two types of
redundancy: hardware and analytical [11, 35]. In hardware redundancy, identical
sensors are used to measure the same parameter. For example, consider an SFDIA
scheme using hardware redundancy as shown in Figure 2.1. A voting scheme is
employed to detect and identify any faulty sensor [12,36,37]. If the signal from one
sensor differs significantly from the remaining two sensors, the sensor is declared as
faulty. Sensor failure accommodation is achieved by replacing the faulty sensor with
one of the two remaining sensors.
In the aircraft industry, the state of the art practice to achieve FTFCS is to
implement high levels of hardware redundancy [7, 10, 11, 36]. For example, Airbus
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A320/330/340/380 has triple or quadruple redundant actuation, sensor and flight
control systems [36]. This is mainly because the failure detection and identification
(FDI) mechanism is quick and reliable; and fault accommodation (FA) is easily
achieved by switching to the fault free hardware. However, hardware redundancy
has serious cost, power and weight implications, especially for aircraft such as UAVs.
Due to these implications, analytical redundancy has become a far more appealing
approach for FTFCS [11].
Generally in analytical redundancy, a model of the monitored system is used
to generate signals that would otherwise be generated by redundant hardware (see
Figure 2.2). In its simplest form, the difference between the model estimate and
the measured reading is used to generate an error residual. This residual is then
monitored to detect and identify faults [37].
Sensor'1'
Sensor'2'
Sensor'3'
Pitch&(q)& Vo,ng'Scheme'
Fault'Free'
Measurement' Flight'Controller'
Figure 2.1: Block diagram of hardware redundancy.
System'Model'
Sensor'
Residual'
Threshold)Logic)
(Residual'>'or'<''
than'threshold)'
Flight'Controller'
Fault'Free'Measurement'
Figure 2.2: Block diagram of analytical redundancy.
2.3 Related Work
In Figure 2.3, a generic structure of the analytical redundancy based FDIA scheme
for FTCS is presented. Based on this figure, the development of FTCS can be
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divided into 3 separate steps [35]. The first step is to generate the residual signal
using a mathematical model of the system. In some FDIA schemes, there are several
analytical models, each of which is sensitive to different types of fault. Once the
residual is generated, the next step is to evaluate the residual to decide if any
failure has occurred. This is the step where the failure is detected (FD) and the
source and type of failure are identified (FI). A simple way of implementing this
step is to use a constant residual threshold. When a residual crosses a threshold,
the fault corresponding to that residual is instantaneously detected and identified.
More sophisticated methods of residual evaluation may consist of adaptive residual
thresholds or based on statistical decision theories such as generalised likelihood ratio
(GLR), cumulative sum (CUSUM) or sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) [7,
11, 35]. As is obvious, the two steps discussed so far are collectively known as the
failure detection and identification (FDI) part of the FDIA scheme.
Figure 2.3: A generic structure of the analytical redundancy based failure detection
identification and accommodation (FDIA) scheme. Note that this figure is taken
from [35].
The final step to developing an FTCS is the failure accommodation (FA), where
the controller is reconfigured on-line in response to the faults. This step could in-
clude just swapping to a different controller that can handle the fault or adapting
the controller in response to the fault. In addition, the fault can be accommodated
by reconfiguring the input signals and/or the output control of the controller. For
example, a faulty sensor signal can be replaced by an analytical model and actu-
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ator failures can be compensated by distributing the actuation on the remaining
actuators.
Some of the popular approaches in the literature for the analytical models are
the use of Kalman filters, Luenberger observers, fault detection filters and neu-
ral networks, to name a few [7, 11, 17, 35, 38]. Kalman filters are usually used in
multiple model based FDI schemes. In these schemes, a bank of Kalman filters is
generated off-line. Of these models, one of them represents the normal mode of
the system, while the others are sensitive to different types of fault. Failure detec-
tion is achieved by using a hypothesis testing algorithm that monitors the residuals
from each Kalman filter and assigns a probability to each of the fault hypothe-
ses [13, 33, 35]. Some well known approaches to FDI schemes based on multiple
models of Kalman filters are multiple model adaptive estimation (MMAE) and in-
teracting multiple model (IMM) [7,35].
With inspiration from the multiple model based FDI schemes, several multiple
model (MM) based FDIA schemes for fault tolerant flight control systems have
been developed [7, 11, 13, 33, 35]. Generally in the MM method for FTFCS, a bank
of models is used to describe the system under normal operating mode and under
various fault conditions, such as sensor or actuator failures. There is a model for
every fault considered. For each of these models, a controller is designed (off-line)
that can be used to accommodate the failure. Failure detection and identification is
performed by using these fault models and, based on a suitable switching mechanism,
the corresponding controller is selected for failure accommodation.
There are a number of variants to the MM method [33]. For example, in [39],
Boskovic and Mehra applied the multiple model switching and tuning (MMST)
method to add fault tolerance to the flight control system of a tailless advanced
fighter aircraft (TAFA), in the presence of wing damage. As described earlier, in
their system, there is a model for each fault scenario, which they refer to as iden-
tification models. And for each fault model, there is a corresponding controller.
This formed a massively parallel architecture of identification models and their cor-
responding controllers. When a failure occurs, a switching mechanism quickly iden-
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tifies the model that is the closest to the current damage mode, and switches to its
corresponding controller. In addition, examples of IMM and MMAE based FDIA
schemes for FTFCS can be found in [40–44]. For instance, in [43] and [44], the
authors have developed an interacting multiple model (IMM) based FTFCS. They
demonstrated the effectiveness of the system on a longitudinal vertical takeoff and
landing (VTOL) aircraft model, which was subjected to single actuator, sensor and
component failure at a given time.
A special case of the MM based FTFCS is the propulsion controlled aircraft
(PCA). In this case, the only anticipated fault is complete hydraulic failure. The
only way to control the aircraft is using the engine throttles. In 1995, NASA Dryden
Flight Research Centre demonstrated the PCA method by successfully landing a
MD-11 and an F-15 aircraft using just propulsion only control, following a complete
hydraulic failure [33,45–47].
Most of the early work on analytical redundancy is based on observers and
Kalman filters [7, 11, 12, 18, 37, 48]. These techniques relied on the linear time in-
variant mathematical models of the systems. In aircraft systems, the assumption
that the system is linear is not often valid throughout the entirety of the flight en-
velope [13, 17, 48]. Therefore, these techniques might perform inadequately in the
non-linear regions of the flight envelope. In addition, these techniques can suffer from
modelling discrepancies between real and mathematical models of the system [17].
Recent literature has seen efforts made to address these issues, especially with the
linearity assumption of the Kalman filters [49]. Several improved versions of the
Kalman filter have been developed and applied to various fault tolerance and state
estimation problems in non-linear systems [14,16,17,35,50,51]. For example in [17],
an SFDIA scheme for the pitch rate sensor of the aircraft based on the extended
Kalman filter (EKF) is presented, due to its applicability to non-linear problems
and its popularity.
Over the past three decades, there has been an increasing interest in the appli-
cation of neural networks (NN) for FTFCS [10,11,17,18,52–54]. This is mainly due
to their innate ability to model both linear and non-linear systems [11, 52]. Unlike
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Kalman filters, they do not require a detailed mathematical description of the sys-
tem. They develop a structure based on training data instead. In addition, they
can also be made to adapt on-line, whilst the system is in use; in order to adapt
to the dynamic conditions of the environment and the system dynamics. On-line
adaptation is provided by the on-line learning algorithm.
In [17], two SFDIA schemes for the pitch rate sensor of the aircraft are compared.
Of the two schemes, one is based on an NN while the other uses EKF. From the
comparison results, the authors concluded that the NN based SFDIA scheme out-
performed the EKF based scheme. In [54], Guo and Musgrave presented a SFDIA
scheme for sensors in the space shuttle main engine (SSME). Their scheme is based
on the auto-associative multi-layer perceptron (MLP) NN, trained using the error
back propagation learning algorithm (EBP).
Napolitano et al. presented an SFDIA and an AFDIA scheme in [11], which are
based on the MLP NN. They studied the developed schemes using a mathematical
model of the B747-200 aircraft model. The SFDIA scheme is capable of accommo-
dating failures in the pitch, roll and yaw rate gyro sensors. In this scheme, MLP
NN based estimators replace the respective faulty sensors. The developed AFDIA
scheme is able to accommodate failures in the rudder, elevator and aileron control
surfaces. In this case, MLP NN based controllers (for pitch, roll and yaw) are used to
compensate for the failure by producing the appropriate control response. In [53], the
performance of an MLP NN and an extended minimal resource allocating (EMRA)
NN were evaluated for airspeed sensor failure. To evaluate the performance, real
data collected from the jet-powered WVU YF-22 research UAV was used. They
concluded that both the NNs were suitable to accommodate airspeed sensor failure,
as part of an SFDIA scheme.
Samy, Postlethwaite and Gu proposed a SFDIA scheme using the radial basis
function (RBF) NN in [10] and [37]. The scheme is aimed at accommodating failures
in the pitch rate, normal acceleration and angle of attack sensors. Out of the 30
SFDIA experiments conducted, only 2 faults went undetected. In [55], the MLP
NN was used again to develop an SFDIA scheme for the pitch, roll and yaw rate
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sensors of a model UAV. Liu et al. developed an FTFCS using the MLP NN which
is capable of handling an aircraft with primary control surfaces failures.
Additional examples of the application of NNs for FTFCS can be found in the
following references [20, 38, 56–58]. A notable project on the application of an NN
for flight control systems is the NASA Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS)
flight research project at NASA Dryden Flight Research Centre [22, 59]. The aim
here is to use the learning ability of the NNs to develop software to aid the pilot
with controlling the aircraft following a failure of a control surface or damage to the
airframe. The developed NN based control systems were tested on a highly modified
F-15B aircraft.
When it comes to NN based applications, including FTFCS problems, the pop-
ular choice for the NN architecture is the MLP NN [11,24,48,60]. In this thesis, the
schemes are based on the fully connected cascade (FCC) NN. This architecture is far
more efficient than the MLP, as it requires fewer neurons to solve a problem [24,60].
Therefore the efficiency of any MLP based FTFCS can be improved by updating it
to use the FCC NN instead.
2.4 Industry Practice
To the knowledge of the author, the analytical redundancy based fault tolerant
approach is still an idea limited to the literature. The practice in the aircraft industry
is to use high levels of hardware redundancy [36]. However, an example of analytical
redundancy can be found in the Airbus A380 aircraft, for a case of a failure called the
oscillatory failure case (OFC) [36, 61]. One of the reasons for the limited use could
be that the hardware redundancy based approach is much simpler to implement
compared to developing an analytical redundancy based system.
The author believes that with the growing UAV sector of the aerospace industry,
analytical approaches will eventually be common practice in the industry. Analytical
redundancy will save cost, space, weight and power, which are especially limited in
UAVs.
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2.5 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to provide the reader with an overview of the literature
on fault tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS). For additional reviews of the lit-
erature, interested readers are advised to refer to the following survey/introductory
publications on FTFCS [7,9,33,62,63]. In the next chapter, a review of the literature
on neural networks (NNs) is provided, to select the NN architecture and learning
algorithm for this research.
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“We must believe that we are gifted for something, and that this thing, at
whatever cost, must be attained.”
– Marie Curie
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Chapter 3
Neural Network Architecture and
Learning Algorithm
3.1 Overview
The human brain is a complex and magnificent organ, stemming from millions of
years of evolution. Amongst other types of cell, the brain is comprised of ≈86
billion neurons, interconnected in a vast mesh [64,65], referred to as biological neural
networks (BNNs). Scientist, doctors and engineers alike, have been captivated with
comprehending the inner workings of the brain. This is not simply for the yielding of
psychological and medical benefits, but also from the desire to design and construct
machines which are essentially near human; or at the very minimum, possess the
human ability to learn and adapt. To this end, the field of artificial neural networks
(ANNs) was conceived, born and continues to grow. The research presented in this
thesis utilises ANNs.
In this chapter, a brief introduction to ANNs is presented in Section 3.2. The
ANN architecture used in this research is selected in Section 3.3 and in Section 3.4,
the learning algorithm to train the ANN is decided. An insight into the number
of neurons and the generalisation ability is presented in Section 3.5. A summary
of the reasons behind the selected ANN architecture and the learning algorithm is
presented in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7, a brief comparison between the neuron by
neuron (NBN) and the Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) learning algorithms is presented.
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Sections 3.8 to 3.10 detail the implementation of the NBN algorithm and the training
steps it entails. The settings for the ANN used in this research are presented in
Section 3.11 and finally the chapter concludes with Section 3.12.
3.2 Brief Introduction to Artificial Neural Net-
works
ANN are simple mathematical representation of the BNN. Similar to the BNN,
the ANN consists of processing elements called neurons. These artificial neurons
are simplistic representation of the biological neurons. Unlike the BNN, where the
neurons are interconnected in a mesh, the neurons in the ANN are connected in an
organised manner based on the architecture of the ANN. From this point on, ANN
will be referred to as NN only. There are two main parts to consider when it comes
to NNs: NN architecture and learning algorithm.
One of the most popular NN architectures is the multilayer perceptron (MLP)
architecture [24, 60]. In this architecture, the neurons of the NN are arranged in
layers. In the MLP NN presented in Figure 3.1 there are three layers of neurons.
The first layer of neurons that receives the inputs to the NN is called the input layer.
The layer of neurons that emits the output of the NN is called the output layer.
And the layer between the input and output layers is referred to as the hidden layer.
The connections between these layers of neurons are weighted (w). Each of these
neurons sum up the incoming weighted signals from the neurons or NN inputs from
the previous layers and pass the sum through a function referred to as the activation
function (f). Based on the summation value and the activation function, the neuron
emits an output. It is these connection weights where the NN stores/learns its
functionality. These weights can be adapted using a suitable learning algorithm to
train the NN to perform a function. This learning can be off-line, when the NN is
not in use, or on-line while the NN is actively in use.
To train the NN for a function, data representing that function must be available.
For example, if the NN is to replicate a sensor, then input data along with the sensor
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Input	   Output	  
Input Layer 
Output Layer 
Hidden Layer 
Figure 3.1: The multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural network (NN).
measurements are required to train the NN. The learning algorithm used in the
training process maps the inputs to the desired sensor measurement. The dataset
used by the NN for training is called the training dataset. The individual dataset (a
pair of inputs and output) is know as a training pattern. Once the NN is trained,
its functionality must be validated or verified. This is achieved by using a different
dataset, known as the validation dataset.
When it comes to learning algorithms for NNs, it could be said that the popular
choice is the error back-propagation algorithm (EBP) [60, 66]. This algorithm is
often used with the MLP network topology. The process of training a network for
a function using this algorithm, can be divided into two phases:
1. Forward propagation
2. Backward propagation
In the forward propagation phase, the input signal is propagated from the input
neuron layer to the output neuron layer. No weights are adapted, therefore no
learning takes place. The network generated outputs are compared against the
desired output for that pattern of inputs. The difference between the desired and
the actual NN output is the error. In the backward propagation phase, the errors
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calculated are then propagated back from layer to layer and the weights connecting
them are adapted to minimise the error using the learning algorithm. It is in this
phase that the weights are adapted and learning takes place. The two phases are then
repeated using new patterns or old patterns until the error is within an acceptable
range. This is the process in which NNs learn their functionality.
Ever since the first NN model was proposed in 1943 by McCulloch and Pitts [67],
NNs have been used in wide range of applications. For example, NNs have been
used in forecasting weather in [68]. In [69], a review of NNs for pharmaceutical
applications is presented. In [70], Atiya reviews NNs for corporate bankruptcies and
developed a new NN based bankruptcy prediction model. NNs have also been used
in the field of power electronics. An introductory review of the NN applications for
power electronics is presented by Bose in [71]. These are just some of the examples
of the extensive field of NN applications.
In this research, NNs are used for estimating aircraft sensor measurements and
controlling aircraft attitude. In the remaining sections of this chapter, an NN archi-
tecture and learning algorithm is selected for the research presented in this thesis.
3.3 Selecting a Neural Network Architecture
Although the MLP architecture is the popular choice for NN applications, it is not
very efficient when compared against architectures with connections across layers.
The Fully Connected Cascade (FCC) architecture presented in Figure 3.2 is an
example of an architecture with connections across layers. In this architecture, all
possible forward connections are made with the neurons arranged in a cascade. This
architecture has been widely studied by Professor Bogdan M. Wilamowski and his
colleagues in [24,25,28,60,66,72–75]. They have shown that the FCC is more efficient
than the MLP, as it requires fewer neurons to solve a problem.
A common benchmarking problem for NNs is the parity-N problem. The parity-
N or N-bit parity function is a mapping defined on 2N binary vectors that indicates
whether the sum of the N elements of every binary vector is odd or even [75–77].
In its simplest form, the parity-2 is an exclusive-or (XOR) logic function, where
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Figure 3.2: The Fully Connected Cascade (FCC) NN architecture. The presented
NN has 2 inputs, 1 output and the bias input.
N represents the number of inputs. Depending on the NN architecture, different
numbers of neurons and weights are required to solve the same parity problem. The
larger the N, the more difficult it is to solve the problem.
Table 3.1: Comparison of FCC and MLP architecture to
solve the Parity-N problem.
Parity Architecture No. Neurons No. Weights
3 MLP 4 16
FCC 2 9
7 MLP 8 64
FCC 3 27
15 MLP 15 256
FCC 4 70
31 MLP 32 1024
FCC 5 170
63 MLP 64 4096
FCC 6 399
Note: This table is adapted from [25, 60]. The MLP architecture is made of 1
hidden layer.
In Table 3.1, the minimum number of neurons and weights required for different
parity problems using the FCC and MLP architectures are presented [25,60]. With
just 6 neurons and 399 weights, the FCC is able to solve the parity-63 problem. This
is in comparison to the MLP which requires 64 neurons and 4096 weights. Similarly,
to solve the parity-31 problem, the FCC requires 5 neurons and 170 weights, whereas
the MLP requires 32 neurons and 1024 weights. It is clearly evident from this table
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that the FCC is far more efficient than the popular MLP architecture. It is able to
solve the same problem with significantly fewer neurons and weights.
In addition to the efficiency, another benefit of the FCC architecture is that it
is relatively easy to find an optimal size of the NN to solve a problem. With the
MLP architecture there is a large number of possibilities by varying the number of
neurons and hidden layers. The FCC on the other hand, simply requires a search
for the number of neurons in cascade.
Despite these benefits, the MLP architecture is far more popular. According to
Wilamowski, one of the reasons for the popularity is the easy availability [25]. The
MLP is one of the oldest architectures and is easy to write training software for. It
is also readily available on popular research platforms such as MATLAB.
3.4 Selecting a Learning Algorithm
When it comes to learning algorithms for NNs, the error back-propagation (EBP) al-
gorithm [60,78,79] is the most popular choice [25,27,60,80]. It is relatively simple to
implement and can handle problems with an unlimited number of patterns. This al-
gorithm is commonly used along with the popular MLP NN architecture. Due to its
simplicity, it is easy to adapt the EBP algorithm for more efficient NN architectures,
which allow connections across layers, such as the FCC NN. However, this algorithm
is known to be slow and ineffective, especially when compared against the Levenberg-
Marquardt (LM) or Neuron by Neuron (NBN) algorithm [25,26,60,73,74,80,81].
A comparison of the EBP, LM and NBN algorithms [60] is presented in Table 3.2.
These algorithms are used to train the parity-4 problem using the MLP architecture.
The MLP architecture has 1 hidden layer with 4 neurons. The maximum number of
training iterations is set to 100 for both the LM and NBN algorithm. In the case of
the EBP, this is set to 100000. The training process is repeated 100 times for each
of the algorithms, with randomly generated initial weights in the range of ±1. The
sum squared error (SSE) is used to evaluate the training process and the expected
SSE is set to 0.001.
From the results presented in Table 3.2, one can conclude that the LM and
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Table 3.2: Comparison of the averages of different algorithms to solve the
parity-4 problem using the MLP architecture. This table is taken from [60].
Algorithms Success Rate (%) No. Iterations Training Time (msec)
EBP 68 12036.01 5348.52
LM 100 23.41 26.64
NBN 100 23.24 25.64
Note: For EBP momentum value: 0.5, learning constant: 1.
NBN algorithms require similar time and number of iterations to solve the parity-4
problem. However, the popular EBP algorithm requires 500 times more iterations
and 200 times longer in training time for the same problem. In addition, the success
rate of the EBP is 68% compared to 100% for the LM and NBN algorithms. The
success rate of the EBP can be improved by using additional neurons to solve the
problem. These results encapsulate how slow and inefficient the EBP algorithm is
compared to algorithms such as the LM and NBN algorithm.
In the next section it will be shown why it is desirable to have an NN solution
with a minimal number of neurons.
3.5 Number of Neurons and Generalisation Abil-
ity
It is quite often the case that too many neurons are used to solve a problem using
a NN. With an increasing number of neurons, the NN converges to a solution faster
and to smaller errors. However, this approach of increasing the number of neurons
to quickly converge to a solution does have some issues. With an increasing number
of neurons, the NN loses its generalisation ability [24, 25, 60, 73, 81]. This is the
ability of the NN to perform well on patterns it has never seen before. If too many
neurons are used, then the NN may overfit itself to the training patterns and respond
poorly to new patterns. On the other hand if fewer neurons are used, the training
error might not be very small, but the NN may produce much better results on new
patterns. Therefore, in order to have good generalisation ability, the NN should use
as few neurons as possible to obtain a reasonable training error [24, 25,60,73,81].
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Figure 3.3: The TSK fuzzy controller control surface with 8×6 = 48 defuzzification
rules. Note that this figure is taken from [24].
To demonstrate this, Wilamowski presented the results of finding the best NN
solution to replace a fuzzy controller in [24, 25]. In Figure 3.3, the defuzzification
rules and the required control surface for the Takagi, Sugeno and Kang or TSK fuzzy
controller is illustrated. The defuzzification rules are used to train and develop the
NN controller. The controller is based on the FCC architecture and to find a good
solution to the controller, the number of neurons is varied. Figure 3.4 shows the
results of an FCC NN controller using 3 (12 weights) and 4 (18 weights) neurons. In
Figure 3.5, the results using 5 (25 weights) and 8 (52 weights) neurons are presented.
In the captions of these figures, the training error for each of these FCC neural
network controller designs is presented. As the number of neurons increases the
training error decreases. For example, with 3 neurons the training error is 0.21049,
whereas it is 1.118 × 10−5 using 8 neurons. However, it can be seen that with
increasing size of the NN, the results become worse. According to Wilamowski, the
best results were obtained using 4 neurons with a training error of 0.049061.
In conclusion, although with increasing number of neurons the training error can
be decreased, the NN will lose its generalisation ability. For optimal performance,
the NN must have as few neurons as possible.
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(a) Using 3 neurons (12 weights). Training Error = 0.21049
(b) Using 4 neurons (18 weights). Training Error = 0.049061
Figure 3.4: TSK Control Surface using 3 and 4 neuron FCC neural networks. Note
that this figure is taken from [24].
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(a) Using 5 neurons (25 weights). Training Error = 0.023973
(b) Using 8 neurons (52 weights). Training Error = 1.118× 10−5
Figure 3.5: TSK Control Surface using 5 and 8 neuron FCC neural networks. Note
that this figure is taken from [24].
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3.6 FCC NN architecture and NBN learning al-
gorithm
In Section 1.3, the popular MLP NN architecture was compared against the FCC
architecture. It was summarised that the MLP architecture is not very efficient
when compared against the architecture with connections across layers, such as
the FCC. The MLP requires significantly more neurons to solve a problem when
compared against the FCC architecture. Therefore, using the FCC instead of the
popular MLP, will have added benefits in terms of processing overhead. In addition,
using the FCC can save development time when compared against the MLP. With
the MLP, there is large number of possibility of designs (by varying the number of
neurons and hidden layers) to experiment with. However, with the FCC, there is just
the number of neurons to experiment with and usually a suitable solution is found
within a couple of trials. Based on these conclusions, the FCC NN architecture is
used for this research.
In addition to the NN architecture, the popular EBP algorithm was compared
against the LM and NBN algorithm in Section 3.4. Table 3.2 shows that the EBP
is not only slow, but is ineffective when compared against algorithms such as LM
and NBN. It requires significantly more number of iteration to solve a problem
compared to LM and NBN. In addition to being slow and ineffective, the EBP is
not powerful enough to solve problems with limited neurons when compared against
the NBN [24,25,60].
From the discussion in Section 3.5, it was concluded that in order to retain the
generalisation ability of the NN, as few neurons as possible should be used. However,
this cannot be achieved using the EBP. The EBP requires more neurons to solve a
problem when compared against the NBN [24, 25, 60]. Therefore, in this research,
the NBN algorithm is used to train the FCC NN based applications.
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3.7 The LM and The NBN Algorithm
It is known that the LM algorithm is more efficient compared to the EBP learning
algorithm [25, 27, 66, 80]. However, the LM algorithm does have some limitations
that limits its applicability to wide range of NN applications. The LM algorithm is
a combination of the gradient descent algorithm and the Gauss-Newton algorithm.
In the LM algorithm, the weights are updated using the following update rule [81]:
wn+1 = wn − (JTJ + µI)−1JTe (3.1)
where
n : is the index of the iteration
wn+1 : is the new weights vector
wn : is the previous weights vector
J : is the Jacobian matrix
I : is the identity matrix
e : is the error vector
µ : is the combination coefficient (always positive)
Aircraft Sensor Estimation for Fault Tolerant Flight
Control System using Fully Connected Cascade
Neural Network
Saed Hussain, Student Member, IEEE, Maizura Mokhtar, Member, IEEE, and Joe M. Howe
Abstract—Flight control systems that are tolerant to failures
can increase the endurance of an aircraft in case of a failure. The
two major types of failure are sensor and actuator failures. This
paper focuses on the failure of the gyro sensors in an aircraft.
The neuron by neuron (NBN) learning algorithm, which is an
improved version of the Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algorithm is
combined with the fully connected cascade (FCC) neural network
(NN) architecture to estimate an aircraft’s sensor measurements.
Compared to other NN and learning algorithms, this combination
can produce good sensor estimates with relatively few neurons.
The estimators are developed and evaluated using flight data
collected from the X-Plane flight simulator. The developed sensor
estimators can replicate a sensor’s measurements with as little
as 2 neurons. The results reflect the combined power of the NBN
algorithm and the FCC NN architecture.
This is achieved by calculating the vector jp,m as the
patterns are applied. This vector is the Jacobian row for pattern
p and network output neuron m.
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Figure 3.6: Jacobian Matrix J
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Figure 3.7: The Error Vector e
The key to this weight update rule is solving the matrix J . The Jacobian matrix
J is presented in Figure 3.6, where p is the training pattern; j is the index of the
neuron; wj,x is the x
th connection weight w to neuron j; and m is the index of the
network output neuron. The error ep,m for training pattern p at network output
neuron m is calculated as follows:
ep,m = dp,m − op,m (3.2)
where dp,m is the desired output and op,m is the actual output for training pattern
p at network output neuron m.
In the Jacobian matrix, notice that for every pattern p, there are M rows, where
M is the number of the NN output. Therefore, there are M×P rows in the Jacobian
matrix, where P is the number of training patterns. The elements in a row of the
Jacobian matrix can be organised in terms of the neurons in the NN. For every
neuron j, the number of elements corresponds to the number of weights connected
to the neuron. In other words, there are C columns in the Jacobian matrix, where
C is the number of weights in the NN. Therefore, the size of the Jacobian matrix
can be described as (P ×M) × C. The error vector e is presented in Figure 3.7,
where for every pattern p there are M rows in the vector, therefore a total of M ×P
elements in the vector. Each of the elements in the error vector e is calculated using
equation (3.2).
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Usually the Jacobian matrix is calculated and stored for updating the weights
using equation (3.1). For small to medium size training patters, the LM algorithm
will work smoothly. However, if large training pattern sets are used, there will be
a huge cost in terms of storage memory and computation time. This is because
the number of elements in the Jacobian matrix J is proportional to the number of
patterns P . This is one of the reasons why the LM algorithm is not always preferred
for NN applications [25,26,66].
Apart from the memory requirement, the LM algorithm has several other lim-
itations when compared against the NBN algorithm. The NBN algorithm is an
improved version of the LM algorithm. The main advantages of the NBN algorithm
over the LM algorithm can be summarised as follows [24,82]:
1. Train Neural Network with Connections Across Layers
The LM algorithm as presented in [83], can only handle the MLP architecture.
As discussed in the previous sections, this architecture is inefficient when com-
pared against architectures with connections across layers, such as the FCC.
The NBN algorithm on the other hand can handle both the MLP and the
efficient FCC NN architecture [74].
2. Forward Propagation Only
In the LM algorithm, just like the popular EBP algorithm, there are two stages
to training an NN, namely, forward propagation and backward propagation.
In the LM algorithm [83], for a given pattern, the backward propagation has
to be repeated for every output in the NN. Therefore, calculating the Jaco-
bian matrix rows for those outputs. In the NBN algorithm, there is no need
for backward propagation. All the information required is computed in the
forward propagation phase of the NN training [80]. With a single forward
propagation , all the Jacobian matrix rows corresponding to the NN outputs
can be calculated. This makes the NBN algorithm efficient compared to LM,
especially when an NN with multiple outputs is used [80].
3. No Jacobian Matrix Calculation
Unlike the LM algorithm, with the NBN algorithm, there is no need to compute
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and store the Jacobian matrix with a size that is proportional to the number
of training patterns. This essentially means that the NBN algorithm can be
applied to problems with unlimited patterns [66].
In the next section some basic concepts in NN training are presented, which will
be used to describe the implementation of the NBN algorithm.
3.8 Basic Concepts in Neural Network Training
Figure 3.8: Concept of a neuron.
In Figure 3.8, a neuron j with ni inputs is depicted. If the neuron is in the first
layer of the NN, all its inputs will be connected to the inputs of the NN. Otherwise,
its inputs can be connected to the outputs of other neurons and to the NN inputs.
In this figure, node y is used flexibly either side of the neuron j. It can be used with
one index, yj, to define the output node of neuron j. If two indices are used, yj,i, it
describes the ith input node of neuron j. The output node of neuron j is calculated
using
yj = fj(netj) (3.3)
where fj it the activation function of neuron j and netj is the sum of the weighted
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input nodes (net input) of neuron j. The value of netj is calculated as follows
netj =
ni∑
i=1
wj,iyj,i + wj,0 (3.4)
where yj,i is the i
th input of neuron j, weighted by wj,i; and wj,0 is the bias weight
of neuron j. The slope sj or the derivative of the activation function fj is
sj =
∂yj
∂netj
=
∂fj(netj)
∂netj
(3.5)
The elements of the Jacobian matrix can be calculated by
∂em
∂wm,j
= −yj,iδm,j (3.6)
where δm,j is the signal gain between output neuron m and neuron j. In general,
the signal gain between two neurons k and j, can be calculated as
δk,j = δk,k
k−1∑
i=j
wi,kδi,j (3.7)
where k ≥ j, δk,k = sk is the slope of the activation function of neuron k, wj,k is the
weight between neurons j and k, δk,j is the signal gain through wj,k and other part
of the network connected to wj,k.
Note that the training process of the NN is evaluated using the sum squared error
(SSE) E. For all training patterns and network outputs, the SSE can be calculated
using
E =
1
2
P∑
p=1
M∑
m=1
e2p,m (3.8)
where ep,m is error at the neural network output m and is calculated using equa-
tion (3.2). In the next section, the implementation of the NBN algorithm is dis-
cussed.
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3.9 Implementation of the NBN Algorithm
The implementation of the NBN algorithm can be divided into two main sec-
tions: forward propagation and quasi-Hessian matrix and gradient vector calcu-
lation. These sections are discussed below. Note that the derivation of the NBN
algorithm is not presented in this chapter. Only the details required to implement
the NBN for the FCC NN architecture are presented. Interested readers are recom-
mended to read [1] for an introduction to the LM algorithm and [82] for the complete
derivation of the NBN algorithm from the LM algorithm.
3.9.1 Forward Propagation
In forward propagation, for a pattern p, for each neuron in the NN, do the following:
1. Calculate the net input to the neuron using equation (3.4).
2. Calculate the output of the neuron using equation (3.3).
3. Calculate the slope of the neuron using equation (3.5).
4. Set the current slope of the neuron as the delta (i.e. δk,k = sj).
5. For simplicity, implement equation (3.7) in two steps:
i. Multiply previous deltas through weights and sum.
xk,j =
k−1∑
i=j
wi,jδi,j (3.9)
ii. Multiply this sum by the slope of the neuron.
δk,j = δk,kxk,j = skxk,j (3.10)
At the end of this forward propagation process, the following variables will have
been computed:
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1. Output node values of each neuron. These output nodes are input to other
neurons. Therefore, the output node values are stored in a vector y, which
stores the inputs to each of the neurons of the NN.
2. The slope of each of the neurons.
3. The delta values for the neurons in the NN. For example, in case of the NN
presented in Figure 3.2, at the end of the forward propagation, the delta values
for each of the neurons are:
i. Neuron 1 (n1): δ1,1
ii. Neuron 2 (n2): δ2,2, δ2,1
iii. Neuron 3 (n3): δ3,3, δ3,2, δ3,1
Note that for a pattern p and output neuron n3 in Figure 3.2, the row elements
of the Jacobian matrix can be calculated using the neuron 3 delta values and the y
vector in equation (3.6). For example, the Jacobian row for pattern p and output
neuron m can be described as
jp,m =
[
∂ep,1
∂w1,1
∂ep,1
∂w1,2
· · · ∂ep,1
∂wj,1
∂ep,1
∂wj,2
· · ·
]
(3.11)
Therefore using equation (3.6) and the delta values for neuron 3, the Jacobian
row can be written as
jp,m =
[
δ3,1 × y1 δ3,2 × y2 δ3,3 × y3
]
(3.12)
where, y1, y2 and y3 are the neuron 1, 2 and 3 input vectors respectively.
3.9.2 Computation of the quasi-Hessian Matrix and Gradi-
ent Vector
In the LM algorithm, the entire Jacobian matrix must be calculated over all the
patterns before the weights can be updated using equation (3.1). This has serious
memory limitations, as the size of the Jacobian matrix increases with the number
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of patterns (P ). As mentioned earlier, the NBN algorithm is an improved version
of the LM algorithm. It avoids the need to calculate and store the entire Jacobian
matrix over all the patterns. To achieve this, the weight update rule for the NBN
algorithm is as follows:
wn+1 = wn − (Q+ µI)−1g (3.13)
where Q is the quasi-Hessian matrix and g is the gradient vector. This is just
another form of the LM update rule [82] where
Q = JTJ (3.14)
g = JTe (3.15)
The matrix Q is calculated by summing the quasi-Hessian sub-matrix qp,m for
pattern p and network output neuron m:
Q =
P∑
p=1
M∑
m=1
qp,m (3.16)
The gradient vector g is calculated by summing the gradient sub-vector ηp,m for
pattern p and network output neuron m:
g =
P∑
p=1
M∑
m=1
ηp,m (3.17)
The size of the matrix Q is C ×C and is independent of the number of patterns
and outputs. Compared to the LM algorithm, the NBN algorithm calculates the
matrix Q and vector g directly as the patterns are applied, there by removing
the need to compute and store the Jacobian matrix (J) [82]. This is achieved by
calculating the vector jp,m as the patterns are applied. This vector is the Jacobian
row for pattern p and network output neuron m. Using this vector, the matrix Q
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and vector g can be updated as each pattern is applied using the following equations:
qp,m = j
T
p,mjp,m (3.18)
ηp,m = jp,mep,m (3.19)
In essence, the entire computation of the quasi-Hessian matrix Q and gradient
vector g is reduced to computing a vector jp,m with C elements. The calculation of
the jp,m using equation (3.6) was shown in the forward propagation section. The
matrix Q and vector g is directly calculated as the patterns are applied, without
the need to store and multiply the Jacobian matrix J . The NBN algorithm with
its forward propagation and the calculation of matrix Q and gradient vector g is
presented in Figure 3.9.
3.10 The NBN Training Process
In the previous section, the implementation of the NBN algorithm was presented.
This showed the calculations required to solve the weights update rule presented in
equation (3.13). In this section, the NBN algorithm is organised into a repeatable
training process which could be used to train the NN off-line (batch training) or
on-line. This is similar to the LM training process. In general, the training process
can be described as follows [1]:
1. Note that the NN is first initialised with the randomly generated weights.
2. Propagate the NN forward and calculate the total SSE E using equation (3.8).
3. Update the weights of the NN as directed by equation (3.13).
4. With the new weights, re-evaluate the total SSE E.
5. If the current SSE has increased compared to the previous SSE as a result of
the weight update, then reset the weights to the previous values. Also, increase
the combination coefficient µ by a factor of 10. Then repeat the process from
step 3.
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1: procedure INITIALIZATION(Q, g)
2: Q 0
3: g  0
4: end procedure
5:
6: for all patterns (p = 1 to p = P ) do
7: procedure FORWARD COMPUTATION
8: for all neurons (nn) do
9: for all weights of current neuron (j) do
10: calculate net input (netj)
11: end for
12: calculate neuron output
13: calculate neuron slope (sj)
14: sj =
@Outj(netj)
@netj
15: set current slope as delta
16: for weights to previous neurons (ny) do
17: for previous neurons (nz) do
18: multiply delta through weights
19: then sum
20: end for
21: multiply sum by the slope
22: end for
23: end for
24: for all outputs (m = 1 to m = M ) do
25: calculate error
26: end for
27: end procedure
28:
29: procedure UPDATE(Q, g)
30: for all outputs (m = 1 to m = M ) do
31: calculate vector jp,m
32: calculate sub matrix qp,m
33: calculate sub vector ⌘p,m
34: Q = Q+ qp,m
35: g = g + ⌘p,m
36: end for
37: end procedure
38: end for
39:
40: procedure IMPROVED LM TRAINING
41: follow the LM algorithm training process
42: update rule: Wn+1 = Wn   (Q+ µI) 1g
43: end procedure
Fig. 3. NBN Algorithm Pseudo Code
The initial value of combination coefficient (µ), used in the
weights update rule of the NBN algorithm, is set to 0.01. The
factor by which to increase or decrease this value of µ is 10.
IV. AIRCRAFT SIMULATOR AND SENSORS
Aircraft data is collected using the X-Plane flight simulator
[26]. This simulator produces realistic flight simulations due
to which its professional version is certified by FAA (Federal
Aviation Administration) for pilot training [27], [28]. It is
also used by leading defence contractors, air forces and space
agencies for applications of flight training, concept design and
testing [28].
For this research, the Cessna 172SP aircraft model in X-
Plane is used to collect the flight data. Since the main emphasis
of the work is on sensor estimation, the aircraft is flown by
the provided AI pilot in X-Plane.
It is assumed that the aircraft is equipped with 6 inertial
sensors without any hardware redundancy. The inertial sensors
are 3 gyroscopes (gyros) and 3 accelerometers. They are
mounted along the x, y and z axis of the aircraft. These sensors
are essential components of the attitude/heading reference
system (AHRS) and the inertial navigation system (INS) found
in today’s aircrafts [29], [30].
The outputs of these sensors are as follows:
1) Gyros: pitch (q), roll (p) and yaw (r) rates.
2) Accelerometers: accelerations along the x (ax), y (ay)
and z (az) axis.
V. ESTIMATOR DEVELOPMENT
A. Estimator Neural Network Input/Output and Structure
The paper concentrates on the gyro sensors of the aircraft.
Therefore three gyro sensor estimators are developed, one each
for the (i) pitch, (ii) roll and (iii) yaw rate gyro sensors. The
outputs of these estimators are their respected estimated sensor
rates.
The inputs to the estimators are other sensors’ measure-
ments (excluding the one it is estimating) and the commanded
control values provided by flight control computers. Inputs
to each of these estimators and their respected outputs are
presented in Table I. These inputs are taken at t  1, where t
is the current sample time.
These inputs are chosen because they can have an effect
or cause an effect on the parameter that the sensor is mea-
suring. The relationship between the measured accelerations
and the gyro rates can be derived from the linear acceleration
equations [31] defined as follows:
ax = U˙   rV + qW
ay = V˙   pW + rU (12)
az = W˙   qU + pV
where (U, V,W ) are the velocity along the X, Y and Z
axes, given in body fixed reference frame. The relationships
between the control inputs and the gyro rates can be derived
from the aircraft’s linearized equations of motion [31]. From
the aircraft’s longitudinal equations of motion, the equation
relevant to this paper is as follows [31]:
⇥
q˙
⇤
=
h
Mw
Iy
Mq
Iy
i"w
q
#
+
h
M E
Iy
i⇥
 E
⇤
(13)
where, q˙ is the rate of change of q, w is the vertical velocity
increment and  E is the elevator demand. Mw, M E and
Mq are the pitching moment derivatives due to w,  E and
Figure 3.9: The Pseudo-Code for the NBN algorithm.
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Figure 3.10: The NBN Training Process. This figure is adapted from [1].
6. If the current SSE has decreased compared to the previous SSE, due to the
weights update, then keep the current weights and decrease the combination
coefficient µ by a factor of 10.
7. Repeat the process from step 2 with the new weights, until the current total
SSE is smaller than the required value.
In Figure 3.10, a flow chart for the training process is presented. In the next
section, the general settings used for the development of the NN applications in this
research is presented.
3.11 Neural Network Settings
In the research presented in this thesis, the NNs are initialised with random weights
in the range of ±1.5. The initial value of combination coefficient (µ), used in the
weights update rule of the NBN algorithm, is set to 0.01. The activation function
used by the neurons is the bipolar sigmoid [84], defined as follows:
Outj =
2
1 + e−netj
− 1 (3.20)
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where netj is the sum of the weighted inputs to neuron j and Outj is the output of
neuron j. This activation function produces an output in the range of ±1.
Note that in the schemes presented in this research, the required output of the
NNs developed might not be in the range of ±1. In such cases, the required output
is normalised to the range of ±1 using the following
xn = (b− a)× xo − xmin
xmax − xmin + a (3.21)
where xn is the normalised value and xo is the value to be normalised. a and b are
the minimum and maximum value of the range to be normalised to, which in this
case is ±1. xmax and xmin are the maximum and minimum values of the range from
which xo is been normalised.
3.12 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the reasons behind choosing
the FCC NN architecture and the NBN learning algorithm for the research. From
the literature presented, it is clear that the FCC NN architecture is far more efficient
than the popular MLP NN architecture. In addition, the NBN learning algorithm is
an improved version of the LM algorithm. This algorithm is more effective compared
to the popular EBP learning algorithm. Therefore, in the research presented in this
thesis, the FCC NN trained using the NBN algorithm is used for the developed
SFDIA and AFDIA schemes. In the next chapter, the developed SFDIA scheme is
presented.
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The SFDIA Scheme
4.1 Overview
Sensors are vital components for any control systems. They inform the controller
about its environment and the state of the system. Any failure of the sensor could
degrade the system’s performance and possibly lead to total system failure. An
aircraft system that can tolerate sensor failures would have added endurance in
the presence of such failures. This chapter presents the development of the sensor
failure, detection, identification and accommodation (SFDIA) scheme. The scheme
utilises the fully connected cascade (FCC) neural network (NN). As described in
Chapter 2, the SFDIA scheme can be divided into two stages:
• Failure detection and identification (FDI): In this stage, a failure occur-
ring or that has occurred is detected. Once the failure is detected, the failed
sensor is then identified.
• Failure accommodation (FA): In this stage, the failed sensor is replaced
with a reliable alternative. In the case of the NN based SFDIA, the failed
sensor is replaced with an NN based estimate.
The SFDIA scheme presented here can accommodate failure in the pitch, roll
and yaw rate gyro sensors of an aircraft. This chapter is organised as follows: the
outline of the developed SFDIA scheme is presented in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3,
the aircraft simulation model and the sensor suite considered for this research are
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presented. The development of the FCC NN based sensor estimators for the SFDIA
is discussed in Section 4.4. During the development of the sensor estimators, some
anomaly was observed with the pitch rate sensor, which is examined in Section 4.5.
The setup of the SFDIA experiments and the results from the conducted experiments
are discussed in Section 4.6. In Section 4.7, a summary of the results and related
discussion is presented. Finally the chapter concludes in Section 4.8.
4.2 SFDIA Outline
A block diagram of the developed SFDIA scheme for the pitch, roll and yaw rate
sensor is presented in Figure. 4.1. In this scheme, for every sensor considered, there
is an NN based sensor estimator. As the name suggest, the output of this estimator
is the sensor measurement it is estimating. Also associated with each sensor is a
fault alarm signal (FA), which could either be 0 or 1: where FA = 1 indicates a fault
and FA = 0 if otherwise. Failure detection (FD) is performed by evaluating the
residual between each sensor and its associated NN estimate. If the residual exceeds
a certain threshold, the failure alarm for that sensor is triggered (FA = 1). Failure
identification (FI) is performed by identifying which sensor fault alarm is triggered.
Once the failed sensor is identified, it remains in the failed state throughout the
process. In other words, the sensor is assumed to remain faulty throughout. It does
not recover from the fault.
In addition, the proposed scheme consists of a fault switch (FS) for every sensor.
The inputs to the fault switch are the fault alarm signal (FA), sensor output and
estimator output. This switch is controlled by the FA signal. In fault free conditions
(FA = 0), the output of FS is the sensor output. However, in the event of failure
(FA = 1), the FS switches to the estimator output. This output is then used by the
flight control system (FCS) to operate in a fault free state.
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Pitch Sensor 
NN Pitch 
Estimate 
Roll Sensor 
NN Roll 
Estimate 
Yaw Sensor 
NN Yaw 
Estimate 
Residual 
Evaluation 
Residual 
Evaluation 
Residual 
Evaluation 
Fault 
Switch 
Fault 
Switch 
Fault 
Switch 
Fault Alarm 
Signal 
Fault Alarm  
Signal 
Fault Alarm 
Signal 
Fault Free 
Pitch Rate 
Fault Free 
Roll Rate 
Fault Free 
Yaw Rate 
Figure 4.1: SFDIA scheme layout for pitch, roll and yaw rate sensors.
4.3 Aircraft Simulation and Sensor Suite
Aircraft data is collected using the X-Plane flight simulator [85]. For this research,
the Cessna 172SP aircraft model in X-Plane is used to collect the flight data. This
aircraft is flown by the artificial intelligence (AI) pilot in X-Plane. The aircraft is
assumed to be equipped with six inertial sensors without any hardware redundancy.
The inertial sensors are three gyroscopes (gyros) and three accelerometers. They
are mounted along the x, y and z axis of the aircraft. These sensors are essential
components of the attitude/heading reference system (AHRS) and the initial navi-
gation system (INS) found in modern aircraft [86,87]. The outputs of these sensors
are as follows:
1. Gyros: pitch (q), roll (p) and yaw (r) rates.
2. Accelerometers: accelerations along the x (ax), y (ay) and z (az) axis.
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Figure 4.2: The Cessna aircraft model in X-Plane 9.
4.4 Estimator Development
In this section, the structure of the NN based sensor estimators is presented. This
is followed by the development of the NN based pitch, roll and yaw rate estimators.
4.4.1 Estimator NN Inputs, Outputs and Structure
The conducted research concentrates on the SFDIA of the gyro sensors. Therefore,
three gyro sensor estimators are developed, one for each of the pitch, roll and yaw
rate gyros. The outputs of these estimators are their respective estimated sensor
rates. The inputs to the estimators are measurements from other sensors, excluding
the one it is estimating. In addition, commanded control outputs by the flight
control computer are also used as inputs. These inputs are taken at the current
sample time t. Inputs to each of these estimators and their respective outputs are
presented in Table 4.1.
These inputs are chosen because they can have an effect or can cause an effect
on the parameter that the sensor is measuring. The relationship between the mea-
sured accelerations and the gyro rates can be derived from the linear acceleration
46
Chapter 4. The SFDIA Scheme
Table 4.1: Inputs to the sensor estimators.
Sensor Estimator Inputs
Pitch (q) az - Normal Acceleration
ax - Longitudinal Acceleration
δE - Elevator Demand
Roll (p) r - Yaw Rate
δA - Aileron Demand
δR - Rudder Demand
Yaw (r) ay - Lateral Acceleration
δA - Aileron Demand
δR - Rudder Demand
Figure 4.3: Aircraft X, Y and Z axis. This figure is adapted from [2].
equations [88], defined as follows:
ax = U˙ − rV + qW + gx
ay = V˙ − pW + rU + gy (4.1)
az = W˙ − qU + pV + gz
where (U, V,W ) and (gx, gy, gz) are the velocity and gravitational acceleration com-
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ponents respectively, along the X, Y and Z axes, given in body fixed reference frame.
The relationships between the remaining inputs and outputs of the estimators can
be derived analytically from the aircraft’s equations of motion described in [88].
To select the best structure (topology) for the FCC NN based sensor estimators,
the number of neurons in each estimator is first explored experimentally; varying
from 2 to 12 neurons. These estimators with different numbers of neurons are trained
and validated using the process described in the following sections.
4.4.2 Training and Validation Data Sets
To train and evaluate the estimators, flight data from the Cessna 172SP aircraft in
X-Plane is recorded for six different flight scenarios. In these scenarios, the aircraft
takes off from different airports to capture different manoeuvres performed by the
AI pilot in X-Plane. The manoeuvres include take-off, straight flight and randomly
changing flight heading. These scenarios were simulated in turbulence-free weather
conditions. Flight data was recorded once the aircraft reached its cruise altitude.
These flight data contain various sensor readings and control inputs, recorded at
every second.
In a practical system, sensor readings are updated at a higher frequency. In
this case however, recording the flight data at every second allows the training data
to capture more dynamic flight characteristics between each training sample. This
helps prevent the NN estimator from over-fitting to less dynamic training data.
Out of the six scenarios, one of them is randomly selected to train the NN based
estimators for each of the three sensors. The remaining five are used for validating
the estimators.
4.4.3 Estimator Training
For each sensor considered, estimators with 2 to 12 neurons are trained off-line
(batch learning) using a fixed set of training data extracted from the training flight
data mentioned in the previous section. The training set consists of data collected
during the steady and transient states of flight. This ensures that the estimators
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can produce good estimates during any state of flight. The estimators are trained
until the Sum Squared Error (SSE) of the epoch is ≤ 0.01 or a maximum of 101
epochs is reached.
4.4.4 Simulation for Validation
Once trained, each of the estimators (ranging from 2 to 12 neurons) for a sensor is
validated on the five different flight scenarios. These scenarios last for 1500 seconds,
therefore containing 1500 samples. To assess the performance of the estimator on the
scenario, the total SSE of all the samples in the scenarios is computed. Finally, the
best estimator for a sensor is selected by calculating the average and the standard
deviation of the SSE for all the scenarios.
4.4.5 Results and Discussion
Yaw Rate Estimator
The SSEs of the yaw rate estimators using different neurons on the five validation
scenarios are presented in Table 4.2. From the average SSE, estimator networks
with 2 and 5 neurons produced the least errors. For the estimator with 2 neurons,
the SSE is 0.03290, while the SSE with 5 neurons is 0.03637. Using the standard
deviation (σ), it is clear that the estimator with 2 neurons is best of the two, with
σ = 0.01979. The output of this estimator on its best and worst scenarios are
presented in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 respectively. The best scenario is scenario 3
and the worst is scenario 1.
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500Figure 4.4: Normalised yaw rate using equation (3.21). Results using 2 neurons in
scenario 3.
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Figure 4.5: Normalised yaw rate using equation (3.21). Results using 2 neurons in
scenario 1.
Pitch Rate Estimator
Table 4.3 presents the validation results for the pitch rate estimators. The estimator
using 6 neurons has the least SSE among them, with SSE = 1.15978. The output
of this estimator on its best and worst scenarios are presented in Figure 4.6 and
Figure 4.7 respectively. The best scenario is scenario 4 and the worst is scenario 3.
As can be seen from Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, the output of the pitch rate
sensor seems to oscillate rapidly over certain time frames. This is due to the aircraft
being disturbed from its equilibrium state. These disturbances could be initiated
by pilot control inputs, change in power settings and atmospheric influences such
as gust and turbulence [89]. Since the scenarios were simulated in turbulence free
weather conditions, in this case, the oscillations are caused by the control outputs
from the AI pilot in X-Plane.
For a certain time frame, the oscillations are neither increasing nor decreasing in
magnitude (see Figure 4.7). Once the aircraft is disturbed, it continues to oscillate
without a significant increase or decrease in magnitude. The aircraft is said to be in
a state of neutral dynamic stability [88, 90]. The magnitude and duration of these
oscillations depends on the aircraft’s aerodynamics and stability. The estimator
follows these oscillations but does not follow the magnitude. This anomaly is further
investigated in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.6: Normalised pitch rate using equation (3.21). Results using 6 neurons in
scenario 4.
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500Figure 4.7: Normalised Pitch rate using equation (3.21). Results using 6 neurons in
scenario 3.
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Roll Rate Estimator
In Table 4.4, the results for the roll rate estimators are presented. As can be seen
from the average SSE, there is a close tie between 2, 4 and 12 neurons, with SSE =
0.83437, 0.83610 and 0.83129, respectively. Using the standard deviations of their
SSE, the estimator with 12 neurons has the best normal distribution among them
(σ = 0.25250). However, it was decided to select the estimator with 4 neurons,
keeping in line with the low neuron count of the previous gyro sensor estimators.
The output of this estimator on its best and worst scenarios is presented in Figure 4.8
and Figure 4.9 respectively. The best scenario for this estimator is scenario 3 and
the worst is scenario 5.
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Figure 4.8: Normalised roll rate using equation (3.21). Results using 4 neurons in
scenario 3.
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Figure 4.9: Normalised roll rate using equation (3.21). Results using 4 neurons in
scenario 5.
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4.5 The Pitch Rate Anomaly
As mentioned in Section 4.4.5, there is an anomaly with the pitch rate estimator.
Although for the majority of the validation datasets, the pitch estimator with 6
neurons follows the oscillatory phase of the sensor output, the estimator it is not
estimating the correct magnitudes. To address this anomaly, three main factors
were considered:
• Sampling frequency
• Training data
• Estimator inputs
These factors are investigated below.
4.5.1 Sampling Frequency
With a sampling frequency of 1 Hz, it is possible that during the pitch rate oscilla-
tions important data could have been lost between samples. These lost data points
could have helped train the estimators in matching the oscillation magnitude.
To investigate this cause, the validation dataset in scenario 3 was examined
closely. Scenario 3 was chosen because, as indicated in Section 4.4.5 and Table 4.3,
this scenario provides the worst results among the five scenarios. It was noted that
the period of the pitch rate oscillation was ≈ 9 sec. If the period of the oscillations
was less than 1 sec, it is possible for important information to be lost during training.
Therefore, it is fair to conclude that increasing the sampling frequency would not
have captured valuable data, which could have helped during the training of the
estimators.
To confirm this further and rule out sampling frequency as a cause for the pitch
rate anomaly, two flight datasets were collected from X-Plane at a sampling fre-
quency of 10 Hz. One of the datasets was used to train the pitch rate estimators
and the other to validate it. An experiment, similar to the one in Section 4.4, was
conducted. However in this case, there is only one validation scenario.
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From the results (see Figure 4.10), it is concluded that increasing the sampling
frequency from 1 Hz to 10 Hz would not resolve the pitch rate anomaly.
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Figure 4.10: Normalised pitch rate using equation (3.21). Results using 5 neurons
estimator trained using 10 Hz sampling frequency data.
4.5.2 Training Data
Training data that is incomplete or an insufficient representation of the problem
could also be a good reason for the pitch rate anomaly. To eliminate training data as
a cause of the pitch rate anomaly, the estimators must be trained using new training
data, as conducted in Section 4.5.1. The new training data, collected at 10 Hz
sampling frequency, is used to train the pitch rate estimators. These estimators are
then validated on a scenario. As evident from Figure 4.10 and Table 4.5, changing
the training data cannot resolve the anomaly observed in the pitch rate estimator.
It is concluded that the training data is not the cause of the pitch rate estimator
failing to match the magnitude of the oscillatory pitch sensor output.
4.5.3 Inputs to Estimators
With the previous two factors excluded, it is concluded that the inputs to the pitch
rate estimators are the cause for the anomaly. Having different and/or additional
inputs could help capture additional information. This additional information could
help in matching the magnitude of the oscillations.
Future work would focus on identifying other sensor suites that could be used
to correct the anomaly observed in the pitch rate estimator. At the present stage,
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Chapter 4. The SFDIA Scheme
since the majority of the pitch rate estimator outputs follows the pitch rate sensor
values, the estimator is used as part of the SFDIA scheme. The pitch rate estimator
anomaly can be accommodated in the failure detection stage, using a high residual
threshold. This is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.6.3.
4.6 Sensor Failure Experiments
With the NN based sensor estimators developed, the next objective is the application
of the estimators for SFDIA. In this section, the setup of the SFDIA experiments,
the types of failures and the results from the experiments are presented.
4.6.1 Failure Detection and Identification Experiment Setup
The X-Plane 9 flight simulator does not support simulation of sensor faults. There-
fore, faults have to be introduced manually once the flight data for a simulation
is collected. To examine the performance of the proposed SFDIA scheme, the five
validation scenarios used in Section 4.4 are reused. Faults are introduced manually
at random locations into these five scenarios.
For every fault type considered, the faults are simulated on each of the scenarios
for every sensor. This would allow the examination of the performance of the SFDIA
scheme for each of the fault types in each sensor. The fault types considered in this
research are discussed in the following section.
4.6.2 Sensor Failure Types
Aircraft sensors can fail in several ways. Some failures are specific to a sensor, while
others are general. The signal from a sensor could be described as follows [48,91,92]:
xt = rt + nt + ft (4.2)
where at time t, x is the signal from the sensor, r is the useful signal, n is the noise
and f is the sensor failure. The sensor data collected from X-Plane provides the
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values for r and n. The f signal is injected manually for each fault type. In this
research, the following fault types are considered [12,92–94]:
• Stuck constant bias failure: At a given time, the sensor output gets stuck and
outputs a constant bias (b).
xt = b (4.3)
• Additive (drift) failure: This type of failure is very common. It is usually
caused by temperature changes or calibration problems. In this fault, a con-
stant term (drift value) is added to the sensor output. An additive fault can
be modelled by the ramp function, as follows [12,48,93]:
f(t) =

0 t < tf
A(t− tf )/TR tf ≤ t < tf + TR
A t ≥ tf + TR
(4.4)
where tf is the time when the fault is introduced, TR is the duration of the
ramp and A is the fault magnitude. The magnitude (A) of the additive fault
can either be large or small. Depending on the duration of the ramp (TR), the
fault can be a step (TR ≈ 0 sec), soft (TR = 4 sec) or hard (TR = 1 sec) in
nature [37,93].
In this research, the outputs of the gyro sensors are assumed to be in the range
of +10 deg/sec to −10 deg/sec. In the case of the additive fault type, large and
small fault magnitudes are modelled using 30% and 15% of the maximum sensor
value, respectively. In other words, for large faults, A = 3 deg/sec and for small
faults, A = 1.5 deg/sec. In total, seven failure cases are considered, which can be
summarised as follows:
1. Constant Bias
2. Hard Additive Large (TR = 1 sec , A = 3 deg/sec)
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3. Hard Additive Small (TR = 1 sec , A = 1.5 deg/sec)
4. Soft Additive Large (TR = 4 s , A = 3 deg/sec)
5. Soft Additive Small (TR = 4 sec , A = 1.5 deg/sec)
6. Step Additive Large (TR = 0 sec , A = 3 deg/sec)
7. Step Additive Small (TR = 0 sec , A = 1.5 deg/sec)
In the next section, the technique to generate the sensor residual is discussed.
4.6.3 Residual Generation Technique
As described earlier, the SFDIA scheme presented here uses residuals d to detect and
identify sensor failures. Generally, residuals are generated by squaring the difference
between the real sensor measurement and the measurement from its model [37] as
shown in equation (4.5). In equation (4.5), d is the residual at time t where x is the
real sensor measurement and x is the estimator (model) measurement at time t.
dt = (xt − xt)2 (4.5)
Failure is detected when the residual d goes over a threshold (τ). Ideally the
sensor measurement and the estimator output should be equal, therefore generating
a residual d = 0, and d 6= 0 in case of failure. When the residual d crosses τ , the
failure alarm is triggered. In this ideal condition, τ should be kept close to 0 for
quick detection (τ ≈ 0).
However, in a practical system the sensor measurements are not equal to the
estimator output due to sensor noise and modelling inaccuracies. This means that
the residual d is not equal to 0 in fault free conditions. For this reason, in the
absence of any faults, a false alarm (FA = 1) could occur frequently when threshold
τ ≈ 0. This could be resolved by raising the value of τ , but this risks not detecting
the faults. Because of this, a balance between false alarms and fault detection is
required.
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In the proposed SFDIA scheme, the residual (d) is generated using a sliding
window mechanism [37, 95]. In this mechanism, a window of size n data points
keeps moving (sliding) with time. The window calculates the moving average of the
n residuals calculated using equation (4.5). The result of the sliding average win-
dow is then weighted to produce the current residual [37]. The residual generation
mechanism can therefore be described as follows:
Dt =
$
n
t∑
i=t−n−1
(xi − xi)2 (4.6)
where D is the residual at time instant t and $ is the weight. Notice how equa-
tion (4.5) is utilised in equation (4.6). The sliding average window filters the resid-
uals using equation (4.5) from noise and modelling inaccuracies. The weight allows
us to magnify the residuals and have a high fault threshold (τ). In this research, the
size of the sliding window is set to 5 (n = 5) and the weight is set to 40 ($ = 40).
For the pitch, roll and yaw rate sensors, the threshold is set to τ = 0.8, τ = 0.8 and
τ = 0.2, respectively.
In the next section, the results of the sensor failure detection and identification
for accommodation experiments are presented.
n 
n 
Time 
t t - 1 t - n + 1 t - n 
Figure 4.11: Sliding average window at time t.
4.6.4 Experiment Results
Yaw Sensor Failures
The results for the yaw rate sensor fault detection time are presented in Table 4.6.
Generally, large magnitude faults are quicker to detect than small magnitude faults.
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The greater the magnitude of the fault, the sooner the residual generated using
equation (4.6) will cross the threshold τ . This observation is reflected in the results
presented in Table 4.6, which compares the results for a sudden step fault of large
and small magnitude. On average, the step fault of large magnitude is detected
instantaneously compared to an average of 0.8 sec in sample time for the small
magnitude step fault.
Similar results can be observed with the hard additive type faults with a ramp
duration of TR = 1 sec (see Section 4.6.2). Although the detection time is affected by
the magnitude of the fault, it is also affected by the transient phase (ramp duration
TR) of the developing fault. Due to this, the detection time for hard faults is greater
than that for step type additive faults.
In comparison to the step and hard additive type faults, soft faults have the
longest detection time. These faults have the highest ramp duration (TR = 4 sec)
amongst the three types of additive fault. On average, the detection time for soft
faults of large magnitude is 2.6 sec, in comparison to an average of 4 sec (sample
time) for small magnitude fault. In the case of the constant bias fault, the average
detection time is 1.6 sec.
In Figure 4.12, the signals associated with the yaw rate sensor during the oc-
currence of a hard fault are presented. Figure 4.12a shows the response of various
signals during the occurrence of a hard fault of large magnitude in scenario 1. In
Figure 4.12b, the responses of various signals during a hard fault of small magnitude
in scenario 4 are shown. Notice the response of the fault signal FA in both cases
after the occurrence of the fault. The time of fault is marked by the vertical green
line running across the three plots.
Pitch Sensor Failures
The results for the pitch rate sensor fault detection time are presented in Table 4.7.
The results reflect the observations made in the yaw rate sensor results. Large mag-
nitude faults are quick to detect and additive faults with a ramp duration TR > 0 sec
take a longer time to detect. On average, the hard additive faults with small mag-
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Figure 4.12: Yaw sensor hard fault simulations.
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Table 4.6: Yaw FDI Results
Detection Time for Fault Types in Sample Time (sec)
Scenario Const.Bias Hard Step Soft
- - L S L S L S
1 1 1 1 0 0 2 3
2 1 1 2 0 1 3 5
3 1 1 2 0 1 2 3
4 2 1 3 0 2 3 5
5 3 1 2 0 0 3 4
Average 1.6 1 2 0 0.8 2.6 4
− : No Fault Detected, Threshold (τ) : 0.2, L : Large, S : Small
nitude are detected in 3 sec. In comparison, the hard faults with small magnitude
are detected in an average of 1.4 sec.
Compared to the hard faults, the soft additive faults take on average 3 sec and
5.2 sec in sample time, for large and small magnitude respectively. Notice that
the average detection time of soft faults is longer than that of hard faults. This
is because the ramp duration is greater for soft faults, which is set at TR = 4 sec,
instead of TR = 1 sec for hard faults. The step fault type has the lowest average of
the additive fault types due to the ramp duration of TR = 0 sec. Step faults with
small and large magnitude have an average of 0.8 sec and 2.6 sec respectively. The
constant bias fault type has an average of 0.8 sec.
Comparing Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 shows how the average detection time for
the pitch rate sensor is greater than that of the yaw rate sensor, especially for the
additive fault types. This is due to the higher fault residual threshold τ used for the
pitch rate sensor. In comparison to the yaw rate sensor, the pitch rate estimator has
a higher modelling error, as discussed in Section 4.5, therefore requiring a higher
value for τ . The threshold τ is set to 0.8 for the pitch sensor whereas for the yaw
sensor, τ = 0.2. The modelling errors are reflected on the average SSE of the pitch
and yaw rate estimators presented in Table 4.3 and Table 4.2 respectively.
In Figure 4.13, the signals associated with the pitch rate sensor during the occur-
rence of a step fault are presented. Figure 4.13a and Figure 4.13b show the response
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of various signals during the occurrence of a step failure of large and small magni-
tude respectively. Note that Figure 4.13a presents the response of various signals in
scenario 3 during a step fault. This is the scenario in which the pitch rate anomaly
is significant. Although the anomaly between the sensor and estimator is significant,
there is no false fault detection.
Table 4.7: Pitch FDI Reults
Detection Time for Fault Types in Sample Time (sec)
Scenario Const.Bias Hard Step Soft
- - L S L S L S
1 1 2 5 1 4 4 7
2 1 1 3 1 3 4 7
3 1 1 1 0 0 1 2
4 1 2 4 1 2 4 7
5 0 1 2 1 4 2 3
Average 0.8 1.4 3 0.8 2.6 3 5.2
− : No Fault Detected, Threshold (τ) = 0.8, L : Large, S : Small
Roll Sensor Failures
In Table 4.8, the results for the roll rate sensor fault detection are presented. Similar
to the pitch rate sensors, τ is set at a higher value: τ = 0.8. This is to accommodate
the difference between the estimator value and the sensor value. The least detection
time is taken by the constant bias fault type with an average of 1 sec in sample time.
For hard fault types the average is 2 sec and 4.6 sec in sample time for large and
small magnitude. As expected, due to higher residual threshold, the fault detection
time is longer.
The soft fault types take the most amount of time to be detected. For large
magnitude soft faults, the average detection time is 4 sec in sample time. The
average detection time is even higher for small magnitude soft failures, standing at
an average of 7 sec in sample time. These results are considerably higher than the
detection time in the yaw rate sensor. The longer detection time is caused by the
higher residual threshold.
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Figure 4.13: Pitch sensor step fault simulations.
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In the case of the step type failures, the average is at 1.2 sec in sample time
for large magnitude. However for the small magnitude, the average is at 3.75 sec
with a fault going undetected in scenario 1. This is quite possible in scenarios
where the magnitude of the fault is relatively small. The fault went undetected
because the residual failed to trigger the threshold. This could be solved by reducing
the threshold τ , but this risks false fault detection. Future work would consider
additional inputs to the roll rate estimator to improve the estimate, and therefore
improve the chances for detection.
In Figure 4.14, the signals associated with the roll rate sensor during the oc-
currence of a soft failure are presented. Figure 4.14a and Figure 4.14b, shows the
response of various signals during the occurrence of soft failures of large and small
magnitude respectively. Notice how the residual signal slowly rises over the thresh-
old. This causes a delay in fault detection, as is evident from the fault signal
response.
Table 4.8: Roll FDI Results
Detection Time for Fault Types in Sample Time (sec)
Scenario Const.Bias Hard Step Soft
- - L S L S L S
1 1 2 5 2 − 4 7
2 1 2 4 1 4 4 7
3 1 2 4 1 3 4 7
4 1 2 5 1 4 4 7
5 1 2 5 1 4 4 7
Average 1 2 4.6 1.2 3.75 4 7
− : No Fault Detected, Threshold (τ) : 0.8, L : Large, S : Small
4.7 Summary of Results and Discussions
The FCC NN based SFDIA scheme is evaluated for failures in pitch, roll and yaw rate
gyro sensors. Each sensor is manually injected with seven different faults at random
locations on five different flight scenarios. The observations of the experiments can
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Figure 4.14: Roll sensor soft fault simulations.
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be summarised as follows:
• Sudden fault types such as constant bias, hard additive and step additive are
quicker to detect than faults that develop over time (e.g. soft additive faults).
• Faults with large magnitude are more easily detected than faults with small
magnitude.
• Higher fault residual threshold to accommodate sensor estimator modelling
errors and noise can increase the fault detection time.
These observations are consistent across the three gyro sensors. All faults were
detected by the presented SFDIA scheme, except for one in the roll rate sensor. This
undetected fault is a step fault with small magnitude. In this case, the fault went
undetected because the residual failed to trigger the threshold. Due to the modelling
inaccuracies of the developed pitch and roll estimators, the residual threshold for
these estimators is set to τ = 0.8, which is 4 times higher than the yaw residual
threshold. This resulted in higher detection time as well as the roll fault going
undetected. Nonetheless, the SFDIA scheme detected 104 faults out of the 105
cases evaluated.
The FDI results presented here can be compared to the SFDIA scheme presented
in [37]. The scheme presented in [37] is based on the extended minimum resource
allocating radial basis function (EMRAN-RBF) NN. The authors of [37], evaluated
their SFDIA scheme on the pitch rate sensor for large magnitude (A = 2.4 deg/sec)
additive faults. With their SFDIA scheme, pitch rate faults were detected in 1.24 sec,
1 sec and 1.86 sec for hard, step and soft faults respectively. In comparison, the SF-
DIA scheme presented here, detected the large magnitude (A = 3 deg/sec) faults in
an average time of 1.4 sec, 0.8 sec and 3 sec for hard, step and soft faults respectively.
The results are fairly comparable, except for the case of soft failure, where the
presented SFDIA scheme took 1.14 sec longer. This difference in performance can be
accounted for by the fact that the SFDIA scheme presented in [37] uses a sampling
time of 20 msec, compared to the 1 sec sampling time used in the scheme presented
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here. The higher the sampling frequency, the quicker the faults are detected. Be-
sides the sampling frequency, the SFDIA scheme presented here just uses 3 inputs
compared to 4 inputs in [37].
One of the drawbacks of the presented SFDIA scheme is the fixed threshold based
detection mechanism. Selecting a fixed fault threshold is a challenging task, espe-
cially in a dynamic system which is susceptible to noise and modelling inaccuracy.
If the threshold is too high, the fault might take longer to be detected or worse, go
undetected. Having a low threshold on the other hand might increase the rate of
false alarms. The sliding averaging window mechanism does help reduce the effect of
noise and modelling inaccuracy. However, if the dynamics of the system changes in
the future, the thresholds would have to be evaluated and fixed again. An alterna-
tive to the fixed threshold based detection mechanism is an adaptive threshold. In
this mechanism, the fault threshold adapts to the changes in the system dynamics
with time. Such a mechanism, as presented in the [50] and [96], would increase the
robustness of the SFDIA scheme presented here.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, a FCC NN based SFDIA scheme was presented. The scheme was
developed to address failures in the pitch, roll and yaw rate gyro sensors of an
aircraft. This chapter presented the development of the FCC NN based pitch, roll
and yaw rate gyro sensors. These estimators were used in the SFDIA scheme to
replace the faulty sensors.
The results show that the FCC NN based estimators can produce good estimates
of the sensor measurements, with as few as 2 neurons (see yaw rate results in Sec-
tion 4.4.5). The pitch and roll rate estimators were able to produce good estimates
with just 6 and 4 neurons respectively. However, the pitch rate estimator presented
some anomaly. Upon further investigation it was conclude that the anomaly is due
to the inputs to the estimator. Since the assumption made was that the aircraft
is equipped with just the accelerometers and rate gyros, additional inputs to the
estimator cannot be examined. Therefore the pitch estimator is limited by this as-
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sumption. Further work needs to be conducted to identify additional sensor suites
that could be used to correctly estimate the pitch sensor.
The SFDIA experiments covered 7 different failures over 105 experiments. Out
of these experiments, only 1 failure went undetected. One of the shortcoming of the
presented scheme is the detection mechanism. The scheme uses a fixed threshold
based detection mechanism. While selecting a fault detection threshold, care must be
taken to balance between the risk of false failure detection and no failure detection.
The SFDIA scheme could be improved by implementing an adaptive fault detection
threshold, which adapts with time.
To conclude, the results presented in this chapter show that the FCC NN can
be used for SFDIA schemes. With as few as 2 neurons, the FCC NN was able to
replicate the yaw rate sensor measurements. In the developed scheme, a faulty pitch,
roll and yaw rate sensor is replaced by its respective NN estimators. Therefore, the
scheme can add endurance to an aircraft system in the presence of failures in these
sensors.
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“Nothing is impossible, the word itself says ‘I’m possible!”
– Audrey Hepburn
73
Chapter 5
Actuator Failures in the X-Plane
Simulator
5.1 Overview
The next stage of the research is to develop the AFDIA scheme. Similar to the
SFDIA, the X-Plane flight simulator is used. This is because of its realistic sim-
ulations of the aircraft dynamics, which is important for the AFDIA experiments.
However, many challenges were faced while using this simulator for this research.
This chapter attempts to highlight these challenges and explain how it affected the
intended actuator failure research.
5.2 Initial Actuator Failure Study Objectives
In the initial stages of this research, the objective was to study actuator failures
in the elevator, aileron and rudder flying control surfaces. The types of failure
considered for the study are as follows:
1. Stuck at failure: where one of the flying control surface is stuck at a deflec-
tion angle.
2. Loss of control surface: where one of the flying control surface detaches
from the aircraft.
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3. Combined stuck at failure: where two different control surfaces are stuck
at a deflection angle. For example a combination of elevator and aileron or
aileron and rudder, stuck at a deflection angle.
The aim was to develop an actuator failure detection, identification and accom-
modation scheme (AFDIA) that can add endurance to an aircraft in the presence
of the said failures.
5.3 Failure Simulation Constraints in the X-Plane
Simulator
The X-Plane simulator is capable of simulating various types of failure, amongst
which is the flying surface failure. This can be seen in Figure 5.1 which shows
the X-Plane System Failures menu, with the Flying Surfaces failure tab selected.
Using this menu, failures can be induced at any time during the simulation. To
study the flying surfaces failure options, similar to the SFDIA scheme, the Cessna
172SP aircraft model in X-Plane 9 was used. Figure 5.1 shows that there is a drop
down menu next to each of the aircraft parts simulated in X-Plane. These parts
are linked to the various flying surfaces of the aircraft. The drop down menu gives
the option of inducing a failure to its respective aircraft part. It does not however
enable the specification of the type of failure being induced. The parts of interest
to this research are listed in the first column of the menu in Figure 5.1.
VERT STAB stands for vertical stabiliser, which in this case is the rudder of the
Cessna. Notice there are two parts to VERT STAB. Depending on the modelling of
the aircraft, the rudder can be divided into two separate parts. In the case of the
Cessna aircraft model, only the VERT STAB 1 is linked to an actual flying surface
of the aircraft model. H STAB stands for horizontal stabiliser or the elevator of
the aircraft. There are two of them, one each for the left and right elevators. The
remaining parts in the first column are the four sections of the left and right wing
of the aircraft. Once again, the number of sections, length of each section and how
they link to the actual flying surfaces, depends on the modelling of the considered
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Figure 5.1: Flying surface failure options menu in X-Plane 9.
aircraft. Note that if an aircraft modelled in X-Plane just has two sections to a wing,
LEFT/RIGHT WING 1 and 2, inducing failure on the remaining two parts option,
LEFT/RIGHT WING 3 and 4, will have no effect in the simulation. This applies
to all the flying surface parts listed in Figure 5.1. If one of these parts option is not
modelled/linked in the aircraft model, inducing failure will have no effect at all. As
part of the X-Plane simulator package, Laminar Research provides an application
called the Plane Maker, which is used to develop or modify aircraft models for X-
Plane. This application can be used to examine which parts of the modelled aircraft
are actually linked to the flying surface parts listed in Figure 5.1.
Using the failure simulation menu in Figure 5.1, if a failure is simulated on
the LEFT/RIGHT WING 1 parts, the ailerons on the Cessna visually appear to
be stuck at the current deflection in the X-Plane simulation. This is because the
ailerons of the Cessna are modelled on the WING 1 section of the aircraft. If a
failure is simulated on VERT STAB 1, the rudder of Cessna visually appears to be
stuck on the current deflection in X-Plane. Similarly, the left and right elevators of
the Cessna aircraft model appear to be stuck at their current deflection if a failure is
simulated on the respective H STAB. From these observations, it is concluded that
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the only type of failure that can be simulated on the flying surfaces of an aircraft
in X-Plane is the ‘stuck at’ type failure. Selecting the fail option in the drop down
menu associate with the parts listed in Figure 5.1 simulates ‘stuck-at’ type failure.
There is no option to simulate the loss of control surface type failure. Hence, it
was decided to exclude the study of loss of control surface failure from the intended
research.
Once the type of actuator failure simulated by X-Plane was identified, the effects
of the ‘stuck-at’ type failure on the Cessna was investigated prior to the development
of the AFDIA scheme. Failure simulations were conducted at random times during
the flight of the Cessna. During the simulation it was observed that the aircraft
did not behave as expected following the introduction of the failure. For example,
during straight level flight of the aircraft, failure is simulated on the elevators of
the Cessna. This should result in the Cessna elevators remaining stuck at about 0
degrees and the straight level flight should be maintained. Instead of maintaining
flight, the aircraft pitches down and eventually crashes. It behaves as if the elevators
were removed from the aircraft and affected the aerodynamics, which consequently
resulted in the crash. Due to this observation, it was decided to try to simulate the
flying surface failure available in X-Plane using a different aircraft model. Hence,
the Airbus A320 model in X-Plane was selected to observe the failure simulated by
X-Plane.
When a flying surface failure is simulated on the Airbus A320 using the menu in
Figure 5.1, very different results are observed. For example, simulating the elevator
failure on the Airbus A320 results in the disappearance or removal of the elevator
from the aircraft in X-Plane. Simulating the failure on the WING 1 or WING 2 part,
results in sections of the aircraft wing being removed. This is very different from
the observations in the Cessna failures, where the elevator or ailerons appeared
to be stuck at their most recent deflection. Unfortunately there is no published
documentation of the X-Plane simulator that details the type of failure simulated
by X-Plane through its built in features. Nonetheless, there is a web page to help
developers and a forum for technical/non-technical discussions [97, 98]. The forum
77
Chapter 5. Actuator Failures in the X-Plane Simulator
Figure 5.2: Cessna 172SP in X-Plane with failure on the LEFT WING 1 part. The
left aileron is stuck at a deflection.
is the only reliable way to clarify any problem in X-Plane by communicating with
other engineers working with X-Plane and the X-Plane developers themselves.
After discussing this difference in observations with other developers and engi-
neers in the forum, it was concluded that the only type of flying surface failure the
simulator is capable of simulating is the loss or removal of the selected flying surface.
Therefore, if left or right H STAB is put in a failed state, the respective elevator
would be removed from the aircraft model, simulating a loss of the entire elevator
surface. Similarly, with the WING part failure, the entire surface of a section of the
wing is lost. The extent of the surface loss depends on the modelling of the aircraft.
Each WING part (i.e. LEFT/RIGHT WING 1/2/3/4) may or may not be linked
to different sections of the aircraft wings. In the case of the Airbus A320, the inner
wing or the part of the wing that attaches to the aircraft body is linked to WING
1. The outer part of the wing, where the aileron is situated is linked to WING 2.
In the case of the Cessna 172SP, flying surface failure simulation also results in the
loss of the flying surface of the aircraft. Although the failed surface remains visible
and appears to be simulating the ‘stuck-at’ failure, the simulator is performing the
aerodynamic calculations without the failed surface and is simulating the loss of the
flying surface. The failed surface remains visible during the simulation in X-Plane
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Figure 5.3: Airbus A320 in X-Plane with failure on the LEFT WING 2 part. The
WING 2 section of the aircraft appears to be removed or destroyed.
because of the method used to develop the aircraft animation model. Due to the
way the Cessna 172SP model is created, the animation of the failed surface remains
visible following a failure. The Airbus A320 model on the other hand, was created
using a method that ensures that the animation of the failed surface disappears
when the failure is simulated. Therefore as soon as the failure is simulated using
the menu in Figure 5.1, the wing surface disappears as expected. Nevertheless, in
both cases the simulator is performing the aerodynamic calculations for an aircraft
with the missing failed flying surface.
Since the X-Plane simulator is limited to simulating the loss of flying surface, the
‘stuck at’ type failure had to be excluded from the actuator failure study. However,
attempts were made to explore whether the failure could be simulated using the
X-Plane datarefs [99]. Datarefs are variables that publish information about the
X-Plane simulation. They can be used to develop X-Plane plug-ins to manipulate
the simulation.
Among the extensive list of datarefs available for X-Plane 9, the one of interest is
the control surface override dataref : sim/operation/override/override control surfaces.
This dataref allows the user to override the control surface deflections of any of the
moving flying surfaces (e.g. the elevator, rudder and aileron) on the aircraft. The
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aim was to use this dataref to override the deflection of the intended failed control
surface and keep it stuck at a deflection angle, using their respective dataref. When
this control surface deflection override dataref was set to ON, all the control sur-
faces on the aircraft were disabled. This means that the deflection values for each of
the control surfaces must be individually programmed, including the intended failed
surface, throughout the simulation.
In addition, there is no possibility in X-Plane, either built-in or through dataref,
that would allow the simulator’s calculations of each of the control surface deflections
to be manually written to the respective surfaces, with the override dataref turned
ON. This leaves just one option where each of the control surface deflections is
calculated (using a control algorithm) manually and a ‘stuck at’ failure is simulated
on the intended failed surface by programming a fixed deflection value throughout
the simulation. In other words, flight control algorithms have to be developed to
implement the ‘stuck at’ failures, which contradicts the need to use the X-Plane
simulator. Due to these X-Plane limitations, the actuator failure study for this
research is limited to the ‘loss of flying surface’ type of failure.
5.4 A Severe Case of Failure
As concluded earlier, the only type of failure simulated by X-Plane is the ‘loss of
flying surface’. Due to this limitation of the simulator, the objectives for the actuator
failure research is revised to only address this type of failure. To that end, the aim
is to develop an AFDIA scheme that can detect such a failure and accommodate
it. Furthermore, it is decided to use the Airbus A320 instead of the Cessna 172SP
model for the actuator failure simulations.
Note that there is a difference between a ‘loss of control surface’ and ‘loss of flying
surface’ failure. The ‘loss of flying surface’ is a far more severe case of a failure in
an aircraft. In such a failure you may not only lose a part of your control surface,
but the entire flying surface. For example, simulating a loss of flying surface failure
on the WING 2 part of the Airbus A320 results in an entire section of the wing
surface being removed, including the aileron (control surface) on that wing. This
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Figure 5.4: F-15 aircraft landed safely by Israeli pilot with just one wing. Taken
from www.uss-bennington.org [3].
may not be a common type of failure, but such a failure was previously experienced.
A well known case of such a failure was that encountered by the Israeli F-15 fighter
pilot Ziv Nedivi in 1983 [3, 100]. During a training exercise, the F-15 had a mid
air collision and lost an entire wing. Following this failure the aircraft went into
an uncontrollable spin and headed for the ground. Fortunately, due to the quick
thinking and experience of the pilot, the aircraft was bought under acceptable control
and landed safely, using just one wing.
Due to the extreme nature of the failure and time limitations, the actuator
failure studied in this research is limited to the loss of wing surface (which includes
the aileron control surface) of the Airbus A320. This is an extreme case of a failure,
similar to the F-15 incident. If this failure can be accommodated using an NN
based AFDIA scheme, it is conceivable that the ‘stuck at’ type of failure can also
be accommodated using an NN based AFDIA scheme.
In the conducted actuator failure research, the WING 2 part of the Airbus A320
is set to a failed state in Figure 5.1. This will result in the loss of wing surface for
the entire section of the wing which is linked to WING 2. Using the Plane Maker
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Figure 5.5: Airbus A320 in Plane Maker. WING 1 part linked to the inner section
of the aircraft wing.
Figure 5.6: Airbus A320 in Plane Maker. WING 2 part linked to the outer section
of the aircraft wing.
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application, the length of each section of the wing linked to parts WING 1 and WING
2 can be determined. In Figures 5.5 and 5.6, a screenshot of the WING 1 and WING
2 section of the A320 aircraft wing in Plane Maker is presented, respectively. The
length of each of the sections is marked in red. Notice that different sections of the
wing are coloured in black based on which WING part is selected from the menu.
The length of the wing of the modelled Airbus A320 is 59 meters, of which WING
2 represents a section of 39 meters. Therefore a loss of wing surface failure using
WING 2 would result in about 66 % wing surface loss.
5.5 Challenges Faced Using X-Plane
X-Plane is well known for its almost realistic aircraft dynamics simulation due to
which it is certified by the FAA for pilot training [29, 31, 97]. Due to its realistic
simulations, it is used by the likes of NASA, Cessna and Japan Airlines, to train
pilots, develop concept designs and flight testing [30, 31]. However, as is evident
from the previous sections, there are certain challenges faced when using X-Plane
for specific research purposes.
Although a manual is provided on using X-Plane [30], it is aimed at users who are
interested in learning to fly. The technical information as to how the systems on the
aircraft are implemented, what types of failures are simulated, amongst others, are
not readily available. Information like this is only available through the forum [98].
In addition, the datarefs that can be used to manipulate the simulator to implement
the AFDIA scheme are not well documented. There are occasions where the same
property of the simulator can be manipulated using multiple datarefs, without any
clear distinction. Therefore, one must experiment with the datarefs in order to find
a suitable one for the intended purpose.
Such examples, among others, are some of the challenges faced while using the
X-Plane simulator for this research.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a brief overview was given of how the actuator failure study and
the development of the AFDIA scheme evolved during the course of this research.
One of the objectives of this chapter was to highlight the challenges faced while
using X-Plane for specific research purposes. The simulator is well known for its
realistic simulations of the aircraft dynamics and therefore used for training pilots.
However when it comes to a specific research study, the limited documentation can
be challenging. The X-Plane technical forum is very helpful in such cases. But it can
take a while before a solution is found. This is especially true if the simulator was
rarely used in such a way, which is the case with this research; or in other research
and development works where the simulator was used with proprietary information,
therefore resulting in limited publicly available documentations.
Due to the limitation of the simulator, the actuator failure study is limited to
the loss of flying surface type of failure. In the next chapter, the loss of the wing
surface failure is studied and a AFDIA scheme is developed.
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“There is only one thing that makes a dream impossible to achieve: the
fear of failure.”
– Paulo Coelho, The Alchemist
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The AFDIA Scheme
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, an actuator failure detection, identification and accommodation
(AFDIA) scheme is presented. The aim of the scheme is to increase the endurance
of the aircraft following a loss of 66% of the wing surface. To achieve this, a fully
connected cascade (FCC) neural network (NN) based roll controller is implemented.
This NN based roll controller has the ability to adapt on-line to the post failure
dynamics of the aircraft. In the presented AFDIA scheme, the FCC NN based roll
controller is used to control the aircraft in the case of failure. The AFDIA scheme
is divided into two main stages:
1. Failure detection and identification (FDI)
The purpose of this stage is to first detect a failure that has occurred or is
occurring. Following a successful detection, the source of the failure needs to
be identified.
2. Failure accommodation (FA)
The objective of this stage is to take action to compensate for the failure. In
this research, this action happens to be adapting the roll controller to try to
bring the aircraft back to equilibrium by compensating for the rolling moment
induced by the loss of wing surface.
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This chapter begins with Section 6.2, which explores what happens to an air-
craft following a loss of 66% of the wing surface. In Section 6.3, the concept behind
the development of the NN based roll controller and its development process is pre-
sented. The AFDIA scheme is presented in Section 6.4. The setup for the AFDIA
experiments is presented in Section 6.5. In Section 6.6, the results of the AFDIA
experiments are presented and discussed. Based on the results of the conducted
AFDIA experiments, improvements are made to the AFDIA scheme in Section 6.7.
In Section 6.8, the setup and overview of the experiments conducted using the im-
proved AFDIA scheme are explained. The results of the improved AFDIA scheme
experiments are discussed in Section 6.9. Finally, the chapter concludes with Sec-
tion 6.12.
6.2 Loss of Wing Surface Failure
In this section, an overview of what happens to an aircraft following a loss of wing
surface is presented. This is followed by the discussion on how to detect and identify
this failure.
6.2.1 Overview
Wings are crucial to an aircraft as they provide most of the lift required to maintain
flight. Any structural failure to the wing during flight will result in the decrease
in lift. Such a failure can unbalance the lift distribution across the aircraft, which
can create a prominent rolling moment. The magnitude of the rolling moment will
depend on the extent of the damage. If the damage is significant and not quickly ac-
commodated, the aircraft will go into an uncontrollable spin. The proposed AFDIA
scheme aims to accommodate this severe case of failure.
The X-Plane 9 simulator has the ability to simulate the loss of wing surface
failure. The simulator can simulate complete loss of wing or loss of a section of wing,
depending on how the model was made in X-Plane. For the purpose of this research,
loss of a section of the wing on an Airbus A320 is simulated, which accounts for about
66% of the wing. To study the behaviour of the aircraft and investigate sensor
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Lift Lift 
(a) Before Failure
Lift 
(b) At Failure
Lift 
(c) After Failure
Figure 6.1: Aircraft wings and lift force acting on them.
Figure 6.2: Aircraft attitude angles or Euler angles. This figure is adapted from [4].
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Figure 6.3: Roll related sensor measurements from an aircraft following a left wing
surface loss failure.
measurements following this failure, simulations are conducted with the aircraft
under the control of the built-in autopilot. Some of the signals of interest from
these simulations are presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4.
Figure 6.3 shows the roll rate (p), acceleration (p˙) and Euler angle (φ), 20 sec
before and after the loss of left wing surface. The time of failure is denoted by the
red vertical line. As expected, the aircraft goes into an uncontrollable spin following
such a failure. This is clearly depicted by the fluctuating roll Euler angle, which
represents the roll attitude of the aircraft. The roll Euler angle changes from one
maximum end (φ = 180 deg) to the other (φ = −180 deg), depicting a continuous
spin along the roll axis of the aircraft. Similar results can be seen following a right
wing surface loss failure in Figure 6.4.
In both cases, the autopilot controller is unable to stop the aircraft from going
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Figure 6.4: Roll related sensor measurements from an aircraft following a right wing
surface loss failure.
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into an uncontrollable spin. The controller does resist the spin for a while, which can
be seen from the gradual change of the Euler angle following the failure. However,
once the aircraft reaches one maximum end of the roll Euler angle, the uncontrollable
spin begins. This can be attributed to the fact that the autopilot controller is
working under the fault free model assumption of the aircraft, which it was designed
for. Following a loss of wing surface failure, the dynamics of the aircraft change and
the autopilot controller is unaware of such an occurrence. Therefore, there is a need
for a controller that can adapt to the new dynamics of the aircraft following such
a failure. This is the motivation for the development and application of the NN
based flight controllers. The NN is incorporated with on-line learning capabilities
to enable the adaptation.
6.2.2 Detecting and Identifying Failure
As can be seen from Figures 6.3 and 6.4, at the time of failure, there is a sudden
significant fluctuation from the norm in the roll acceleration measurements. This
sudden fluctuation can be used to detect the loss of wing surface type of failure.
Since the fluctuation in the roll acceleration is significant compared to the norm, this
failure can simply be detected by a fixed threshold mechanism. In this mechanism,
the failure is detected when the roll acceleration crosses a fixed threshold, similar to
the SFDIA scheme.
In Table 6.1, the maximum roll acceleration following a wing surface loss failure
is presented. The table presents the results from 5 separate simulations, for left and
right wings each. The average maximum roll acceleration is above 50 deg/sec2, for
both left and right wing failure. The failure threshold could be set to this, but as
can be seen from the first experiment for the right wing failure, the maximum roll
acceleration is at 44.8 deg/sec2.
While selecting a fixed threshold, two points need to be considered: false detec-
tion and detection time. If the threshold is too low (close to normal measurements),
failure might be triggered in the absence of one. And if the threshold is set too high,
it might take a while for the failure to be detected, or worse, go undetected. In this
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research, after experimenting with various thresholds, it is decided to set the fixed
threshold at τ = 35 deg/sec2.
Table 6.1: Maximum roll acceleration values immediately following a wing surface
loss failure for left and right wings. Results from 5 different X-Plane simulations for
each left and right wing are presented.
Max. Roll Acc (deg/sec2)
Exp No. Left Wing Right Wing
1 -56.2557 44.8520
2 -57.4426 52.8902
3 -64.3698 49.7127
4 -47.8023 59.1092
5 -49.7121 52.3656
Average -55.1165 51.7859
SD (σ) 6.6151 5.1856
Another important observation from Figures 6.3 and 6.4 is the direction of the
sudden fluctuation in the roll acceleration immediately following a failure. The roll
acceleration is negative (‘−ve’) if the failure is on left wing and positive (‘+ve’) if it
is on the right wing. This can also be seen from the maximum roll acceleration mea-
surements immediately following a failure; as presented in Table 6.1. This finding
can therefore be used to identify the failed wing. In the next section, the concept
behind the design of the NN based roll controller and its development process are
presented.
6.3 Adaptive Neural Network Roll Controller
In this section, the concept behind the development of the roll controller is presented.
This is followed by the development of the roll controller.
6.3.1 Balance the Moment
As discussed in the previous section, following a wing surface loss failure the aircraft
goes into an uncontrollable spin. This is due to the rolling moment induced by
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the imbalance of the lift force across the aircraft. The aircraft autopilot controller
is unable to stop this spin, as it is still operating under the assumption that the
aircraft is fault free, which is what it was designed for. It is unaware of the change
in the aircraft dynamics following the failure. Therefore, to increase the endurance
of the aircraft in case of such a failure, a controller with an adaptive capability is
required.
In this case, an NN based roll controller is developed which can adapt to the
new dynamics of the aircraft following a failure. Under normal conditions, the NN
based adaptive roll controller must emulate the output of the autopilot roll control.
Following a loss of wing surface, the objective of the adaptive controller is to adapt
the use of the aileron on the healthy wing. This is to attempt to produce the
compensating moment required to cancel the failure induced rolling moment and
bring the aircraft back to equilibrium.
It must be noted that the failure induced rolling moment that needs to be can-
celled can vary throughout the duration of the flight. The aircraft is flying in a
dynamic environment, simulated by the X-Plane weather system. Environment fac-
tors such as the direction and speed of the wind, amongst others, will affect the
moment forces acting on the aircraft. With a loss of 66% of the wing surface, it is
conceivable that the aircraft will be highly unstable in these dynamic conditions.
Table 6.2: Inputs/Output of the NN based roll controller.
Output Inputs
Roll control command (δˆA) Roll rate (p)
Actual roll Euler angle (φact)
Demanded roll Euler angle (φdem)
The NN based roll controller has three inputs, namely: roll rate (p), actual roll
Euler angle (φact) and demanded roll Euler angle (φdem). The actual and demanded
Euler angles inform the controller about the error in the aircraft roll attitude, which
is the difference between the two Euler angles (φact − φdem). The roll rate gives the
controller a sense of the current roll motion. These inputs are chosen to provide
the controller with all the information it needs to generate the roll command, in the
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absence or presence of failure. The output of the NN based roll controller is the roll
command denoted by δˆA. The output is a normalised value in the range of ±1. The
list of the inputs to the NN based roll controller is presented in Table 6.2.
In the next section, the roll controller development process is discussed. The
aim of this is to identify the right number of neurons required to generate the roll
command.
6.3.2 Roll Controller Development Process
The roll controller development process is similar to that of the NN based sensor
estimator described in Section 4.4. This process is as follows:
1. Training and Validation Data
The development of the controller can be divided into two main phases: the
training and the validation phases. In the training phase, the controller is
trained on a dataset to learn its functionality. Once the training process is
completed, the functionality of the controller is validated over several datasets.
These datasets are generated using flight data collected from X-Plane simula-
tions. The X-Plane simulator is used to collect flight data for the Airbus A320
aircraft, recorded at 50 Hz (i.e. 0.02 sec). In total, 16 X-Plane simulations are
conducted to collect data for the controller development. In these simulations,
the aircraft takes off from various airports and is controlled by the aircraft
autopilot system in X-Plane.
Out of the 16 flight simulations, 1 is selected at random to generate the training
dataset. The training dataset is generated such that it starts from the flight
data recorded just after take-off. The dataset spans over 4 minutes, during
which the aircraft climbs to the requested cruise altitude and keeps changing its
heading as commanded at random times. This helps to encapsulate the steady
and transient state behaviour of the aircraft autopilot roll controller. Since the
data was recorded at 50 Hz (every 0.02 sec) and the training dataset spans
over 4 minutes, there are 12000 individual samples in the training dataset.
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The remaining 15 flight simulations are used to generate 15 validation datasets,
each covering 10 minutes of flight data. These validation datasets help to verify
and assess the functionality of the trained controller. Since the validation
dataset spans over 10 minutes, there are 30000 individual samples in each
validation dataset.
2. Training the Controller
The controller is trained using the 12000 samples in the training dataset. This
training dataset is used to train 10 different controller designs, ranging from
2 to 12 neurons. Each of these controllers is trained until the Sum Squared
Error (SSE) of the training epoch is ≤ 0.001 or a maximum of 1000 epochs is
reached. The training dataset is presented in Figure 6.5.
3. Validating the Controller
Once trained, each controller design (ranging from 2 to 12 neurons) is validated
on the 15 validation datasets. These datasets are 10 minutes long, containing
30000 samples. The performance of the different controller designs are assessed
for each dataset by calculating the total SSE of all the samples in the dataset.
The best controller design is then selected by calculating the average and the
standard deviation of the SSE for all the datasets. The results of this validation
process is presented in Table 6.3. From the table, the design with 5 neurons
is the best option for the roll controller. The NN controller with 5 neurons
has the lowest SSE standard deviation (5.161340) and average SSE as low as
9.77061. Note that the individual SSE presented in Table 6.3 is the total SSE
of the 30000 samples. An example of the validation result using the 5 neuron
based NN roll controller is presented in Figure 6.6.
With the controller developed, the AFDIA scheme is presented in the next sec-
tion.
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Figure 6.5: Training data for the neural network roll controller.
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6.4 The AFDIA Scheme
6.4.1 Overview
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the developed AFDIA scheme can be
divided into two main stages:
1. Failure detection and identification (FDI)
The purpose of this stage is to first detect a failure that has occurred or is
occurring. Following a successful detection, the source of the failure needs to
be identified.
2. Failure accommodation (FA)
The objective of this stage is to take action to compensate for the failure. In
this research, this action happens to be adapting the roll controller to try to
bring the aircraft back to equilibrium by compensating for the rolling moment
induced by the loss of wing type of failure.
With this in mind, the operational outline of the developed AFDIA scheme is
presented in the following section.
6.4.2 AFDIA Operational Outline
A flow chart for the AFDIA scheme is presented in Figure 6.7. The first stage of
the scheme is the failure detection and identification (FDI). In this stage, the roll
acceleration (p˙) sensor measurements are monitored for detecting actuator failure
and identifying its source. A fixed threshold based mechanism is used to detect the
loss of wing surface. A failure is detected when the roll acceleration measurements
cross a fixed threshold of τ = 35 deg/sec2. Once the failure is detected, the failed
wing is identified using the direction of the fluctuation in the roll acceleration (p˙)
measurements. A negative fluctuation would indicate a left wing failure, while a
positive fluctuation would indicate a right wing failure. The AFDIA scheme has
two failure flags, FL and FR, for the left and right wing failure, respectively. If a
failure is detected, the FL/R flag is set to 1, otherwise the flag remains at the default
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value of 0. Therefore, the FDI stage of the AFDIA scheme can be as summarised
as follows:
FL =

1, if p˙ ≤ −τ
0, otherwise
(6.1)
FR =

1, if p˙ ≥ +τ
0, otherwise
(6.2)
If the failure flag FL/R is set in the FDI stage, the next stage would be failure
accommodation (FA). However, the presented scheme has an additional step, where
a sliding data window is updated, regardless of the outcome of the FDI stage. This
data window stores the previous n (window size) time steps of flight data variables
which will be used to adapt the NN roll controller in case of failure. At each time
step, the data window discards the oldest time step variables from the window and
adds the current time step variables; effectively sliding the window through the data
with time (t). Therefore, at time instance k, the sliding data window updates by
storing the variables at time k and discarding the oldest variables from time instance
(k − n).
The purpose of this data window is to store data that will be used to adapt
the NN roll controller in case of failure. Since the controller has 3 inputs and 1
output, at each time step (k), 4 variables are stored. At time k, the values of the
NN controller inputs, namely, the roll rate (p), measured roll Euler angle (φact) and
the demanded roll Euler angle (φdem), are stored in the data window regardless of
the outcome in the FDI stage (i.e. FL/R = 0/1).
The fourth variable (Jroll) depends on the FDI stage outcome. If no failure is
detected in the FDI stage (i.e. FL/R = 0), then the fourth variable stored in the
window is the roll control command (Jroll = δA) from the flight computer. Since
no failure is detected, there is no need for adapting the NN roll controller. Hence,
the data in the sliding window is not used. However, if a failure is detected in the
FDI stage (i.e. FL/R = 1), then a different variable is stored in the window, which
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is used by the failure accommodation (FA) stage of the scheme. The variable stored
is generated as follows:
Jroll = c×m(pref − p) (6.3)
where:
c : is a scalar multiple
p : is the roll rate in deg/sec
pref : is the desired roll rate in deg/sec
m(x) : 2 × x + 10
20
− 1
In the FA stage, the NN roll controller needs to adapt to the post failure dynamics
of the aircraft and try to achieve equilibrium. Following a loss of left or right wing
surface, the aircraft goes into an uncontrollable spin induced by the rolling moment
due to the failure. Therefore, the objective of the AFDIA scheme is to stabilise
the aircraft by using the aileron on the healthy wing to compensate for the failure
induced moment. This objective is achieved by adapting the NN roll controller.
To guide the on-line adaptation process of the NN roll controller, the function
presented in equation (6.3) is used. The resultant J value from this function is
considered as the desired output roll command by the on-line implementation of
the NBN algorithm. The on-line implementation of the NBN algorithm is basically
the NBN training process presented in Section 3.10, with the data in the sliding
window considered as the training data. This training process is repeated once the
sliding data window is updated, at every time step k (see Figure 6.7). At time k, the
training process is executed only once (i.e. 1 epoch), using the data in the sliding
window.
The guiding function presented in equation (6.3) uses the difference in the roll
rate (pref − p) of the aircraft to guide the adaptation of the NN roll controller,
based on the following assumption:
Assumption: If the aircraft achieves an equilibrium state and stops spinning, the
roll rate (p) of the aircraft must be approximately 0 deg/sec.
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Using this assumption, the desired roll rate of the aircraft (pref ) in equation (6.3)
is set to pref = 0 deg/sec. Following a failure, this difference in roll rate (i.e. pref − p)
would be large compared to the controller output ratio that is in the range of ±1.
This range also happens to be the output range of the output neuron of the NN
roll controller. If this difference is fed directly to the controller on-line learning
algorithm, the controller might change more dramatically than required. Therefore,
this difference is scaled using a scalar multiple (c) and the scaling equation (3.21),
reproduced here:
m(xo) = xn = (b− a)× xo − xmin
xmax − xmin + a (6.4)
Equation (3.21) scales the difference to the range of ± 1, assuming that the
maximum and minimum value of the roll rate will be in the ± 10 deg/sec range. If
the roll rate exceeds this range, then the equation will scale it accordingly. Notice
when these range values are substituted in equation (3.21), it changes to m(x) in
equation (6.3).
In the case of a failure at time step (k), the fourth value stored in the sliding
data window is the guiding function value Jroll, calculated using equation (6.3). The
detection of the failure results in the on-line learning of the NN roll control being
triggered. The data stored in the sliding window is then used by the on-line learning
algorithm for adapting the controller. Once the learning is completed for the time
step (k), the adapted NN roll controller is used to generate a new roll command.
This command is then used by the flight control system to control the aircraft.
Note that the presented AFDIA scheme just has an NN roll controller. Due to
time constraints on the research, the pitch and yaw controllers were not developed.
Therefore, the control for pitch and yaw is set to 0 following a failure. This has the
added benefit of just studying the behaviour of the NN roll controller.
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Figure 6.7: The AFDIA Scheme.
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6.5 AFDIA Experimental Setup
In this section, an overview of the implementation of the AFDIA scheme in X-Plane,
experiment conditions and overview are presented.
6.5.1 AFDIA Implementation in X-Plane
The AFDIA scheme is implemented in the X-Plane simulator as a plug-in. This
plug-in contains a control window which allows the user to trigger the failure and
display information about the state of the AFDIA scheme. During the development
of the NN controller, the controller was trained and validated on datasets with a
sampling frequency of 50 Hz. This was the intended frequency at which the AFDIA
scheme was to be executed. Due to timing constraints imposed by X-Plane simulator
execution demands and the need to log various simulation data for analysis, the
execution frequency of the AFDIA scheme is decreased to 25 Hz. It will be shown
later that the AFDIA scheme is capable of executing at 50 Hz.
6.5.2 Experimental Conditions
The X-Plane simulator is setup to simulate the flight of the aircraft under normal
weather conditions. The Airbus A320 is controlled by the autopilot of the aircraft.
The autopilot is programmed to maintain straight and level flight, to a set heading.
The aircraft altitude is approximately 3000 ft (i.e. 941.4 m) above mean sea level
(MSL), maintaining a speed of approximately 450 kn (i.e 833.4 km/h).
The wing surface loss failure is triggered at random times during the simulation.
Following a failure, the autopilot of the aircraft is turned off to ensure that it does
not interfere with the controller output from the AFDIA scheme.
6.5.3 Experiment Overview
Two main parameters of the AFDIA scheme, the sliding data window size (n) and
the scalar multiple (c) in equation (6.3), are varied to perform a comparative study
of the performance of the scheme. There are 3 different window sizes, namely, n =
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5, 10 and 15. For each of the window sizes n, the scalar multiple varies from c = 1
to c = 4. For each combination of the window size n and scalar multiple c, 20 loss
of wing surface failure experiments are conducted, 10 each for the left and the right
wing. Therefore, in total 240 separate experiments are conducted as described by
the equation below:
No.Experiments = n× c× (10 Left + 10 Right) Failures
240 = 3× 4× 20 (6.5)
The results from these experiments are analysed in the context of the following
aspects:
i. Post Failure Aircraft Behaviour: The response of the NN controller and
the behaviour of the aircraft following the failure are discussed.
ii. Flight Duration: The flight duration is used to quantify the endurance of the
aircraft following a failure.
iii. Failure Detection Time: The time taken by the AFDIA scheme to detect
the loss of wing surface is analysed.
iv. AFDIA Scheme Execution Time: The time taken by the NN based AFDIA
scheme to execute in the presence or absence of failure is assessed.
In the next section, the results of the AFDIA scheme experiments are presented
and discussed.
6.6 Results and Discussions
6.6.1 Post Failure Aircraft Behaviour
The AFDIA scheme is designed to accommodate the loss of 66% wing surface failure.
The aim of the scheme following this failure is to try to control the aircraft and bring
it back to a state where the moments are in equilibrium. If this is achieved, the
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aircraft would maintain flight and therefore increase the endurance of the aircraft in
the presence of such a severe failure. As discussed in the beginning of the chapter,
under the control of the X-Plane autopilot, such a failure would cause the aircraft
to spin uncontrollably along its roll axis and eventually crash. An ideal result for
the AFDIA scheme would be if the aircraft manages to maintain flight following the
failure.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 present two of the simulation results from the AFDIA exper-
iments conducted. Figure 6.8 represents the loss of left wing surface, while the loss
of right wing surface is represented by Figure 6.9. These figures depict the roll accel-
eration (p˙), roll rate (p), roll Euler angle (φ), both the NN controller and autopilot
roll commands (δˆA and δA respectively); and the altitude of the aircraft above mean
sea level (MSL). These figures are plotted from 20 sec before the failure, where the
time of failure is marked by the vertical red line. From the altitude plots in both
the figures, it is clear that following a failure, the aircraft gradually looses altitude.
The plots in these figures end when the aircraft crashes. Thus, the ideal result for
the AFDIA scheme is not achieved. However, the aircraft does avoid going into an
uncontrollable spin, as can be seen from the Euler angles. These observations are
consistent in all the 240 experiments conducted.
In Figures 6.8 and 6.9, almost immediately after the failure, the roll acceleration
crosses the fault detection threshold. The NN roll controller immediately adapts
and responds to compensate for the induced rolling moment. In Figure 6.8, the
NN roll controller output jumps to about + 0.7 in response to the failure. Notice
that this is in the opposite direction to the jump in roll rate and Euler angle, where
the measurements are negative. In an attempt to balance the rolling moment, the
NN roll controller is trying to pull the aircraft in the opposite direction to which
it is rolling. Similar behaviour can be observed in the case of right wing failure in
Figure 6.9.
In both the figures, within seconds of the failure, the Euler angle gradually starts
to change, indicating that the aircraft is gradually rolling to a side. In contrast to
this, the altitude of the aircraft remains almost steady following a failure. The
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altitude gradually climbs for a while before it starts to fall. The climb in altitude is
due to the minor upward pitching of the aircraft following the failure. Eventually the
aircraft cannot climb any further due to the extent of the aircraft roll attitude and
the decrease in lift. At this point the aircraft starts to loose altitude and eventually
crashes.
Notice the difference in the Euler angle plots using the AFDIA scheme in Fig-
ures 6.8 and 6.9, compared against the X-Plane autopilot only control in Figures 6.3
and 6.4. The aircraft avoids an uncontrollable spin in the presence of the AFDIA
scheme. Using the AFDIA scheme, the aircraft behaves like it is resisting the rota-
tion along the roll axis after the loss of wing surface. The end result of this resistance
is the gradual turn of the aircraft along its roll axis, which increases the flight dura-
tion following failure when compared against the X-Plane autopilot. Although the
ideal results for the AFDIA scheme is not achieved, the scheme managed to perform
better than the X-Plane autopilot, by avoiding an uncontrollable spin.
The scheme successfully managed to increase the duration of the flight after the
failure, therefore adding endurance to the aircraft. For the purpose of this discussion,
the flight duration between the time of failure and crash of the aircraft is used to
quantify the endurance following failure.
6.6.2 Flight Duration
As mentioned earlier, in the experiments conducted two parameters of the AFDIA
scheme are varied to understand the effects on the performance of the scheme. The
performance of the scheme is evaluated in terms of the flight duration following
the failure. Flight duration is used as a measure of endurance added to aircraft
following the failure. The parameters varied are namely, the scalar multiple (c) in
equation (6.3) and the size (n) of the sliding data window used to store data for
on-line adaptation of the NN roll controller. From the experiments conducted, it is
clear that depending on the value of these parameters, the flight duration following
failure can vary.
Table 6.4 presents a summary of the flight duration following failure for the
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108
Chapter 6. The AFDIA Scheme
120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
−100
0
100
200
Time (sec)
(d
eg
/s
ec
2 )
 
 
Roll Acc.
Threshold
(a) Roll Acceleration
120 130 140 150 160 170 180
0
5
10
Time (sec)
(d
eg
/s
ec
)
 
 
Roll Rate
(b) Roll Rate
120 130 140 150 160 170 180
0
20
40
60
80
Time (sec)
(d
eg
)
 
 
Roll Euler
(c) Roll Euler
120 130 140 150 160 170 180
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Time (sec)
R
a
t
io
 
 
NN Roll Cmd
AP Roll Cmd
(d) Roll Command
120 130 140 150 160 170 180
0
500
1000
1500
Time (sec)
(m
et
re
s)
 
 
Altitude MSL
(e) Mean Sea Level (MSL) Altitude
Figure 6.9: Aircraft Performance Results for Right Wing Failure. Window size n =
15, scalar multiple c = 4. The Red line marks the time of failure.
109
Chapter 6. The AFDIA Scheme
T
ab
le
6.
4:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
th
e
fl
ig
h
t
d
u
ra
ti
on
p
os
t
w
in
g
su
rf
ac
e
lo
ss
fa
il
u
re
.
E
ac
h
m
ea
n
an
d
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
va
lu
e
p
re
se
n
te
d
h
er
e
fo
r
th
e
le
ft
an
d
ri
gh
t
w
in
g
fa
il
u
re
is
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
10
ex
p
er
im
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
se
t
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
of
th
e
w
in
d
ow
si
ze
(n
)
an
d
sc
al
ar
m
u
lt
ip
le
(c
).
N
ot
e
th
at
th
e
co
lo
u
r
co
d
in
g
h
ig
h
li
gh
ts
th
e
va
lu
es
p
lo
tt
ed
in
F
ig
u
re
6.
10
.
D
u
ra
ti
on
of
F
li
gh
t
(s
ec
)
L
ef
t
W
in
g
F
ai
l
R
ig
h
t
W
in
g
F
ai
l
A
ve
ra
ge
of
B
ot
h
W
in
gs
W
in
.
S
iz
e
S
ca
la
r
M
ea
n
S
D
M
ea
n
S
D
M
ea
n
S
D
5
1
26
.7
32
8
0.
71
57
26
.6
20
2
0.
95
46
26
.6
76
5
0.
83
51
2
35
.6
70
7
1.
25
59
36
.3
32
3
0.
74
29
36
.0
01
5
0.
99
94
3
42
.1
95
9
1.
88
44
45
.3
08
8
0.
48
02
43
.7
52
3
1.
18
23
4
45
.9
34
4
1.
14
83
50
.2
32
5
1.
18
66
48
.0
83
5
1.
16
75
A
ve
ra
ge
37
.6
33
4
1.
25
11
39
.6
23
4
0.
84
11
38
.6
28
4
1.
04
61
10
1
25
.1
77
4
0.
43
96
27
.0
79
4
0.
46
72
26
.1
28
4
0.
45
34
2
33
.6
24
5
0.
49
30
36
.2
68
7
0.
38
38
34
.9
46
6
0.
43
84
3
41
.2
44
3
0.
57
74
44
.0
46
9
0.
49
48
42
.6
45
6
0.
53
61
4
46
.8
33
2
0.
57
94
49
.9
79
4
0.
55
23
48
.4
06
3
0.
56
58
A
ve
ra
ge
36
.7
19
8
0.
52
23
39
.3
43
6
0.
47
45
38
.0
31
7
0.
49
84
15
1
25
.1
75
4
0.
28
99
27
.0
28
5
0.
33
25
26
.1
01
9
0.
31
12
2
34
.3
54
3
0.
37
00
36
.1
69
6
0.
64
46
35
.2
62
0
0.
50
73
3
41
.9
60
1
0.
47
27
44
.6
86
6
0.
61
55
43
.3
23
3
0.
54
41
4
46
.6
22
2
0.
97
46
50
.0
91
9
0.
89
63
48
.3
57
0
0.
93
55
A
ve
ra
ge
37
.0
28
0
0.
52
68
39
.4
94
1
0.
62
22
38
.2
61
1
0.
57
45
110
Chapter 6. The AFDIA Scheme
0 1 2 3 4 5
25
30
35
40
45
50
Scalar Multiple (c)
C
o
m
bi
ne
d 
Me
an
 F
li
gh
t 
Ti
me
(s
ec
)
 
 
Window 5
Window 10
Window 15
Figure 6.10: The relationship between the flight time and the parameters scalar
multiple and window size.
experiments conducted. In this table, the mean and standard deviation of flight
duration after the failure is organised based on the change in the scalar multiple (c)
for every sliding data window size (n). Note that each mean and standard deviation
value presented in the table is the average of 10 experiments for every combination
of sliding data window size (n) and scalar multiple (c). The individual results of the
240 experiments are presented in Appendix A.
From the results in Table 6.4, it is clear that for a set combination of n and c
parameters, the flight duration is almost similar regardless of the side of the failure.
For example, for n = 5 and c = 1, the flight duration post failure is 26.7 sec and
26.6 sec, for left and right wing surface loss, respectively. Similarly, for n = 15 and
c = 3, the flight duration post failure is 41.9 sec and 44.7 sec, for left and right wing
surface loss, respectively. This is expected as both the wings lose the same amount
of wing section in the failure simulation. Since the amount of surface loss is the
same, both the wings experience similar loss of lift force and therefore similar failure
induced rolling moment. The minor differences in the flight duration between the
two wings can be attributed to environmental factors, such as the direction of the
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wind.
Examining the results further reveals the extent of influence the c and n pa-
rameters have on the flight duration post failure. If the scalar multiple c is kept
constant and the window size n is varied, the change in the flight duration is almost
negligible. For example, for c = 1 and n = {5, 10, 15}, the combined average (left
and right wing) flight durations are {26.8, 26.1, 26.1} sec, respectively. However,
if the window size n remains constant and the scalar multiple c is varied, there is
a significant increase in the flight duration from c = 1 to c = 4. For n = 5, the
combined average (left and right wing) flight durations are {26.7, 36 , 43.7, 48} sec,
for scalar multiple c = {1, 2, 3, 4} respectively. As the scalar multiple increases,
the flight duration increases. The durations are almost similar for the same scalar
multiple across different window sizes. These observations are clearly represented
in Figure 6.10. For different window sizes the flight duration remains almost the
same, when the scalar multiple is constant. However, with the window size constant,
increasing the scalar multiple results in an increase in the flight duration.
The sliding data window stores variables for n time steps, which is used to adapt
the NN controller on-line following a failure. The mechanism enables the use of
historical data in the on-line adaptation process which could benefit the adapting
controller. From the results presented in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.10, it is clear that
changing the number of historical data points (i.e window size n), has negligible
effect on the flight duration following the failure.
The purpose of the scalar multiple c is to magnify the error that is used to guide
the on-line adaptation of the roll controller following failure. From Table 6.4 and
especially from Figure 6.10, it can be seen that the flight duration following the
failure is directly proportional to the scalar multiple c. In equation (6.3), the scalar
multiple c is used to multiply the difference between the desired and actual roll
rate (pref − p), to generate the Jroll value used to guide the adaptation of the roll
controller on-line. For a set difference between the desired and actual roll rate, as
the scalar multiple c increases, the value of Jroll increases. The output of the NN roll
controller is proportional to the Jroll value. Therefore, the NN roll controller output
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will increase proportionally to the value of the scalar multiple c. This is observable
from the Figures 6.8 and 6.9.
In Figures 6.8 and 6.9, the scalar multiple c is 1 and 4, respectively. In both these
figures, notice the maximum output generated by the NN roll controller immediately
after the failure. In case of Figure 6.8, where c = 1, the maximum output is in the
range of + 0.7. In comparison, in Figure 6.9, where c = 4, the output reaches the
maximum possible controller output value of − 1. With the increase in the value
of c, the maximum output of the NN roll controller increases. This increase in the
controller output means that the aileron in the healthy wing is deflected further in
Figure 6.9 than in Figure 6.8, to generate a greater resisting rolling moment. The
result of this greater resistance is an increase in the flight duration following failure.
Therefore, with increasing value of the scalar multiple c, the flight duration after
failure increases.
6.6.3 Failure Detection Time
Failure detection is one of the important stages of any fault tolerant system. In case
of severe failure such as the loss of wing surface, quick detection is very important.
The sooner the failure is detected, the quicker the system can respond to compensate
for the failure. In the presented AFDIA scheme, failure is detected when the roll ac-
celeration (p˙) measurements crosses a fixed threshold τ = 35 deg/sec2. In Table 6.5,
the detection time for each of the 240 experiments conducted is summarised. Each
mean and standard deviation value is the average of 10 experiments for a set window
size (n) and scalar multiple (c). The results for each of the individual experiments
is presented in Appendix B for reference.
Since the failure detection stage is independent from the failure accommodation
(FA) stage, the detection time is not affected by the changing c and n values. From
Table 6.5, it can be said that the combined average mean failure detection time
of both the wings is around 0.04 sec In some instances, the mean detection time is
slightly greater than 0.04 sec and less in others. Overall, the detection time is within
1 or 2 time steps of the AFDIA execution, which is set to execute every 0.04 sec or
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25 Hz.
In all the 240 experiments conducted, the loss of wing surface failure was quickly
and successfully detected, using the simple fixed threshold based fault detection
mechanism. However, the fault detection mechanism employed in the AFDIA does
have some limitations. As with any fixed threshold based mechanism, the challenge
is to identify a good fault detection threshold. If the threshold is too low (i.e. too
close to the norm), the probability of false failure detection increases. On the other
hand, if the threshold is too high, the failure might take longer to be detected or
worse, go undetected. The failure detection threshold (τ) for the AFDIA scheme
presented here is set to τ = 35 deg/sec, based on the discussion in Section 6.2.2.
Additionally, in the experiments conducted, the failure was simulated when the
aircraft was maintaining a straight and level flight. This limitation of the experiment
is a good reason why no false failure detection was triggered in the 240 experiments
conducted. For example the roll acceleration measurements (p˙) could have crossed
the failure threshold τ when the aircraft was making a steep turn or pitch or was
affected by environmental factors. Crossing the threshold τ would result in a failure
detection, in the absence of a failure.
Further study needs to be conducted to develop a robust mechanism to detect
loss of wing surface failure during any phase of the flight. One possible solution is
to develop a adapting threshold, which will adapt to the phase of the flight with
time. Another approach could be the use of multiple thresholds monitoring various
signals (not just p˙) to identify a loss of wing surface failure.
6.6.4 AFDIA Execution Time Analysis
One of the important aspects to consider for an AFDIA scheme is the time it takes to
execute. In Tables 6.6 and 6.7, the execution time of the AFDIA scheme for left and
right wing failures respectively, are summarised. The tables compare the execution
time before and after failure. To enable the comparison, the results are based on
data 20 sec before and after failure. Each of the results presented is the average
of 10 experiments for a set combination of window size (n) and scalar multiple (c).
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The results for the individual experiments are presented in Appendix C.
From the results presented in these tables, it can be said that on average the
execution time of the AFIDA scheme before failure is about 7.36 µsec. Following
a failure, the execution time increases to about an average of 0.455 msec. This
increase in execution time is due to the on-line adaptation of the NN roll controller.
It is expected that the execution time will increase with increasing window size (n).
This is because there are more data with increasing window size (n) that would
need to be processed for adapting the controller. However, at these time resolution
(around 0.1 msec), their differences are insignificant.
Table 6.6: Summary of AFDIA execution time before and after loss of left wing
surface. Each mean and standard deviation value presented here is based on the
average of 10 experiments for the set combination of window size (n) and scalar
multiple (c).
Before Fail (sec) After Fail (sec)
Window Scalar Mean SD Mean SD
5 1 7.41 µ 4.62 µ 0.477 m 0.455 m
2 7.69 µ 3.11 µ 0.599 m 0.403 m
3 7.03 µ 2.89 µ 0.396 m 0.239 m
4 7.65 µ 1.30 µ 0.463 m 0.261 m
Average 7.45 µ 2.43 µ 0.484 m 0.340 m
10 1 7.41 µ 5.50 µ 0.432 m 0.388 m
2 7.32 µ 0.379 m 0.497 m 0.404 m
3 7.21 µ 3.64 µ 0.389 m 0.197 m
4 7.07 µ 3.68 µ 0.392 m 0.185 m
Average 7.25 µ 0.0980 m 0.428 m 0.294 m
15 1 7.27 µ 5.67 µ 0.440 m 0.376 m
2 7.24 µ 4.41 µ 0.414 m 0.334 m
3 7.33 µ 3.24 µ 0.450 m 0.204 m
4 7.49 µ 5.06 µ 0.416 m 0.230 m
Average 7.33 µ 4.60 µ 0.430 m 0.286 m
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At the beginning of the AFDIA experiment setup section (see Section 6.5.1), it
was mentioned that the AFDIA scheme was set to execute at 25 Hz, although the
NN roll controller was developed based on data collected at 50 Hz. This limit was
applied due to the timing constrains imposed by the X-Plane simulator execution
demands and the need to log various simulation data. From the results it is clear
that the scheme can comfortability be implemented within 50 Hz (0.04 sec), even
when the NN controller is adapting post failure.
Table 6.7: Summary of AFDIA execution time before and after loss of right wing
surface. Each mean and standard deviation value presented here is based on the
average of 10 experiments for the set combination of window size (n) and scalar
multiple (c).
Before Fail (sec) After Fail (sec)
Window Scalar Mean SD Mean SD
5 1 7.49 µ 3.12 µ 0.387 m 0.321 m
2 6.91 µ 2.24 µ 0.398 m 0.275 m
3 7.44 µ 2.90 µ 0.527 m 0.279 m
4 7.76 µ 1.91 µ 0.521 m 0.259 m
Average 7.40 µ 2.54 µ 0.458 m 0.284 m
10 1 7.41 µ 6.51 µ 0.367 m 0.205 m
2 7.59 µ 3.10 µ 0.501 m 0.188 m
3 7.66 µ 2.63 µ 0.552 m 0.302 m
4 7.01 µ 2.65 µ 0.406 m 0.180 m
Average 7.42 µ 3.72 µ 0.457 m 0.219 m
15 1 7.54 µ 4.70 µ 0.570 m 0.328 m
2 7.15 µ 2.22 µ 0.445 m 0.241 m
3 7.37 µ 3.44 µ 0.473 m 0.195 m
4 7.21 µ 3.18 µ 0.415 m 0.158 m
Average 7.32 µ 3.39 µ 0.476 m 0.231 m
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6.7 Reflective Improvement of the AFDIA Scheme
Based on the observations made from the results of the 240 experiments conducted,
improvements are made to the AFDIA scheme. These improvements are discussed
in this section.
6.7.1 Euler angle based error function
In the AFDIA scheme, the Jroll function (see equation (6.3)) used to guide the on-
line adaptation of the NN roll controller is based on the roll rate (p) of the aircraft.
Following the loss of wing surface, the aircraft will go into an uncontrollable spin.
The roll rate is used based on the assumption that if the aircraft stops spinning and
is in equilibrium, the roll rate would be approximately 0 deg/sec. However, there
are certain disadvantages of using the roll rate for guiding the adaptation process.
To understand the downside of using the roll rate, consider the roll rate and NN
roll command (δˆ) plots in Figures 6.8 and 6.9. Notice that in Figure 6.8, for small
fluctuations in the roll rate, the Jroll value would fluctuate accordingly, resulting in
small fluctuations in the adapting NN roll controller output. When the fluctuations
are small, the NN controller adaptation process fluctuates accordingly within small
ranges. What happens if the fluctuations are large?
Such a case is observable in Figure 6.9, where the value of the scalar multiple
c is 4. The scalar multiple c magnifies the fluctuations in the roll rate, resulting
in large fluctuations in the Jroll value calculated using equation (6.3). These large
changes in the Jroll value result in the adaptation process of the NN roll controller
fluctuating significantly, resulting in significant fluctuations in the NN roll controller
output. The significant fluctuation in adapting controller output produces propor-
tional fluctuations in the roll rate, which then feeds back to the Jroll function and
the outcome repeats. These fluctuations in the Jroll value (driven by the roll rate)
are counter productive to the NN adaptation process and could further destabilise
the aircraft. The importance of the scalar multiple c in the Jroll function was shown
in the results discussion in Section 6.6.2 where, with increasing value of c, the flight
duration following failure increased. However, from the discussion in this section, it
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is clear that use of roll rate in the Jroll function could be counter productive to the
objective of the AFDIA scheme.
Reflecting on these observations from the AFDIA experiments conducted, the
Jroll function to guide the adaptation of the NN roll controller is modified to use
the roll Euler angle (φ) instead. A Jroll function using the Euler angle (φ) is linear
compared to one based on the roll rate (p). Following a loss of wing surface, the ob-
jective of the AFDIA scheme is to use the aileron on the healthy wing to compensate
for the failure induced rolling moment and try to stabilise the aircraft. To achieve
this using the Euler angle based Jroll function, the NN roll controller is adapted to
try to level the aircraft where the roll Euler angle is 0 deg. Therefore the adaptation
guiding function in equation (6.3) can be written as follows:
Jroll = c×m(φref − φ) (6.6)
where:
c : is a scalar multiple
φ : is the roll Euler angle in deg
φref : is the desired roll Euler angle, which is 0 deg in level flight
m(x) : 2 × x + 30
60
− 1
The m(x) function as described in equation (3.21) scales the difference between
the desired and actual roll Euler angle (φref −φ) to the range of ± 1. This function
assumes that the maximum and minimum value of the roll Euler angle will in the
± 30 deg range. If the Euler angle exceeds this range, then the function will scale
it accordingly.
6.7.2 On-line Learning and Stopping Condition
The FCC NN based roll controller is adapted on-line using the NBN learning algo-
rithm and sliding data window technique. The on-line adaptation of the controller
is similar to the off-line training. In the case of the off-line training, a large dataset
is used to train the controller. Similarly in on-line learning, a sliding data window
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is used to adapt the controller. However, the size of the sliding data window is
significantly smaller than the dataset used to train the controller off-line.
When the controller is trained off-line, the error to guide the training process of
the controller is derived as follows:
esum =
p∑
dp − op (6.7)
where esum is the error calculated by summing the error between the desired (d)
and actual output (o), for every pattern (p) or samples in the dataset. In the
off-line training phase, the NN controller is learning to mimic the output of the
flight controller roll command. This is the desired output (d) and the NN controller
output (o) is the actual output. However in the presented AFDIA scheme, when the
controller is adapting on-line following a failure, the flight controller roll command
cannot be used as the desired output (d), since the dynamics of the system have
changed. Instead a desired value is derived from the post failure system using
equation (6.3). Hence, equation (6.7) can be rewritten as
esum =
n∑
Jrolln − on (6.8)
where esum is the error calculated by summing the error between the function (Jroll)
and actual output (o) of the NN controller, for every pattern or number of time
steps (n) in the sliding data window. As mentioned earlier, Jroll is the guiding
function for on-line adaptation of the NN controller. In the AFDIA experiments
presented in Section 6.6, this function derived its value from the error between the
reference (pref ) and actual (p) roll rate. This function has since been updated in the
previous section to derive its value from the difference between the desired (φref )
and actual (φ) roll Euler angle (see equation (6.6)).
In the Jroll function, what happens if the difference approaches 0, as the controller
adapts to bring the aircraft to equilibrium? The guiding error function Jroll tends
towards 0 and if the adaptation continues, the on-line training error value could be
approximated as
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esum ≈
n∑
− o (6.9)
essentially feeding the adapted NN controller output as the error itself. This would
degrade the adapting NN controller from the adapted controller state. Therefore
a stopping condition is introduced in the AFDIA scheme to stop the adaptation
at some point. To stop the adaptation process, the NN controller output (δˆA) is
continuously monitored. The condition for stopping the adaptation process can be
stated as follows:
“Stopping Condition: If the controller output (δˆA) converges to a value and
remains within a tolerance range for a set period of time (t), the adaptation process
can be terminated.”
In essence, this condition checks if the controller output has converged to a value
and therefore stop any further adaptation of the NN controller. In the improved
AFDIA scheme, the time period for this condition to be satisfied is set to t = 1 sec.
Since the scheme executes at 25 Hz, this condition has to be satisfied 25 times
continuously before the adaptation is terminated.
This stopping condition is implemented by using an error value, SCONerr and
error tolerance range γ . To check if the controller output has converged and is within
a tolerance error range, the error value SCONerr is calculated after every adaptation
of the controller, by subtracting the current output (δˆA) after adaptation from the
average of the previous consecutive outputs when the condition was satisfied. For
example, at time k, where k > time of failure (Tfail), the error value SCONerr is
calculated as follows:
SCONerr = δˆ(k)−
m∑
i=1
δˆ(k − i)
i
(6.10)
where i is a counter value that tracks the number of consecutive times the value of
SCONerr was within the tolerance range γ. Based on limited experiments conducted
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to find a suitable value for the tolerance range, γ is set to 0.1. The maximum value of
i is m = 25, as the stopping condition has to be satisfied 25 times. If the difference
between the two are within the defined tolerance range γ, the counter value i is
incremented. If the count i reaches the maximum value, i = m = 25, indicating
that the stopping condition is satisfied for the stated time period, the adaptation
is terminated. However, if the error SCONerr is not within the γ range, the count
value (i) is reset to 1, and the sum of the previous output values is reset to the
current output. This stopping condition process can also be described in a pseudo
code form as presented in Figure 6.11.
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to find a suitable value for the tolerance range, γ is set to 0.1. The maximum value of
i is m = 25, as the stopping condition has to be satisfied 25 times. If the difference
between the two are within the defined tolerance range γ, the counter value i is
incremented. If the count i reaches the maximum value, i = m = 25, indicating
that the stopping condition is satisfied f e stated time period, the adaptation
is terminated. However, if the error SC err is not within the γ range, the count
value (i) is reset to 1, and the sum of the previous output values is reset to the
current output. This stopping condition process can also be described in a pseudo
code form as presented in Figure 6.11.
Algorithm 1: Pseudo Code for the On-line Adaptation Stopping Condition
1 if first time of execution then
2 i = 1;
3 sum of previous output = current output;
4 else
5 calculate the error between the current output and average of the previous
output SCONerr = δˆ(k)−
m∑
i=1
δˆ(k−i)
i
6 if SCONerr <= γ then
7 i = i+ 1;
8 if i = m then
9 Stop Adaptation;
10 Adapt = 2;
11 end
12 else
13 Reset the count;
14 i = 1
15 end
16 end
Figure 6.11: Pseudo code for the on-line adaptation stopping condition.
In the improved AFDIA scheme, a state flag called ‘Adapt’ is used to implement
the stopping condition. This state indicator flag has 3 possible values, namely, 0, 1
and 2. When no failure is detected by the FDI stage of the AFDIA scheme, Adapt
is set to 0, indicating that there is no need for adapting the controller. If a failure is
detected in the FDI stage (FL/R = 1), the Adapt flag is set to 1 to indicate that the
NN controller is adapting on-line following a failure. Once the stopping condition
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In the improved AFDIA scheme, a state flag called ‘Adapt’ is used to implement
the stopping condition. This state indicator flag has 3 possible values, namely, 0, 1
and 2. When no failure is detected by the FDI stage of the AFDIA scheme, Adapt
is set to 0, indicating that there is no need for adapting the controller. If a failure is
detected in the FDI stage (FL/R = 1), the Adapt flag is set to 1 to indicate that the
NN controller is adapting on-line following a failure. Once the stopping condition
for terminating the adaptation process is satisfied, the state of the Adapt is set to
2.
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In the next section, the operational outline of the improved AFDIA scheme is
presented.
6.7.3 Improved AFDIA Scheme Operational Overview
In Figure 6.12 the flow chart for the improved AFDIA scheme is presented. As with
the original scheme, the first step is failure detection and identification (FDI), where
the roll acceleration (p˙) sensor measurements are monitored. Failure is detected
when the roll acceleration measurement crosses a fixed threshold of τ = 35 deg/sec2.
Once the failure is detected, the failed wing is identified using the direction of the
fluctuation in the roll acceleration (p˙) measurements.
The AFDIA scheme has two failure flags, FL and FR, for the left and right wing
failure, respectively. If a failure is detected, the FL/R flag sets to 1, otherwise the flag
remains at the default value of 0. In addition, the scheme has a Adapt flag, which
helps to implement the stopping condition. If no failure is detected, there is no need
for the NN controller to adapt, therefore Adapt = 0. If a failure is detected, the
need for adapting the NN controller is indicated by setting Adapt = 1. Therefore
the FDI stage of the AFDIA scheme can be summarised as follows:
FL, Adapt =

1, if p˙ ≤ −τ
0, otherwise
(6.11)
FR, Adapt =

1, if p˙ ≥ +τ
0, otherwise
(6.12)
After the FDI stage of the scheme, the sliding data window is updated with the
variables of the current time step. Similar to the original scheme, the fourth variable
stored in the data window depends on the outcome of the FDI stage. If no failure is
detected, (i.e. FL/R = 0), then the fourth variable stored in the window is the roll
control command (Jroll = δA). However, if a failure is detected (i.e. FL/R = 1),
then the fourth variable stored is the Jroll value calculated using equation (6.6).
In the failure accommodation (FA) stage, the NN roll controller adapts to the
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Figure 6.12: The Improved AFDIA Scheme.
post failure dynamics of the aircraft. The objective is to adapt to use the aileron
on the healthy wing to balance the failure induced rolling moment and stabilise the
aircraft. To achieve this objective the controller aims to return the aircraft to level
flight condition, where φ = 0 deg. The adaptation of the roll controller is indicated
by Adapt = 1. Once the stopping condition is satisfied, the adaptation process is
terminated, indicated by Adapt = 2.
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6.8 Improved AFDIA Experimental Setup and
Overview
The implementation of the improved AFDIA scheme in X-Plane and the simulation
conditions are the same as the experiments for the original design of the AFDIA
scheme. For the improved AFDIA scheme, only 20 experiments are conducted, 10
each for the loss of left and right wing surface. In these experiments, the sliding
data window size (n) and the scalar multiple (c) are kept constant at 15 and 4,
respectively. Each of these experiments were conducted for a duration of 5 minutes
each.
6.9 Results and Discussion
6.9.1 Post Failure Aircraft Behaviour
Following the loss of wing surface, the AFDIA scheme attempts to bring the aircraft
back to equilibrium and maintain flight. To do this the scheme uses the remaining
aileron on the healthy wing and tries to achieve level flight (where φ = 0 deg), to
produce the required moment to compensate for the failure induced rolling moment.
As mentioned during the development of the original AFDIA scheme, an ideal sce-
nario would be if the aircraft maintains flight following the loss of wing surface.
Using the improved AFDIA scheme, this ideal scenario is achieved.
Figure 6.13 presents one of the AFDIA scheme results following the loss of left
wing surface failure. Note that the plots in figure starts from 20 sec before failure
and ends 60 sec after failure. The time of failure is indicated by the red vertical
line. Immediately after the failure, the roll Euler angle starts to change rapidly,
indicating a rapid turn along the roll axis of the aircraft. As is obvious, the aircraft
rolls to the left side following the failure. The rapid turn along the roll axis would
generate significant acceleration, which is visible from the roll acceleration plot.
This significant jump in the roll acceleration crosses the fault detection threshold
immediately after the failure. Notice the change in the Adapt flag from state 0 to 1,
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confirming the detection of the failure and therefore the need to adapt the NN roll
controller.
The NN controller adapts immediately following the failure, resulting in an in-
creasing output command ( output increases towards +1), until it settles at about
+0.8. Notice the change in the state of the Adapt flag, which changes from 1 to 2,
indicating that the NN controller has adapted to control the aircraft with the post
failure dynamics. The result of the swift reaction from the NN controller is that
the aircraft achieves a steady attitude and avoids an uncontrollable spin. This is
observable from the roll Euler plot following the failure in Figure 6.13. From the
roll Euler plot it is clear that although the roll attitude remains steady, the aircraft
has not achieved level flight, where the roll Euler angle would be 0 deg. Instead, the
aircraft maintains an almost steady roll attitude of about −6 deg.
The roll attitude stabilises when the failure induced rolling moment is balanced
by the moment generated by the aileron on the healthy wing. In Figure 6.13,
this is achieved when the roll Euler angle is about −6 deg. It must be mentioned
that the aircraft is flying in a dynamic environment, simulated by the X-Plane
weather system, where it is constantly effected by environmental conditions such
as wind direction and speed among other weather phenomenon. With 66% of the
wing surface missing, the aircraft is highly unstable to these dynamic changes in
environmental forces which effect the rolling moment.
From the roll Euler plot in Figure 6.13, notice that after a while the Euler
angle slowly drifts away from about −6 deg. To counteract this drift, the NN roll
controller output slowly increases from about +0.8. At 120 sec, the Euler angle
starts to gradually slide away, until a maximum of about −14 deg is achieved at
approximately 135 sec. By 120 sec, the NN controller output is already at the
maximum output value of +1, to counteract the change in Euler angle. This drift
in the aircraft attitude and the subsequent changes are due to the change in the
rolling moment that needs to be balanced. The dynamic environmental conditions
are affecting the rolling moment that needs to be balanced to maintain a steady
roll attitude. The NN controller deflects the aileron on the healthy wing to the
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Figure 6.13: Aircraft Performance Results for Left Wing Failure. The Red line
marks when the failure was injected.
127
Chapter 6. The AFDIA Scheme
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
−200
−100
0
100
200
Time (sec)
(d
eg
/s
ec
2 )
 
 
Roll Acc.
Threshold
(a) Roll Acceleration
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
0
10
20
30
40
Time (sec)
(d
eg
/s
ec
)
 
 
Roll Rate
(b) Roll Rate
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Time (sec)
(d
eg
)
 
 
Roll Euler
(c) Roll Euler
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Time (sec)
R
a
t
io
 
 
NN Roll Cmd
AP Roll Cmd
(d) Roll Command
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Time (sec)
F
la
g
 
 
Adapt
(e) Adapt Flag
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
1400
1600
1800
2000
Time (sec)
(m
et
re
s)
 
 
Altitude MSL
(f) Altitude
Figure 6.14: Aircraft Performance Results for Right Wing Failure. The Red line
marks when the failure was injected.
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Figure 6.15: Aircraft Performance Results for Right Wing Failure. The Red line
marks when the failure was injected.
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maximum, in order to compensate for the change in rolling moment. Eventually,
the rolling moment that needs to be balanced changes and at about 140 sec, the
Euler angle starts to return back towards the post failure steady state and settles
at about −6 sec again.
In Figure 6.14 the simulation result following a loss of right wing surface is
presented. In many ways the result is similar to the left wing failure in Figure 6.13.
However, it does display some interesting behaviour, not present in Figure 6.13.
In Figure 6.14, the roll acceleration crosses the fault detection threshold (τ)
and triggers the adaptation of the controller (Adapt = 1) immediately following the
failure. The NN controller output rapidly increases to the maximum output of −1 in
order to compensate for the failure induced rolling moment. Within a few seconds,
the NN controller is adapted and any further adaptation is terminated, by setting
Adapt = 2, as can be seen from the adapt flag plot.
From the Euler angle plot in Figure 6.14, notice that immediately following a
failure, the Euler angle changes rapidly. Due to the response of the controller, the
Euler angle peaks at about 8 deg, before returning towards level flight, where the
roll Euler angle is 0 deg. Unlike the results presented in Figure 6.13, the aircraft
approaches 0 deg roll attitude or level flight. However, an interesting behaviour is
observed when the Euler angle approaches 0 deg.
Notice from the NN roll controller command plot in Figure 6.14 that as soon
as roll attitude approaches 0 deg (at about 80 sec), the controller output flips to
the maximum output of +1. This results in the Euler angle rapidly changing to a
maximum of 17 deg, indicating a sudden rolling of the aircraft. The NN controller
returns to the desirable output of −1, shortly after the flip. This results in the
aircraft returning towards a level flight attitude. Once again, when the Euler angle
approaches 0 deg (at about 93 sec), the NN controller outputs flips and the Euler
angle changes rapidly.
This behaviour where the NN roll controller output flips when the Euler angle
approaches 0 deg is what the stopping condition discussed in Section 6.7.2 was
designed to avoid. This behaviour is a sign of the NN controller degradation from
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the ideal adapted state of the controller. The degradation is the result of the on-line
learning mechanism used to adapt the NN roll controller.
As described in Section 6.7.2, the on-line learning mechanism works on using
the difference in the desired and the actual Euler angle (i.e. φref − φ) in the Jroll
function presented in equation (6.6). The NN roll controller is adapted on-line by
using the difference between the Jroll value and the NN controller output as the
learning error. After a failure, when the aircraft roll attitude approaches the Euler
angle of 0 deg, the value of Jroll approaches 0. Around this time, if the on-line
learning process continues, the output of the NN controller would be greater than
Jroll and eventually feed itself as the learning error as described in equation (6.9).
This would result in the degradation of the adapted controller that managed to
bring the aircraft back to an Euler angle of 0 deg following a failure. Therefore
a stopping condition was introduced (see Section 6.7.2) to terminate the learning
process around this time. However, from the results presented in Figure 6.14, it is
clear that the stopping condition was not effective in stopping the controller degra-
dation. Although throughout the simulation the aircraft maintains flight following
the failure, the ideal controller has been degraded to an extent.
Note that such a behaviour of controller degradation was not observed in the
results presented in Figure 6.13 because the Euler angle never approached 0 deg.
There are examples in the conducted experiments where the stopping condition
was very effective in preventing the degradation of the adapted controller. As an
example, consider the results presented in Figure 6.15 following a loss of right wing
surface. At around 98 sec, the NN roll controller manages to bring the aircraft roll
attitude to 0 deg, after the failure. Note that there are some signs of controller
degradation from the fluctuations in the controller output. But these fluctuations
are minor compared to the degradation in the results presented in Figure 6.14. In
addition, the Euler angle remains steady at 0 deg during these minor fluctuations
in controller output.
Figures 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15 are some of the results from the 20 experiments con-
ducted using the improved AFDIA scheme. These results encapsulate the observed
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behaviour of the aircraft post failure in all 20 experiments. Using the improved AF-
DIA scheme, during the duration of the experiments, the aircraft was able to main-
tain flight following about 66% loss of wing surface. This is a remarkable achievement
compared to the original AFDIA scheme results presented in Section 6.6.
The improved AFDIA scheme implements a stopping mechanism to terminate
the on-line adaptation of the NN roll controller, post failure. This has contributed
to the success of the improved scheme. However, issues with this were highlighted
in the above results discussion. Further study needs to be conducted to identify a
better guiding function for the on-line adaptation of the controller. In conjunction
with this, other mechanisms to terminate the on-line adaptation of the NN roll
controller must be explored.
Although mentioned earlier, note that the AFDIA scheme only implements an
NN roll controller. Following a failure, the pitch and yaw command output is set
to 0. This decision was made due to the timing constraints on the research. In
addition, implementing just the NN roll controller would enable the understanding
of the behaviour of the aircraft post failure with just the adapting NN roll control.
This knowledge could then be used in future work while developing the NN pitch
and yaw controller.
As is obvious, setting the pitch and yaw control command output to 0 post
failure does effect the behaviour of the aircraft following a failure. The aircraft does
not maintain a fixed altitude or heading following a failure. Based on the effects of
the environmental factors (e.g. wind direction) and with 66 % of the wing surface
missing, the aircraft changes altitude and heading randomly. However, the NN roll
controller keeps control of the aircraft roll post failure and avoids going into an
uncontrollable spin.
6.9.2 AFDIA Execution and Adaptation Time
In the original AFDIA scheme presented in Section 6.4, the execution time was
compared based on data 20 sec before and after failure. Such a comparison cannot be
made here due to the addition of the stopping condition to terminate the adaptation
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process following the failure. However, a fair comparison between the two AFDIA
schemes can be made based on data before failure.
In Table 6.8, analysis of the AFDIA scheme execution time is presented based
on 20 sec of data before the controller adaptation (i.e. before failure). This table
presents the results for the 20 experiments conducted, 10 each for the left and right
wing surface loss failure. On average, the execution time of the improved AFDIA
scheme is about 7.45 µsec. This is not very different from the execution times of the
original AFIDA scheme. At this time resolution, the change in the execution time
based on the addition of the simple stopping condition is negligible.
Table 6.8: Analysis of the improved AFDIA execution time over 20 seconds before
the controller adaptation.
Left Wing Right Wing
Exp.No. Mean SD Mean SD
(sec) (sec) (sec) (sec)
1 7.00 µ 5.00 µ 7.00 µ 1.00 µ
2 7.00 µ 2.00 µ 7.00 µ 1.00 µ
3 8.00 µ 9.00 µ 7.00 µ 2.00 µ
4 7.00 µ 1.00 µ 7.00 µ 1.00 µ
5 0.0120 m 0.130 m 7.00 µ 6.00 µ
6 7.00 µ 2.00 µ 7.00 µ 6.00 µ
7 7.00 µ 6.00 µ 7.00 µ 1.00 µ
8 8.00 µ 6.00 µ 7.00 µ 6.00 µ
9 7.00 µ 1.00 µ 7.00 µ 7.00 µ
10 8.00 µ 9.00 µ 8.00 µ 6.00 µ
Average 7.80 µ 0.0171 m 7.10 µ 3.70 µ
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present the time taken for the controller to adapt following
failure and the mean execution time of the AFDIA scheme during the adaptation
period, for left and right wing respectively. It can be said that on average the
controller adapts within 2.21 sec. The average execution time of the improved
AFDIA scheme during this adaptation period is about 0.403 msec. This is very
similar to the results of the original AFDIA scheme, following the failure. Once
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again, these result confirm that the improved AFDIA scheme can execute at 50 Hz
if necessary.
Table 6.9: Analysis of the improved AFDIA scheme execution and adaptation time
following a loss of left wing surface.
Exp. No. Mean Exe. Time SD Adaptation Time
(sec) (sec) (sec)
1 0.415 m 0.208 m 3.475
2 0.412 m 0.136 m 1.857
3 0.419 m 0.177 m 1.843
4 0.443 m 0.185 m 1.989
5 0.355 m 0.190 m 1.822
6 0.425 m 0.197 m 2.194
7 0.427 m 0.167 m 2.404
8 0.490 m 0.395 m 2.147
9 0.431 m 0.143 m 1.850
10 0.433 m 0.199 m 2.017
Average 0.425 m 0.200 m 2.160
SD 0.499
6.10 Endurance Post Failure
In the original AFDIA scheme, evidence of endurance could be seen from the increase
in flight duration post failure when compared against the X-Plane autopilot. The
experiments conducted using the original scheme were terminated when the aircraft
eventually crashed. With the improved AFDIA scheme, the aircraft managed to
achieve the ideal goal of not crashing following a failure. With 66% of the wing
surface missing, the aircraft maintained flight, which is a significant improvement
in endurance when compared to the original AFDIA scheme.
In the interests of time, the 20 experiments conducted using the improved AF-
DIA scheme were limited to the duration of 5 minutes. During this duration the
aircraft avoided going into an uncontrollable spin and crashing. In addition to the
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Table 6.10: Analysis of the improved AFDIA scheme execution and adaptation time
following a loss of right wing surface.
Exp. No. Mean Exe. Time SD Adaptation Time
(sec) (sec) (sec)
1 0.382 m 0.166 m 2.096
2 0.277 m 0.225 m 2.814
3 0.360 m 0.226 m 2.314
4 0.435 m 0.390 m 2.364
5 0.390 m 0.331 m 2.268
6 0.416 m 0.298 m 2.164
7 0.371 m 0.428 m 2.157
8 0.380 m 0.335 m 2.263
9 0.375 m 0.152 m 1.975
10 0.419E m 0.290 m 2.200
Average 0.381 m 0.284 m 2.262
SD 0.224
20 experiments conducted, 6 additional experiments were conducted using the im-
proved AFDIA scheme.
In these experiments, 3 each are conducted for the loss of left and right wing
surface. The aim of these experiments was to demonstrate the added endurance
using the improved AFDIA scheme, following a 66% loss of wing surface. The
results from these experiments are presented in Figures 6.16 through to 6.21.
In these additional experiments, the X-Plane simulation using the improved AF-
DIA scheme was left to run for a minimum of 2 hours following a failure. During this
duration, the aircraft maintained flight with 66% of the wing surface missing. Hence,
demonstrating the endurance added by the improved AFDIA over long duration, in
the presence of severe loss of wing surface.
6.11 To Learn or Not to Learn
This section is independent of the results presented in this chapter. Instead, the aim
here is to express the view of the author on how the schemes (SFDIA and AFDIA)
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developed in this thesis could be considered for industrial implementation. These
implementation issues are discussed from the perspective of the need to learn (or
adapt on-line).
Before an aircraft system is in service, it has to be certified to add confidence
in the system and meet strict safety requirements. This certification also applies
to the control software on-board the aircraft systems. Certification is provided by
authorities such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the US or the
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the UK. The main document used as a guideline
for the certification process is the DO-178 [101].
In accordance with this document, it is challenging to certify control software
that is adaptive in nature. One of the major obstacles here is that adaptive control
systems, such as the AFDIA scheme presented here, are considered non deterministic
in nature and therefore it is harder to verify the stability of the control software. Due
to this, the aerospace industry in general is reluctant to use such adaptive systems
in practice. However, an argument can be made to use such systems, by considering
when the system learns or adapts on-line.
In [37], the authors present an SFDIA scheme using NNs. Another NN based
SFDIA is presented by the authors in [11]. In both of these schemes, the NN
sensor estimators adapt on-line, even in the absence of failure. The main reasoning
here is that the estimators improve their estimations by adapting to the dynamic
environment of the aircraft. When a sensor failure occurs, the on-line learning is
terminated to avoid degrading the sensor estimations. However, the question has to
be raised on the necessity to learn in the absence of failure.
The SFDIA scheme presented in this thesis does not learn in the presence or
absence of failure. Once the NN based estimators are developed, their structure
remains fixed (i.e. no change in the weights or the number of neurons) through-
out their lifetime. The reasoning for this is that if the NN based sensor estimators
produce good estimates of the hardware sensors, there is no need to adapt the esti-
mators on-line to the changing dynamics of the aircraft environment. The hardware
sensors have already been certified and are implemented in practical systems, with-
136
Chapter 6. The AFDIA Scheme
out any need to adapt to the environment dynamics. Therefore, if the structure
of the NN based sensor estimations are fixed, they can be classed as deterministic
software and considered for certification using the existing practices.
Additionally in [11], the AFDIA scheme implements NN based pitch, roll and
yaw controllers that adapt in the absence of failures. Once again, the argument
here is to improve the controller estimation with the changing aircraft dynamics.
Once a failure occurs, the NN controllers adapt using different guiding functions to
accommodate the failures. Similar to the SFDIA scheme, an argument can be made
that, if the NN controllers produce good estimates of the normal controls that have
already been certified and which do not adapt on-line, there is no need to adapt (or
learn) the NN based controllers in the absence of failures. Therefore, the NN based
controllers with fixed structure can be certified using existing practices. The NN
controllers will only adapt on-line when there is a failure (i.e. a need to learn the
new dynamics of the aircraft).
In conclusion, although NNs have learning capabilities, one should consider when
this is beneficial to the intended application.
6.12 Conclusion
In this chapter, an FCC NN based actuator failure detection, identification and
accommodation (AFDIA) scheme was presented. The aim of this scheme was to add
endurance to an aircraft following 66% loss of wing surface. This chapter presented
the development of an FCC NN based roll controller, which was used by the AFDIA
scheme. This FCC NN roll controller uses only 5 neurons to control the roll attitude
of an aircraft.
The experiments were conducted using the Airbus A320 aircraft model in X-
Plane. Following a 66% loss of wing surface, the aircraft under the control of X-
Plane built-in autopilot would go into an uncontrollable spin and crash. This can
be attributed to the fact that the autopilot is unaware of the change in dynamics of
the aircraft following such a sever failure. An ideal scenario for the AFDIA scheme
would be to maintain flight following a loss of the wing surface.
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Initially, an AFDIA scheme was developed and studied on 240 experiments.
Based on the observations from these experiments (Section 6.6), an improved version
of the AFDIA scheme was developed. In the original AFDIA scheme (Section 6.4),
the aircraft avoided going into an uncontrollable spin, like the results from the
X-Plane built-in autopilot (Section 6.2). The aircraft did eventually crash, but
the scheme increased the duration of the flight following a failure, when compared
against the X-Plane autopilot results. Hence, adding endurance to the aircraft in
presence of the failure. However, the ideal scenario of maintaining flight following
failure was not achieved.
With the improved AFDIA scheme (Section 6.7.3), not only did the aircraft
manage to avoid an uncontrollable spin, but also maintained flight following such a
severe failure. This is remarkable, considering the fact that the aircraft maintains
flight with 66% of the wing surface missing. Therefore, with the improved AFDIA
scheme, the ideal scenario of maintaining flight following this failure is achieved.
This is an exceptional addition of endurance to the aircraft system in the presence
of such an extreme failure. Due to timing constraints on the research, the improved
AFDIA scheme was evaluated on 20 experiments only, each for 5 minutes duration.
During the duration of these experiments, the aircraft did not crash following the
failure. However, to highlight the endurance added by the improved AFDIA scheme,
6 experiments were conducted, each of which spanned a duration of 2 hours. Dur-
ing these experiments, the aircraft maintained flight with 66% of the wing surface
missing. This demonstrated the endurance added by the improved AFDIA scheme
over long duration flight.
One of the drawbacks of the scheme was the use of the fixed threshold based
mechanism for fault detection. The threshold must be predetermined, taking into
account the probability of false detection and longer detection time. It must be
noted that, in all the experiments conducted in this chapter, the failure was promptly
detected and there was no false detection. However, this 100 % detection of failure
can be attributed to the fact that the failure simulations were limited to the straight
level flight manoeuvre phase of the aircraft. Further work needs to be conducted to
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improve on the detection mechanism.
In conclusion, an AFDIA scheme is presented in this chapter that can add en-
durance to an aircraft with 66% of the wing surface missing. The AFIDA scheme
manages to maintain flight in the presence of such a severe failure. The results pre-
sented in this chapter also validate the use of an FCC NN for AFDIA applications.
The AFDIA scheme is able to add such remarkable endurance with just 5 neurons
in the FCC NN based roll controller.
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Figure 6.16: Aircraft flight data over 2 hours following left wing failure. The Red
line marks when the failure was injected.
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Figure 6.17: Aircraft flight data over 2 hours following left wing failure. The Red
line marks when the failure was injected.
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Figure 6.18: Aircraft flight data over 2 hours following left wing failure. The Red
line marks when the failure was injected.
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Figure 6.19: Aircraft flight data over 2 hours following right wing failure. The Red
line marks when the failure was injected.
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Figure 6.20: Aircraft flight data over 2 hours following right wing failure. The Red
line marks when the failure was injected.
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Figure 6.21: Aircraft flight data over 2 hours following right wing failure. The Red
line marks when the failure was injected.
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“Success is going from failure to failure without losing your enthusiasm.”
– Winston Churchill
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Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Research Overview
The endurance of an aircraft in presence of failures can be improved if the flight
control system is tolerant to failures. Two of the major types of failure in aircraft
systems are sensor and actuator failures. In this research, schemes for fault tolerant
flight control systems (FTFCS) were developed to add endurance to an aircraft in
the presence of failures. To that end, two schemes were developed:
1. Sensor failure, detection, identification and accommodation scheme (SFDIA)
2. Actuator failure, detection, identification and accommodations scheme (AF-
DIA)
These schemes are based on the fully connected cascade (FCC) neural network
(NN). The FCC NN architecture has been shown to be far more efficient and powerful
compared to the popular multilayer perceptron (MLP) NN architecture [25,60]. To
the best knowledge of the author, this is first time the benefits of the FCC NN
are harnessed for SFDIA and AFDIA in aircraft systems. The SFDIA and AFDIA
scheme developed are discussed in the following section, where the contributions of
this research are summarised.
147
Chapter 7. Conclusions and Future Work
7.2 Research Contribution
From the research conducted in this thesis, 3 main contributions can be identified.
These are as follows:
1. FCC NN for SFDIA and AFDIA
This research presented the development and application of SFDIA and AF-
DIA scheme based on the FCC NN. This is the first time the FCC NN archi-
tecture has been used for such application. Usually the popular choice for NN
applications is the MLP NN architecture [25,60]. However, this architecture is
not efficient and powerful when compared with the FCC NN. For example in
the results presented by the authors in [60] and [25], to solve a parity-15 prob-
lem, the MLP NN with 1 hidden layer required 15 neurons. In comparison,
the FCC NN was able to solve the problem using just 5 neurons. Additionally,
to solve a party-63 problem the FCC NN required 6 neurons compared to 63
by the MLP architecture.
In this research, FCC NN based pitch, roll and yaw rate sensor estimators
were developed. These estimators are part of the SFDIA scheme. Following a
failure in these sensors, the FCC NN based estimators replace the fault sensor
measurements. With as few as 2 neurons, the FCC NN was able to estimate
the yaw sensor measurements. The developed AFDIA scheme depends on an
FCC NN based roll controller. This controller is able to mimic the output
of the aircraft roll controller with 5 neurons. Following a severe loss of wing
surface, the FCC controller adapts to maintain flight. The results achieved
in this thesis validate the use of this NN architecture for SFDIA and AFDIA
applications in aircraft systems.
2. The SFDIA Scheme
One of the major types of failure in an aircraft system is sensor failure. The
endurance of an aircraft can be increased in the presence of sensor failure if
the aircraft system is capable of tolerating or accommodating it. This added
tolerance can be achieved by implementing a sensor failure detection, iden-
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tification and accommodation (SFDIA) scheme. In this research an SFDIA
scheme based on an FCC NN was developed.
In this scheme, FCC NN based pitch, roll and yaw rate sensor estimators were
developed. These estimators could replace the faulty physical sensor in case
of a failure. One notable outcome of the SFDIA scheme development was
the ability of the FCC NN to accurately estimate the yaw sensor measure-
ments with just 2 neurons. In total, 105 failure experiments were conducted
to analyse the developed SFDIA scheme. In these experiments, only 1 failure
went undetected. These results validate the use of the FCC NN based SFDIA
scheme, however, the scheme does have some shortcomings. These shortcom-
ings were explored in the relevant sections and solutions were proposed as part
of further work on improving the scheme.
One noteworthy limitation of the presented SFDIA scheme is the fixed thresh-
old based failure detection mechanism. Selecting a fixed fault threshold is a
challenging task especially in a dynamic system which is susceptible to noise
and modelling inaccuracy. If the threshold is too high, the fault might take
longer to be detected or worse, go undetected. Having a low threshold on
the other hand might increase the rate of false detection. Additionally, if the
dynamics of the system change in the future, the thresholds would have to
be evaluated and fixed again. An alternative to the fixed threshold based
detection mechanism is an adaptive threshold. In this mechanism, the fault
threshold adapts to the changes in the system dynamics with time. Such a
mechanism, as presented in the [50] and [96], would increase the robustness of
the SFDIA scheme developed in this research.
3. The AFDIA Scheme
Another major type of failure in an aircraft system is the failure of the ac-
tuators. In this research an FCC NN based actuator failure detection, iden-
tification and accommodation (AFDIA) scheme was developed. This scheme
aimed at accommodating a severe case of failure, where about 66% of the
wing surface is lost during flight. Successfully accommodating this would re-
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sult in a remarkable addition of endurance to an aircraft system. An ideal
scenario would be if the aircraft maintains flight with the loss of 66% of the
wing surface. To achieve this scenario, the scheme implemented a an FCC NN
based roll controller that could adapt on-line following a failure in order to
accommodate the failure.
Initially, 240 AFDIA experiments were conducted based on which the final
AFDIA scheme was proposed. The final AFDIA scheme was able to success-
fully accommodate such a severe failure, and achieved the ideal scenario of
maintaining flight following a 66% loss of wing surface. 6 simulation results
covering 2 hours of flight following the failure were presented to highlight the
remarkable display of added endurance using the final design of the AFDIA
scheme. The aircraft maintained flight over the 2 hours of simulation following
a 66% loss of wing surface.
Regardless of this success, the scheme does have some limitations which were
discussed in the relevant sections. One noteworthy limitation of the AFDIA
scheme was the use of fixed threshold based fault detection mechanism. This is
similar to the limitation of the SFDIA scheme discussed earlier, and a possible
alternative to this is the use of the adaptive threshold based mechanism. In
addition to this, in all the AFDIA experiments conducted the failure was
successfully detected.
However, theses results could have been favoured by the limitation of the exper-
iments to straight level flight. If the aircraft was making a turning manoeuvre
and/or was in a turbulent environment, it is possible that the roll accelera-
tion (p˙) signal monitored for fault detection would cross the fixed threshold.
This would result in false failure detection. Additional study needs to be con-
ducted to develop detection mechanisms, that would take into account the
flight phase of the aircraft, to ensure no false alarms are triggered. One pos-
sible solution is to monitor multiple signals to ensure the robustness of the
detection mechanism.
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7.3 Future Work
In this section, future work based on the research presented in this thesis is pro-
posed. Note that future work specific to improving the presented SFDIA and AFDIA
schemes has been discussed in the relevant sections of the thesis. The aim of this
section is to provide the reader with some possible future work to expand on the
research presented here.
1. Multiple Sensor Failure
The SFDIA scheme developed addressed failures in pitch, roll and yaw rate
sensors. The scheme however was limited to single sensor failure at a time.
Future work could focus on extending the scheme to addresses multiple sensor
failure at a time, similar to the research conducted by Samy [37].
2. Complete AFDIA Scheme
The developed AFDIA scheme added endurance to an aircraft in the presence
of 66% loss of wing surface. Due to timing constraints on the research, the
scheme only implemented an FCC NN based roll controller. Future work could
focus on developing an NN based pitch and yaw controller. These controllers
could further enhance the results achieved using just the roll controller. For
example, following a 66% loss of wing surface, the aircraft is able to maintain
flight using the NN based roll controller which is part of the AFDIA scheme.
Although the aircraft maintains flight following such a severe failure, it does
not maintain a fixed altitude or heading. This is due to the lack of pitch or
yaw control which is set to 0 following a failure.
The AFDIA scheme could be expanded to implement an FCC NN based pitch
and yaw controller, similar to the roll controller. This would further enhance
the capability of the AFDIA scheme by enabling the ability to control the pitch
and yaw attitude of the aircraft following a failure. In addition, implementing
the pitch and yaw controller could allow the AFDIA scheme to accommodate
loss of surface failures in the elevators and rudder of the aircraft.
3. Integration of the AFDIA and SFDIA Scheme
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The SFDIA and the AFDIA scheme presented were developed independently
of each other. However in practical applications one must consider how these
two schemes will interact with each other. This problem was not addressed in
this body of research. Future work needs to consider how these two schemes
could be integrated to function together in a harmonious fashion.
4. Using a Different Simulator
As mentioned earlier, the X-Plane simulator which is well known for its re-
alistic simulations was used for this research. However, some challenges were
encountered while using the simulator. These challenges and the intended
research for different types of actuator failures were discussed in Chapter 5.
Since the simulator only simulates loss of flying surface failures, additional
control actuator failures could not be explored. This is a key limitation of the
research presented here.
Changing the simulator would allow the exploration of the further develop-
ment of the AFDIA scheme, which accommodates a wide range of actuator
failures. In addition, the FCC NN could be used to develop a robust detection
mechanism that can detect a wide range of failures.
7.4 Summary
To conclude, the endurance of an aircraft can be increased in the presence of failures
if the aircraft implements a fault tolerant flight control system (FTFCS). FTFCS
can be achieved by implementing a failure detection, identification and accommo-
dation (FDIA) schemes. In this research a sensor failure detection, identification
and accommodation (SFDIA) and an actuator failure detection, identification and
accommodation (AFDIA) schemes were developed. These schemes are based on the
fully connected cascade (FCC) neural network (NN) architecture.
The SFDIA scheme can add endurance to an aircraft, following a pitch, roll
or yaw rate sensor failure. The AFDIA scheme only addresses a severe failure of
66% loss of wing surface. The scheme manages to add endurance to an aircraft by
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maintaining flight following a 66% loss of wing surface. The results presented in
this research validate the use of the FCC NN for SFDIA and AFDIA applications,
especially in aircraft systems.
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“If you’re absent during my struggle, don’t expect to be present during my
success.”
– Will Smith
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Appendix B
Wing Loss Failure Detection Time
Table B.1: Wing loss failure detection for window = 5, scalar = 1.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 150.2093 150.2445 0.0352 153.4508 153.4713 0.0204
2 170.5392 170.5796 0.0404 184.5443 184.5694 0.0251
3 143.5146 143.5789 0.0644 194.0704 194.0901 0.0197
4 189.1687 189.1915 0.0229 228.3029 228.3212 0.0182
5 132.6779 132.7407 0.0628 176.3582 176.4010 0.0427
6 142.0612 142.0849 0.0238 155.0044 155.0645 0.0601
7 169.9746 170.0213 0.0467 176.2123 176.2685 0.0563
8 170.4048 170.4354 0.0307 169.5892 169.6324 0.0431
9 157.0428 157.0884 0.0455 155.6791 155.7398 0.0607
10 161.6944 161.7281 0.0337 176.4925 176.5608 0.0683
Average 0.0406 0.0415
SD 0.0145 0.0194
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Table B.2: Wing loss failure detection for window = 5, scalar = 2.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 145.6527 145.7096 0.0569 166.9955 167.0497 0.0542
2 148.8450 148.8662 0.0211 189.5925 189.6095 0.0170
3 187.1584 187.2029 0.0446 164.9295 164.9783 0.0488
4 194.2176 194.2512 0.0336 173.7009 173.7484 0.0475
5 189.5728 189.5934 0.0206 170.6874 170.7298 0.0425
6 171.8127 171.8881 0.0754 181.5386 181.5931 0.0546
7 238.7266 238.7613 0.0346 145.0285 145.0559 0.0274
8 173.7110 173.7456 0.0346 163.8123 163.8484 0.0360
9 149.1387 149.1726 0.0339 154.8599 154.9047 0.0448
10 141.9343 141.9942 0.0599 187.2548 187.2708 0.0160
Average 0.0415 0.0389
SD 0.0176 0.0143
Table B.3: Wing loss failure detection for window = 5, scalar = 3.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 161.0309 161.0635 0.0326 80.6845 80.7080 0.0235
2 159.0683 159.1147 0.0463 90.7037 90.7395 0.0357
3 154.6511 154.6768 0.0258 90.6158 90.6498 0.0339
4 160.0643 160.1172 0.0529 90.7653 90.7891 0.0239
5 69.2255 69.2600 0.0345 66.6714 66.7080 0.0366
6 67.7085 67.7430 0.0345 91.7399 91.8022 0.0622
7 72.8978 72.9330 0.0352 78.7934 78.8304 0.0371
8 94.7390 94.7963 0.0573 75.6629 75.7257 0.0628
9 78.3245 78.3706 0.0461 74.3234 74.3511 0.0277
10 79.6691 79.6932 0.0242 76.7755 76.8040 0.0285
Average 0.0389 0.0372
SD 0.0112 0.0142
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Table B.4: Wing loss failure detection for window = 5, scalar = 1.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 68.2297 68.2892 0.0595 73.5369 73.5902 0.0534
2 85.9019 85.9587 0.0568 76.3093 76.3741 0.0648
3 90.3830 90.4226 0.0395 75.5405 75.5907 0.0502
4 80.6632 80.7038 0.0406 102.5565 102.5846 0.0281
5 80.8449 80.9104 0.0655 81.0155 81.0407 0.0253
6 76.1817 76.2323 0.0506 70.9078 70.9449 0.0371
7 85.5400 85.5884 0.0484 72.8010 72.8508 0.0498
8 80.6698 80.6946 0.0248 86.3452 86.3819 0.0367
9 76.0401 76.0650 0.0249 74.4326 74.4946 0.0620
10 73.8208 73.8876 0.0668 73.4776 73.5384 0.0607
Average 0.0477 0.0468
SD 0.0152 0.0142
Table B.5: Wing loss failure detection for window = 10, scalar = 1.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 80.7792 80.8262 0.0470 86.7793 86.8268 0.0476
2 78.1572 78.2050 0.0478 87.2424 87.3009 0.0585
3 80.5175 80.5769 0.0594 71.6131 71.6604 0.0473
4 75.8739 75.8973 0.0233 75.3718 75.4064 0.0347
5 81.2256 81.2491 0.0235 81.3047 81.3398 0.0351
6 91.0892 91.1470 0.0578 77.7362 77.7716 0.0354
7 75.9325 75.9793 0.0468 75.5302 75.5770 0.0469
8 76.1179 76.1527 0.0348 86.7858 86.8205 0.0348
9 81.2339 81.2922 0.0582 77.0848 77.1313 0.0465
10 70.7253 70.7834 0.0581 75.7555 75.7793 0.0238
Average 0.0457 0.0410
SD 0.0140 0.0100
xvi
Appendix B. Wing Loss Failure Detection Time
Table B.6: Wing loss failure detection for window = 10, scalar = 2.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 70.7193 70.7666 0.0473 70.5580 70.6163 0.0583
2 73.0351 73.0821 0.0470 78.1478 78.2068 0.0590
3 75.4610 75.5196 0.0586 73.7115 73.7480 0.0365
4 71.4530 71.4888 0.0357 70.9606 70.9855 0.0249
5 78.4922 78.5277 0.0355 71.0135 71.0631 0.0496
6 88.9384 88.9978 0.0594 72.5785 72.6033 0.0248
7 76.9918 77.0519 0.0601 75.8810 75.9452 0.0642
8 73.6007 73.6499 0.0492 70.9752 71.0266 0.0515
9 88.5065 88.5676 0.0611 71.4699 71.5365 0.0667
10 70.5100 70.5463 0.0363 74.4551 74.4938 0.0387
Average 0.0490 0.0474
SD 0.0105 0.0154
Table B.7: Wing loss failure detection for window = 5, scalar = 3.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 85.9712 86.0173 0.0461 67.6392 67.6742 0.0350
2 74.0665 74.1014 0.0348 70.9082 70.9553 0.0471
3 71.0192 71.0777 0.0584 78.3881 78.4502 0.0620
4 81.7382 81.7859 0.0476 70.4545 70.4791 0.0247
5 71.6353 71.6949 0.0596 72.6344 72.6733 0.0390
6 75.7505 75.8087 0.0581 70.4863 70.5229 0.0366
7 69.5616 69.5850 0.0234 69.3459 69.3710 0.0250
8 75.7232 75.7718 0.0486 70.1988 70.2260 0.0272
9 69.3601 69.4104 0.0503 77.0252 77.0922 0.0670
10 70.4438 70.4685 0.0247 73.3797 73.4069 0.0272
Average 0.0452 0.0391
SD 0.0133 0.0152
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Table B.8: Wing loss failure detection for window = 5, scalar = 4.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 74.6240 74.6836 0.0596 72.7998 72.8235 0.0237
2 75.2279 75.2630 0.0351 71.4469 71.4826 0.0357
3 79.4044 79.4281 0.0236 72.0546 72.1018 0.0472
4 73.5883 73.6363 0.0480 71.9588 72.0176 0.0588
5 73.8048 73.8631 0.0584 74.1592 74.2060 0.0469
6 73.5208 73.5682 0.0475 76.9473 76.9707 0.0234
7 73.0975 73.1208 0.0233 77.1843 77.2314 0.0471
8 76.4080 76.4675 0.0595 76.6338 76.6922 0.0584
9 73.8869 73.9334 0.0465 79.5101 79.5569 0.0468
10 76.6249 76.6600 0.0351 72.6063 72.6414 0.0351
Average 0.0437 0.0423
SD 0.0138 0.0126
Table B.9: Wing loss failure detection for window = 15, scalar = 1.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 71.6469 71.6822 0.0353 76.8948 76.9183 0.0236
2 77.9197 77.9546 0.0349 83.4240 83.4707 0.0468
3 73.4262 73.4495 0.0233 76.1094 76.1448 0.0353
4 73.3592 73.4059 0.0468 78.6395 78.6977 0.0582
5 71.8964 71.9201 0.0237 79.5126 79.5368 0.0243
6 76.0207 76.0673 0.0466 82.1412 82.1777 0.0364
7 76.9514 76.9751 0.0237 79.1593 79.1834 0.0241
8 75.6557 75.6794 0.0237 75.1402 75.1643 0.0241
9 80.1010 80.1249 0.0239 73.6826 73.7069 0.0243
10 82.6930 82.7283 0.0353 73.5186 73.5675 0.0489
Average 0.0317 0.0346
SD 0.0095 0.0128
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Table B.10: Wing loss failure detection for window = 15, scalar = 2.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 74.3368 74.3977 0.0609 85.0228 85.0803 0.0575
2 75.1422 75.2234 0.0811 76.9478 76.9829 0.0351
3 85.7658 85.7886 0.0228 75.1421 75.1888 0.0467
4 84.4270 84.4855 0.0585 82.0908 82.1491 0.0583
5 77.8633 77.8985 0.0352 76.0015 76.0607 0.0591
6 86.6682 86.7035 0.0353 73.6773 73.7009 0.0237
7 71.9630 71.9979 0.0349 78.6380 78.6740 0.0359
8 77.3724 77.4074 0.0349 80.5242 80.5827 0.0584
9 77.8936 77.9525 0.0589 81.0764 81.1147 0.0383
10 85.0382 85.0730 0.0348 82.5224 82.5470 0.0246
Average 0.0457 0.0438
SD 0.0180 0.0141
Table B.11: Wing loss failure detection for window = 15, scalar = 3.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 72.4499 72.4737 0.0238 99.0213 99.0782 0.0570
2 73.9562 73.9911 0.0348 77.8016 77.8251 0.0236
3 82.5639 82.5983 0.0345 81.9279 81.9747 0.0468
4 78.9039 78.9535 0.0496 83.7080 83.7316 0.0236
5 78.8983 78.9571 0.0588 87.8392 87.8847 0.0455
6 78.6266 78.6863 0.0597 88.9238 88.9720 0.0482
7 77.5355 77.5709 0.0353 85.5678 85.6161 0.0484
8 85.3709 85.4169 0.0460 88.0931 88.1161 0.0230
9 80.8130 80.8487 0.0357 88.7900 88.8281 0.0382
10 84.0983 84.1517 0.0534 75.2576 75.2922 0.0345
Average 0.0432 0.0389
SD 0.0120 0.0122
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Table B.12: Wing loss failure detection for window = 15, scalar = 4.
Left Wing Failure Time (sec) Right Wing Failure Time (sec)
No. Injection Detection Elapsed Injection Detection Elapsed
1 81.0614 81.0975 0.0360 80.9811 81.0166 0.0355
2 81.4565 81.5167 0.0602 107.8848 107.9082 0.0234
3 78.2466 78.3048 0.0582 137.6862 137.7240 0.0378
4 85.5152 85.5500 0.0348 86.0602 86.0942 0.0340
5 85.0523 85.1090 0.0566 104.5917 104.6387 0.0470
6 78.9414 78.9648 0.0235 122.8475 122.9080 0.0604
7 78.9922 79.0158 0.0236 127.9466 128.0069 0.0603
8 81.2929 81.3281 0.0352 148.3316 148.3754 0.0438
9 80.2570 80.2931 0.0361 109.2654 109.3023 0.0369
10 89.1300 89.1957 0.0657 122.4466 122.5085 0.0620
Average 0.0430 0.0441
SD 0.0157 0.0131
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Appendix C
Controller Run Time
Table C.1: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 1.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.00 µ 0.365 m 5.50 µ 0.430 m
2 7.10 µ 0.370 m 8.40 µ 0.411 m
3 7.30 µ 0.520 m 4.70 µ 0.339 m
4 8.40 µ 0.345 m 7.10 µ 0.325 m
5 7.10 µ 0.943 m 5.00 µ 0.830 m
6 7.60 µ 0.375 m 6.10 µ 0.370 m
7 8.10 µ 0.243 m 1.19 µ 0.229 m
8 6.80 µ 0.368 m 5.00 µ 0.373 m
9 7.20 µ 0.370 m 8.00 µ 0.403 m
10 7.50 µ 0.873 m 7.00 µ 0.836 m
Average 7.41 µ 0.477 m 4.62 µ 0.455 m
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Table C.2: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 1.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
2 7.50 µ 0.446 m 5.80 µ 0.341 m
3 7.40 µ 0.445 m 0.700 µ 0.240 m
4 7.50 µ 0.397 m 0.700 µ 0.393 m
5 7.00 µ 0.286 m 0.500 µ 0.233 m
6 6.90 µ 0.247 m 0.500 µ 0.146 m
7 7.70 µ 0.419 m 6.30 µ 0.482 m
8 8.10 µ 0.489 m 9.30 µ 0.49 m
9 7.80 µ 0.444 m 1.30 µ 0.199 m
10 7.40 µ 0.266 m 0.700 µ 0.175 m
Average 7.49 µ 0.387 m 3.12 µ 0.321 m
Table C.3: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 2.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.80 µ 0.338 m 0.900 µ 0.227 m
2 7.80 µ 0.816 m 0.800 µ 0.771 m
3 7.40 µ 0.456 m 1.20 µ 0.311 m
4 7.70 µ 1.21 m 6.60 µ 0.878 m
5 8.00 µ 0.601 m 0.900 µ 0.224 m
6 7.60 µ 0.492 m 5.00 µ 0.480 m
7 7.70 µ 0.526 m 4.70 µ 0.249 m
8 7.80 µ 0.517 m 5.10 µ 0.235 m
9 7.50 µ 0.517 m 5.20 µ 0.352 m
10 7.60 µ 0.513 m 0.700 µ 0.299 m
Average 7.69 µ 0.599 m 3.11 µ 0.403 m
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Table C.4: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 2.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 6.90 µ 0.383 m 1.20 µ 0.185 m
2 6.80 µ 0.454 m 1.40 µ 0.537 m
3 6.80 µ 0.404 m 5.00 µ 0.232 m
4 6.90 µ 0.419 m 1.60 µ 0.288 m
5 6.70 µ 0.413 m 1.10 µ 0.267 m
6 7.30 µ 0.395 m 6.80 µ 0.181 m
7 6.90 µ 0.408 m 1.30 µ 0.344 m
8 7.10 µ 0.404 m 1.40 µ 0.282 m
9 7.00 µ 0.287 m 1.40 µ 0.214 m
10 6.70 µ 0.415 m 1.20 µ 0.221 m
Average 6.91 µ 0.398 m 2.24 µ 0.275 m
Table C.5: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 3.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 6.90 µ 0.404 m 1.60 µ 0.199 m
2 7.00 µ 0.413 m 1.50 µ 0.258 m
3 6.50 µ 0.428 m 1.10 µ 0.201 m
4 6.80 µ 0.425 m 4.60 µ 0.197 m
5 7.30 µ 0.394 m 2.20 µ 0.235 m
6 6.90 µ 0.355 m 1.40 µ 0.154 m
7 6.90 µ 0.347 m 1.60 µ 0.194 m
8 7.50 µ 0.388 m 7.70 µ 0.287 m
9 6.90 µ 0.311 m 1.40 µ 0.271 m
10 7.60 µ 0.491 m 5.80 µ 0.396 m
Average 7.03 µ 0.396 m 2.89 µ 0.239 m
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Table C.6: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 3.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.50 µ 0.482 m 7.90 µ 0.293 m
2 7.10 µ 0.450 m 6.70 µ 0.268 m
3 6.90 µ 0.461 m 1.70 µ 0.264 m
4 7.10 µ 0.496 m 1.30 µ 0.221 m
5 7.30 µ 0.516 m 1.20 µ 0.266 m
6 7.70 µ 0.578 m 0.900 µ 0.373 m
7 7.90 µ 0.541 m 6.40 µ 0.201 m
8 7.60 µ 0.607 m 1.00 µ 0.279 m
9 7.60 µ 0.568 m 0.900 µ 0.262 m
10 7.70 µ 0.570 m 1.00 µ 0.366 m
Average 7.44 µ 0.527 m 2.90 µ 0.279 m
Table C.7: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 4.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 6.80 µ 0.383 m 1.50 µ 0.171 m
2 6.90 µ 0.252 m 1.60 µ 0.261 m
3 7.90 µ 0.382 m 0.900 µ 0.381 m
4 8.10 µ 0.514 m 0.250 µ 0.208 m
5 7.90 µ 0.519 m 0.900 µ 0.222 m
6 8.00 µ 0.514 m 1.20 µ 0.173 m
7 7.60 µ 0.471 m 1.10 µ 0.175 m
8 7.70 µ 0.519 m 1.20 µ 0.207 m
9 7.90 µ 0.488 m 1.00 µ 0.204 m
10 7.70 µ 0.591 m 1.10 µ 0.609 m
Average 7.65 µ 0.463 m 1.30 µ 0.261 m
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Table C.8: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 5, scalar = 4.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 8.00 µ 0.552 m 5.50 µ 0.213 m
2 7.70 µ 0.543 m 1.00 µ 0.467 m
3 8.00 µ 0.517 m 4.30 µ 0.204 m
4 7.90 µ 0.507 m 0.900 µ 0.201 m
5 8.00 µ 0.545 m 1.00 µ 0.251 m
6 7.70 µ 0.513 m 1.20 µ 0.238 m
7 7.50 µ 0.524 m 1.50 µ 0.199 m
8 8.00 µ 0.521 m 1.30 µ 0.195 m
9 7.50 µ 0.496 m 1.30 µ 0.360 m
10 7.30 µ 0.494 m 1.10 µ 0.264 m
Average 7.76 µ 0.521 m 1.91 µ 0.259 m
Table C.9: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 1.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.30 µ 0.600 m 1.60 µ 0.683 m
2 8.20 µ 0.903 m 0.0104 m 0.823 m
3 7.40 µ 0.389 m 6.80 µ 0.376 m
4 6.80 µ 0.232 m 1.40 µ 0.226 m
5 8.20 µ 0.190 m 0.0127 m 0.109 m
6 7.60 µ 0.220 m 7.60 µ 0.167 m
7 7.20 µ 0.309 m 6.60 µ 0.272 m
8 7.20 µ 0.760 m 4.50 µ 0.798 m
9 7.00 µ 0.393 m 1.90 µ 0.170 m
10 7.20 µ 0.326 m 1.50 µ 0.255 m
Average 7.41 µ 0.432 m 5.50 µ 0.388 m
xxv
Appendix C. Controller Run Time
Table C.10: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 1.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.80 µ 0.379 m 0.0112 m 0.151 m
2 7.50 µ 0.369 m 6.40 µ 0.376 m
3 6.90 µ 0.377 m 1.20 µ 0.146 m
4 7.20 µ 0.381 m 4.70 µ 0.157 m
5 8.00 µ 0.393 m 0.0130 m 0.220 m
6 8.00 µ 0.393 m 0.0130 m 0.220 m
7 7.30 µ 0.382 m 6.30 µ 0.207 m
8 7.00 µ 0.201 m 1.50 µ 0.189 m
9 7.30 µ 0.380 m 6.20 µ 0.148 m
10 7.10 µ 0.410 m 1.60 µ 0.231 m
Average 7.41 µ 0.367 m 6.51 µ 0.205 m
Table C.11: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 2.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.00 µ 0.393 m 4.60 µ 0.146 m
2 7.10 µ 0.585 m 1.70 µ 0.628 m
3 7.00 µ 0.380 m 1.50 µ 0.152 m
4 7.00 µ 0.456 m 1.70 µ 0.410 m
5 7.10 µ 0.543 m 5.10 µ 0.616 m
6 7.20 µ 0.573 m 0.90 µ 0.621 m
7 7.70 µ 0.600 m 6.40 µ 0.595 m
8 7.40 µ 0.498 m 5.10 µ 0.209 m
9 8.20 µ 0.467 m 9.80 µ 0.155 m
10 7.50 µ 0.476 m 1.10 µ 0.512 m
Average 7.32 µ 0.497 m 3.79 µ 0.404 m
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Table C.12: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 2.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.00 µ 0.405 m 2.00 µ 0.181 m
2 6.90 µ 0.376 m 1.90 µ 0.133 m
3 7.50 µ 0.486 m 1.70 µ 0.193 m
4 7.80 µ 0.549 m 4.50 µ 0.284 m
5 7.70 µ 0.473 m 1.30 µ 0.129 m
6 8.10 µ 0.556 m 7.30 µ 0.185 m
7 7.40 µ 0.506 m 1.10 µ 0.136 m
8 7.40 µ 0.506 m 1.10 µ 0.136 m
9 8.00 µ 0.585 m 5.10 µ 0.285 m
10 8.10 µ 0.573 m 5.00 µ 0.216 m
Average 7.59 µ 0.501 m 3.10 µ 0.188 m
Table C.13: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 3.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 6.90 µ 0.390 m 1.40 µ 0.157 m
2 7.70 µ 0.402 m 0.0111 m 0.214 m
3 7.20 µ 0.389 m 4.50 µ 0.157 m
4 7.40 µ 0.385 m 6.40 µ 0.161 m
5 7.40 µ 0.412 m 1.80 µ 0.195 m
6 7.00 µ 0.463 m 5.80 µ 0.284 m
7 6.80 µ 0.275 m 1.30 µ 0.178 m
8 6.90 µ 0.412 m 1.50 µ 0.206 m
9 7.40 µ 0.453 m 1.30 µ 0.237 m
10 7.40 µ 0.313 m 1.30 µ 0.182 m
Average 7.21 µ 0.389 m 3.64 µ 0.197 m
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Table C.14: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 3.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.50 µ 0.408 m 6.90 µ 0.141 m
2 6.90 µ 0.430 m 1.50 µ 0.279 m
3 7.60 µ 0.497 m 1.10 µ 0.178 m
4 7.50 µ 0.488 m 1.10 µ 0.179 m
5 8.10 µ 0.558 m 4.20 µ 0.310 m
6 7.80 µ 0.819 m 6.70 µ 0.853 m
7 7.60 µ 0.536 m 1.00 µ 0.166 m
8 8.00 µ 0.618 m 1.50 µ 0.490 m
9 7.90 µ 0.552 m 1.20 µ 0.150 m
10 7.70 µ 0.616 m 1.10 µ 0.272 m
Average 7.66 µ 0.552 m 2.63 µ 0.302 m
Table C.15: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 4.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 6.70 µ 0.390 m 1.40 µ 0.177 m
2 6.80 µ 0.403 m 1.30 µ 0.162 m
3 7.10 µ 0.393 m 1.50 µ 0.152 m
4 7.10 µ 0.407 m 1.50 µ 0.184 m
5 7.00 µ 0.414 m 1.60 µ 0.168 m
6 6.60 µ 0.406 m 1.40 µ 0.199 m
7 7.40 µ 0.392 m 9.20 µ 0.174 m
8 7.40 µ 0.404 m 6.30 µ 0.211 m
9 7.20 µ 0.289 m 6.50 µ 0.214 m
10 7.40 µ 0.417 m 6.10 µ 0.207 m
Average 7.07 µ 0.392 m 3.68 µ 0.185 m
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Table C.16: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 10, scalar = 4.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.00 µ 0.395 m 4.50 µ 0.192 m
2 6.80 µ 0.415 m 1.50 µ 0.185 m
3 7.10 µ 0.418 m 1.70 µ 0.176 m
4 6.80 µ 0.421 m 1.60 µ 0.260 m
5 6.80 µ 0.405 m 1.70 µ 0.171 m
6 7.60 µ 0.376 m 8.80 µ 0.126 m
7 7.00 µ 0.403 m 1.40 µ 0.194 m
8 7.10 µ 0.399 m 2.00 µ 0.142 m
9 7.00 µ 0.415 m 1.60 µ 0.162 m
10 6.90 µ 0.416 m 1.70 µ 0.194 m
Average 7.01 µ 0.406 m 2.65 µ 0.180 m
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Table C.17: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 15, scalar = 1.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.20 µ 0.383 m 6.80 µ 0.230 m
2 7.40 µ 0.275 m 0.0104 m 0.225 m
3 7.60 µ 0.180 m 7.10 µ 0.142 m
4 7.30 µ 0.449 m 1.70 µ 0.481 m
5 7.20 µ 0.441 m 5.10 µ 0.243 m
6 7.10 µ 0.265 m 1.50 µ 0.189 m
7 7.20 µ 0.558 m 6.80 µ 0.602 m
8 7.00 µ 0.584 m 1.50 µ 0.675 m
9 7.20 µ 1.01 m 6.50 µ 0.815 m
10 7.50 µ 0.249 m 9.30 µ 0.162 m
Average 7.27 µ 0.440 m 5.67 µ 0.376 m
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Table C.18: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 15, scalar = 1.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.60 µ 0.832 m 7.80 µ 0.823 m
2 7.10 µ 0.342 m 4.40 µ 0.367 m
3 7.30 µ 0.396 m 7.00 µ 0.168 m
4 7.00 µ 0.413 m 1.80 µ 0.177 m
5 7.70 µ 0.511 m 6.10 µ 0.165 m
6 7.90 µ 0.494 m 1.30 µ 0.149 m
7 7.20 µ 1.26 m 1.20 µ 0.948 m
8 8.00 µ 0.502 m 4.70 µ 0.164 m
9 7.8 µ 0.481 m 6.30 µ 0.161 m
10 7.80 µ 0.470 m 6.40 µ 0.161 m
Average 7.54 µ 0.570 m 4.70 µ 0.328 m
Table C.19: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 15, scale = 2.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.10 µ 0.465 m 2.00 µ 0.554 m
2 7.50 µ 0.440 m 9.00 µ 0.244 m
3 7.50 µ 0.455 m 8.00 µ 0.240 m
4 7.20 µ 0.258 m 1.70 µ 0.197 m
5 6.90 µ 0.439 m 1.60 µ 0.340 m
6 7.60 µ 0.409 m 6.40 µ 0.430 m
7 7.00 µ 0.488 m 1.40 µ 0.419 m
8 7.30 µ 0.288 m 6.50 µ 0.223 m
9 7.10 µ 0.445 m 1.80 µ 0.372 m
10 7.20 µ 0.453 m 5.70 µ 0.327 m
Average 7.24 µ 0.414 m 4.41 µ 0.334 m
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Table C.20: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 15, scalar = 2.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.10 µ 0.398 m 1.50 µ 0.156 m
2 7.20 µ 0.457 m 4.50 µ 0.251 m
3 6.90 µ 0.440 m 1.70 µ 0.339 m
4 7.10 µ 0.439 m 6.30 µ 0.316 m
5 6.90 µ 0.442 m 1.40 µ 0.298 m
6 6.90 µ 0.324 m 1.40 µ 0.267 m
7 6.90 µ 0.431 m 1.50 µ 0.251 m
8 7.20 µ 0.448 m 1.60 µ 0.116 m
9 7.40 µ 0.503 m 1.00 µ 0.182 m
10 7.90 µ 0.571 m 1.30 µ 0.234 m
Average 7.15 µ 0.445 m 2.22 µ 0.241 m
Table C.21: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 15, scale = 3.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 6.80 µ 0.767 m 1.30 µ 0.502 m
2 7.40 µ 0.432 m 6.20 µ 0.153 m
3 7.00 µ 0.285 m 3.80 µ 0.219 m
4 7.60 µ 0.411 m 8.10 µ 0.159 m
5 7.00 µ 0.406 m 1.40 µ 0.230 m
6 7.20 µ 0.384 m 1.70 µ 0.152 m
7 7.20 µ 0.423 m 6.40 µ 0.168 m
8 7.20 µ 0.414 m 1.30 µ 0.165 m
9 7.30 µ 0.456 m 1.20 µ 0.145 m
10 7.50 µ 0.525 m 1.00 µ 0.151 m
Average 0.722 m 0.450 m 3.24 µ 0.204 m
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Table C.22: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 15, scale = 3.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 6.90 µ 0.423 m 1.20 µ 0.153 m
2 7.10 µ 0.402 m 1.50 µ 0.143 m
3 7.00 µ 0.415 m 1.60 µ 0.156 m
4 7.30 µ 0.480 m 6.50 µ 0.217 m
5 7.10 µ 0.451 m 1.60 µ 0.174 m
6 7.60 µ 0.540 m 1.40 µ 0.179 m
7 8.10 µ 0.526 m 8.80 µ 0.253 m
8 7.20 µ 0.455 m 7.50 µ 0.158 m
9 8.00 µ 0.561 m 0.90 µ 0.320 m
10 7.00 µ 0.448 m 6.80 µ 0.294 m
Average 7.37 µ 0.473 m 3.44 µ 0.195 m
Table C.23: AFDIA run time for left wing failure, window = 15, scale = 4.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.60 µ 0.389 m 8.90 µ 0.147 m
2 7.60 µ 0.404 m 7.90 µ 0.130 m
3 7.20 µ 0.386 m 1.60 µ 0.127 m
4 7.40 µ 0.409 m 4.30 µ 0.186 m
5 7.20 µ 0.330 m 6.40 µ 0.291 m
6 7.30 µ 0.329 m 1.70 µ 0.261 m
7 6.80 µ 0.406 m 1.30 µ 0.159 m
8 7.40 µ 0.382 m 1.60 µ 0.134 m
9 8.50 µ 0.723 m 7.90 µ 0.727 m
10 7.90 µ 0.399 m 9.00 µ 0.142 m
Average 7.49 µ 0.416 m 5.06 µ 0.230 m
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Table C.24: AFDIA run time for right wing failure, window = 15, scalar = 4.
Run Time Mean (sec) Run Time SD (σ) (sec)
No. Before Fail After Fail Before Fail After Fail
1 7.80 µ 0.394 m 8.70 µ 0.157 m
2 7.20 µ 0.431 m 1.50 µ 0.138 m
3 7.00 µ 0.419 m 1.60 µ 0.199 m
4 7.70 µ 0.414 m 8.70 µ 0.122 m
5 7.50 µ 0.398 m 9.00 µ 0.167 m
6 7.00 µ 0.405 m 4.80 µ 0.149 m
7 6.70 µ 0.419 m 1.00 µ 0.131 m
8 7.10 µ 0.441 m 0.50 µ 0.165 m
9 7.10 µ 0.416 m 1.40 µ 0.167 m
10 7.00 µ 0.415 m 0.90 µ 0.158 m
Average 7.21 µ 0.415 m 3.81 µ 0.155 m
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Aircraft Sensor Estimation for Fault Tolerant Flight
Control System using Fully Connected Cascade
Neural Network
Saed Hussain, Student Member, IEEE, Maizura Mokhtar, Member, IEEE, and Joe M. Howe
Abstract—Flight control systems that are tolerant to failures
can increase the endurance of an aircraft in case of a failure.
The two major types of failure are sensor and actuator failures.
This paper focuses on the failure of the gyro sensors in an
aircraft. The neuron by neuron (NBN) learning algorithm,
which is an improved version of the Levenberg-Marquardt (LM)
algorithm, is combined with the fully connected cascade (FCC)
neural network architecture to estimate an aircraft’s sensor
measurements. Compared to other neural networks and learning
algorithms, this combination can produce good sensor estimates
with relatively few neurons. The estimators are developed and
evaluated using flight data collected from the X-Plane flight
simulator. The developed sensor estimators can replicate a
sensor’s measurements with as little as 2 neurons. The results
reflect the combined power of the NBN algorithm and the FCC
neural network architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years there has been a significant growth inthe development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for
various applications (e.g. search and rescue, survey, border
control). UAVs are most commonly used in applications that
are considered dangerous, dull, impractical or unreachable by
manned vehicles. These applications have contributed to an
increasing importance for UAVs and the need to improve their
endurance. Increasing the endurance of a UAV allows for:
• Longer flight hours without the need to refuel/recharge.
• Autonomously maintaining stability despite varying en-
vironmental conditions.
• Autonomously maintaining stability in case of failure.
Long endurance can be achieved by developing UAV sys-
tems that incorporate:
• Intelligent energy management systems.
• Intelligent flight behavior.
• Adaptive fault tolerance.
This research considers the development of a fault tolerant
flight control system (FTFCS) to increase the endurance of a
UAV in case of failure. In particular, this paper focuses on
the development of neural network based sensor estimators to
replace faulty sensors in case of sensor failure.
The paper investigates, for each sensor, the optimal archi-
tecture of the neural network based estimator. The type of
neural network used is the fully connected cascade (FCC)
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neural network. The FCC neural network is chosen because it
is able to achieve its objective with small number of neurons in
the network [1]–[5]. Therefore, the paper presents the optimal
number of neurons within the neural network to be used as
the sensor estimator. These FCC neural network based sensor
estimators will be used in future experiments to replace faulty
sensors.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides
background information on FTFCS, as well as the use of
neural networks for FTFCS. Section III describes the FCC
neural network and learning algorithm used to develop the
sensor estimators. The aircraft simulator used for this research
is briefly presented in Section IV. In Section V, the estimator
development process is explained. Finally the results are
discussed in Section VI and the conclusion is presented in
Section VII.
II. FAULT TOLERANT FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
FTFCS are systems that have the ability to tolerate compo-
nent failures automatically while maintaining overall system
stability and acceptable performance in the event of errors and
failures. Their purpose is to detect, identify and accommodate
any type of failure that may occur during a flight. Two major
classes of failure are sensor and actuator failures [6], [7]. In
general a fully FTFCS needs to perform:
• Sensor failure detection, identification and accommoda-
tion (SFDIA) [8]
• Actuator failure detection, identification and accommo-
dation (AFDIA) [8]
These tasks could be further divided into [8]:
• Failure detection and identification (FDI), which detects
significant abnormalities and identifies the cause.
• Failure accommodation (FA), which in the case of sen-
sors, replaces the faulty sensor with an appropriate es-
timation. In case of the actuators, it determines what
actions need to be taken to recover the impaired aircraft.
This paper focuses on the failure accommodation stage
(FA) of the SFDIA scheme. SFDIA schemes are particularly
important when failed sensor measurements are used in the
feedback loop of an aircraft’s control laws. This could result in
closed loop instability, possibly leading to unrecoverable flight
conditions if the failure is not detected and accommodate for
[6], [8].
A. Redundancy for FDIA
Traditionally, fault detection, identification and accommo-
dation (FDIA) is achieved through high levels of hardware
redundancy. This is still the state-of-the-art practice in the
aircraft manufacturing industry [6], [8]–[10]. For example,
Airbus A320/330/340/380 has triple or quadruple redundant
actuation, sensor and flight control computer systems [9].
In hardware redundancy for SFDIA, identical sensors are
used to measure the same parameter; and fault tolerance is
achieved based on a voting scheme [11]. For example, in a
system with three redundant sensors, if one of the redundant
signals differs significantly from the other two, the differing
signal is eliminated.
However, hardware redundancy has serious cost, power and
weight implications, especially for small aircraft’s like UAVs.
Due to these implications, analytical redundancy is a far more
appealing approach for FTFCS. Analytical redundancy uses
a model of the monitored system to generate signals that
would otherwise be generated by redundant hardware. In its
simplest form, the difference between the model estimate and
the measured reading is used to generate an error residual.
This residual is then monitored to detect and identify faults
[12].
B. Neural Networks for Analytical Redundancy
Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing
interest in the application of neural networks for SFDIA
schemes [8], [13], [14]. For example, Guo and Musgrave
[15] presented a SFDIA scheme for sensors in the space
shuttle main engine (SSME). Their scheme is based on the
auto-associative multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural network,
trained using the error back propagation learning algorithm
(BPA). Napolitano et al. [8] developed a SFDIA scheme
using the MLP neural network trained using the extended
back propagation algorithm (EBPA). Samy et al. [6], [12]
proposed a SFDIA scheme using the radial basis function
(RBF) neural network, trained using the extended minimum
resource allocating network (EMRAN) algorithm.
In this paper, a combination of the FCC neural network and
neuron by neuron (NBN) learning algorithm is proposed for
sensor accommodation. This can be part of any neural network
based SFDIA scheme. Once a sensor failure is detected and
isolated in the failure detection and identification (FDI) stage,
the accommodation stage replaces the faulty sensor reading
with a reliable estimate. SFDIA schemes based on neural
network replaces the faulty sensor reading with a neural
network generated estimate. It other words, the neural network
works as an estimator.
III. FULLY CONNECTED CASCADE (FCC) NEURAL
NETWORK AND NEURON BY NEURON (NBN) LEARNING
ALGORITHM
A. Neural Network Architecture
It could be argued that the MLP neural network architecture
is the most popular choice for neural network applications [1]–
[4], [16]. However, this architecture is neither powerful nor
efficient. MLP architectures requires more neurons, to solve a
problem, than other architectures in which connection across
layers is allowed [1]–[5]. Although increasing the number of
neurons converges the neural network faster, the network loses
its generalization ability [1], [2]. Therefore, the neural network
responds poorly to patterns never used in the training.
As a comparison between the two architectures, the authors
of [5] state that: to solve the parity-7 problem, the MLP ar-
chitecture using one hidden layer required 8 neurons; whereas
the fully connected cascade (FCC) architecture (Fig. 1), which
allows connection across layers, managed to solve this prob-
lem using just 3 neurons. To solve the parity-64 problem, 64
neurons were required by the MLP architecture in comparison
to 6 neurons by the FCC architecture.
This shows that the FCC architecture is better and more
efficient in comparison to the MLP architecture. Therefore, the
FCC neural network is chosen for use as the sensor estimator
neural network.
n3
n1
n2
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Fig. 1. FCC Neural Network Architecture
B. Learning Algorithm
The error back propagation (EBP) algorithm is popularly
used along with the MLP neural network architecture. How-
ever this algorithm is slow and inefficient [1]–[3], [5], [17].
Many improvements have been made to help speed up the
EBP algorithm (e.g. momentum, EBPA), but as long as first
order algorithms are used, improvements are not dramatic [17].
Instead of the EBP algorithm, advance second order algorithms
like the Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) or the neurons by neuron
(NBN) algorithms should be used. These algorithms can not
only train fast, but also efficiently, with small number of
neurons within the neural network [1]–[3], [5], [16], [18]–[20].
The NBN algorithm is an improved version of the second
order LM algorithm [2], [5]. In the LM algorithm, the weights
are updated using the following update rule [20]:
Wn+1 =Wn − (JTJ + µI)−1JTe (1)
where Wn+1 is the new weights vector; Wn is the previous
weights vector; J is the Jacobian matrix; I is the identity
matrix; e is the error vector; and µ is the combination
coefficient. The size of the Jacobian matrix and the error vector
are (P ×M)×N and (P ×M)× 1 respectively, where P is
the number of training patterns, M is the number of network
outputs and N is the number of weights [21].
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Abstract—Flight control systems that are tolerant to failures
can increase the endurance of an aircraft in case of a failure. The
two major types of failure are sensor and actuator failures. This
paper focuses on the failure of the gyro sensors in an aircraft.
The neuron by neuron (NBN) learning algorithm, which is an
improved version of the Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algorithm is
combined with the fully connected cascade (FCC) neural network
(NN) architecture to estimate an aircraft’s sensor measurements.
Compared to other NN and learning algorithms, this combination
can produce good sensor estimates with relatively few neurons.
The estimators are developed and evaluated using flight data
collected from the X-Plane flight simulator. The developed sensor
estimators can replicate a sensor’s measurements with as little
as 2 neurons. The results reflect the combined power of the NBN
algorithm and the FCC NN architecture.
This is achieved by calculating the vector jp,m as the
patterns are applied. This vector is the Jacobian row for pattern
p and network output neuron m.
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Fig. 2. The Jacobian Matrix J
The Jacobian matrix is presented in Fig. 2, where, p is the
training pattern; j is the index of the neuron; wj,x is the xth
connection weight w to neuron j; and m is the index of the
network output neuron. The error ep,m for training pattern p
at network output neuron m is calculated as follows:
ep,m = dp,m − op,m (2)
where dp,m is the desired output and op,m is the actual output
for training pattern p at network output neuron m.
Usually, the Jacobian matrix is calculated and stored for
updating the weights using (1). This is fine with problems
that require small number of training patterns. However, for
problems with a large number of training patterns, memory
limitation may become a major concern. This is due to the
size for the Jacobian matrix [21], [22].
In the NBN algorithm, the weights are updated using the
following update rule:
Wn+1 =Wn − (Q+ µI)−1g (3)
where Q is the quasi-Hessian matrix and g is the gradient
vector. This is just another form of the LM update rule [23]
where
Q = JTJ (4)
g = JTe (5)
However, in the NBN algorithm, the matrix Q is calculated
by summing the quasi-Hessian sub-matrix qp,m for pattern p
and network output neuron m:
Q =
P∑
p=1
M∑
m=1
qp,m (6)
The gradient vector g is calculated by summing the gradient
sub-vector ηp,m for pattern p and network output neuron m:
g =
P∑
p=1
M∑
m=1
ηp,m (7)
The size of the matrix Q is N × N and is independent
of the number of patterns and outputs. Compared to the
LM algorithm, the NBN algorithm calculates the matrix Q
and vector g directly as the patterns are applied. Therefore
removing the need to compute and store the Jacobian matrix
(J) [23]. This is achieved by calculating the vector jp,m as
the patterns are applied. This vector is the Jacobian row for
pattern p and network output neuron m. Using this vector,
the matrix Q and vector g can be updated as each pattern is
applied using the following equations:
qp,m = j
T
p,mjp,m (8)
ηp,m = jp,mep,m (9)
The main advantages of the NBN algorithm over the LM
algorithm can be summarized as follows [1], [23]:
1) It can train arbitrarily connected, feed forward neural
network (i.e. it can be used with the FCC network unlike
the LM algorithm).
2) Error derivatives are calculated in the forward propaga-
tion therefore no need for back propagation. This makes
it more efficient compared to LM algorithm, especially
for networks with multiple outputs [17].
3) It does not need to compute and store large Jacobian ma-
trix, therefore it can be used with unlimited patterns [21].
Due to these benefits, the NBN algorithm is selected to train
the FCC neural network based sensor estimators. The pseudo
code for this algorithm, adapted from [23], is given in Fig. 3.
In the next subsection, the settings of various parameters used
to create the neural networks for the estimators is presented.
C. Neural Network Settings
The neural networks are initialized with random weights in
the range of +1.5 to −1.5. The activation function used by
the neurons is the bipolar sigmoid [24], defined as follows:
Outj =
2
1 + e−netj
− 1 (10)
where netj is the sum of the weighted inputs to neuron j
and Outj is the output of neuron j. This activation function
produces an output in the range of +1 to −1.
To match the output range of the neurons, the sensor
measurements that should be the output of the estimators are
normalized using [25]:
xn = (b− a)× xo − xmin
xmax − xmin + a (11)
where xn is the normalized value and xo is the value to be
normalized. a and b are the minimum and maximum value of
the range to be normalized to, which in this case is +1 to −1.
xmax and xmin are the maximum and minimum values of the
range from which xo is been normalized. This range is set to
be +10 to −10.
1: procedure INITIALIZATION(Q, g)
2: Q← 0
3: g ← 0
4: end procedure
5:
6: for all patterns (p = 1 to p = P ) do
7: procedure FORWARD COMPUTATION
8: for all neurons (nn) do
9: for all weights of current neuron (j) do
10: calculate net input (netj)
11: end for
12: calculate neuron output
13: calculate neuron slope (sj)
14: sj =
∂Outj(netj)
∂netj
15: set current slope as delta
16: for weights to previous neurons (ny) do
17: for previous neurons (nz) do
18: multiply delta through weights
19: then sum
20: end for
21: multiply sum by the slope
22: end for
23: end for
24: for all outputs (m = 1 to m =M ) do
25: calculate error
26: end for
27: end procedure
28:
29: procedure UPDATE(Q, g)
30: for all outputs (m = 1 to m =M ) do
31: calculate vector jp,m
32: calculate sub matrix qp,m
33: calculate sub vector ηp,m
34: Q = Q+ qp,m
35: g = g + ηp,m
36: end for
37: end procedure
38: end for
39:
40: procedure IMPROVED LM TRAINING
41: follow the LM algorithm training process
42: update rule: Wn+1 =Wn − (Q+ µI)−1g
43: end procedure
Fig. 3. NBN Algorithm Pseudo Code
The initial value of combination coefficient (µ), used in the
weights update rule of the NBN algorithm, is set to 0.01. The
factor by which to increase or decrease this value of µ is 10.
IV. AIRCRAFT SIMULATOR AND SENSORS
Aircraft data is collected using the X-Plane flight simulator
[26]. This simulator produces realistic flight simulations due
to which its professional version is certified by FAA (Federal
Aviation Administration) for pilot training [27], [28]. It is
also used by leading defence contractors, air forces and space
agencies for applications of flight training, concept design and
testing [28].
For this research, the Cessna 172SP aircraft model in X-
Plane is used to collect the flight data. Since the main emphasis
of the work is on sensor estimation, the aircraft is flown by
the provided AI pilot in X-Plane.
It is assumed that the aircraft is equipped with 6 inertial
sensors without any hardware redundancy. The inertial sensors
are 3 gyroscopes (gyros) and 3 accelerometers. They are
mounted along the x, y and z axis of the aircraft. These sensors
are essential components of the attitude/heading reference
system (AHRS) and the inertial navigation system (INS) found
in today’s aircrafts [29], [30].
The outputs of these sensors are as follows:
1) Gyros: pitch (q), roll (p) and yaw (r) rates.
2) Accelerometers: accelerations along the x (ax), y (ay)
and z (az) axis.
V. ESTIMATOR DEVELOPMENT
A. Estimator Neural Network Input/Output and Structure
The paper concentrates on the gyro sensors of the aircraft.
Therefore three gyro sensor estimators are developed, one each
for the (i) pitch, (ii) roll and (iii) yaw rate gyro sensors. The
outputs of these estimators are their respected estimated sensor
rates.
The inputs to the estimators are other sensors’ measure-
ments (excluding the one it is estimating) and the commanded
control values provided by flight control computers. Inputs
to each of these estimators and their respected outputs are
presented in Table I. These inputs are taken at t− 1, where t
is the current sample time.
These inputs are chosen because they can have an effect
or cause an effect on the parameter that the sensor is mea-
suring. The relationship between the measured accelerations
and the gyro rates can be derived from the linear acceleration
equations [31] defined as follows:
ax = U˙ − rV + qW
ay = V˙ − pW + rU (12)
az = W˙ − qU + pV
where (U, V,W ) are the velocity along the X, Y and Z
axes, given in body fixed reference frame. The relationships
between the control inputs and the gyro rates can be derived
from the aircraft’s linearized equations of motion [31]. From
the aircraft’s longitudinal equations of motion, the equation
relevant to this paper is as follows [31]:
[
q˙
]
=
[
Mw
Iy
Mq
Iy
][w
q
]
+
[
MδE
Iy
][
δE
]
(13)
where, q˙ is the rate of change of q, w is the vertical velocity
increment and δE is the elevator demand. Mw, MδE and
Mq are the pitching moment derivatives due to w, δE and
q, respectively. Iy is the moment of inertia of aircraft about
the pitch axis. The relevant equations from the lateral motion
of the aircraft are as follows [31]:
[
p˙
r˙
]
=
[
Lv
Ix
Lp
Ix
Lr
Ix
Nv
Iz
Np
Iz
Nr
Iz
]vp
r
+
LδRIx LδAIx
NδR
Iz
NδA
Iz
[δR
δA
]
(14)
where, p˙ and r˙ are the rate of change of p and r, respectively;
L is the rolling moment; N is the yawing moment; v is the
side-slip velocity increment; δR is the rudder demand; and δA
is the aileron demand. Lv , Lp, Lr, LδR and LδA are the rolling
moment derivatives due to v, p, r, δR and δA, respectively. Nv ,
Np, Nr, NδR and NδA are the yawing moment derivatives with
respect to v, p, r, δR and δA. Iz is the moment of inertia of
aircraft about the yaw axis.
These equations are derived assuming the aircraft is in
steady, straight and level trimmed conditions, with small
disturbances. Writing the aircraft equations using these as-
sumptions and linearizing them is a common practice. This
helps to simplify the equations and analyze the behavior of
the aircraft in response to the control inputs.
In order to select the best structure (topology) for the FCC
neural network based sensor estimators, the number of neurons
in each estimator is first experimented; varying from 2 to 12
neurons. These estimators with different number of neurons
are trained and validated using the process described in the
following subsections.
TABLE I
INPUTS TO THE SENSOR ESTIMATORS
Sensor Estimator Inputs
Pitch (q) az - Normal Acceleration
ax - Longitudnal Acceleration
δE - Elevator Demand
Roll (p) r - Yaw Rate
δA - Aileron Demand
δR - Rudder Demand
Yaw (r) ay - Lateral Acceleration
δA - Aileron Demand
δR - Rudder Demand
B. Training and Validation Data Sets
To train and evaluate the estimators, flight data from the
Cessna 172SP aircraft in X-Plane is recorded for 6 different
flight scenarios. In these scenarios, the aircraft takes off from
different airports to capture different maneuvers performed
by the AI pilot in X-Plane. These flight data contain various
sensor readings and control inputs, recorded every second.
In a practical system, sensor readings are updated at a
higher frequency. In this case, however, recording the flight
data at every second allows greater dynamics of the data to
be captured within a single and short time window for the
training data.
These scenarios were simulated in turbulent free weather
conditions. The data was recorded once the aircraft reached
its cruise altitude. Out of these scenarios, 1 of them is used
for training and the remaining 5 are used for validating the
estimators. Only 1 training set is used to train the FCC neural
network. This is to test the capabilities of the NBN algorithm
in training the neural network.
C. Estimator Training
The estimators are trained offline (batch learning) using a
fixed set of training data extracted from the training flight data
mentioned in the previous section. The training set consists of
data collected during the steady and transient state of flight.
This ensures that the estimators can produce good estimates
during any state of flight. The estimators are trained until
the Sum Squared Error (SSE) of the epoch is ≤ 0.01 or a
maximum of 101 epochs is reached.
D. Simulation for Validation
Once trained, each of the estimators (ranging from 2 to 12
neurons) for a sensor are validated on the 5 different flight
scenarios. These scenarios last for 1500 seconds, therefore
containing 1500 patterns. To assess the performance of the
estimator on the scenario, the total Sum Squared Error (SSE)
of all the patterns in the scenarios is computed. Finally, the best
estimator for a sensor is selected by calculating the average
and the standard deviation of the SSE for all the scenarios.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Yaw Rate Estimator
The Sum Squared Errors (SSE) of the yaw rate estimators
using different neurons on the 5 validation scenarios are pre-
sented in Table II. From the average SSE, estimator networks
with 2 and 5 neurons produce the least errors. Using the
standard deviation, it is clear that the estimator with 2 neurons
is the best among the two.
The output of this estimator on its best and worst scenarios
is presented in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 respectively. The best scenario
is scenario 3 and the worst is scenario 1.
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Fig. 4. Normalized yaw rate using (11) and the associated SSE. Results using
2 neurons in scenario 3.
TABLE II
YAW RATE ESTIMATOR ERRORS FOR THE VALIDATION SCENARIOS
SUM SQUARED ERRORS (SSE)
Neurons 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Scenario 1 0.05403 0.05790 0.05775 0.04916 0.14770 1.08820 0.08818 0.14520 0.41494 0.22531 0.74185
Scenario 2 0.01678 0.03428 0.02443 0.02183 0.23910 2.11596 0.13171 0.29886 1.26390 0.36817 1.23907
Scenario 3 0.00923 0.04650 0.03638 0.01692 0.25249 5.99460 0.25252 0.91540 2.30973 0.99688 3.57601
Scenario 4 0.05017 0.10001 0.04895 0.06144 0.11770 0.69716 0.08022 0.05969 0.27662 0.07500 0.47789
Scenario 5 0.03428 0.05799 0.04082 0.03250 0.44971 3.44615 0.35203 0.39369 2.05501 0.39984 2.04609
Average Error 0.03290 0.05934 0.04167 0.03637 0.24134 2.66841 0.18093 0.36257 1.26404 0.41304 1.61618
SD 0.01979 0.02475 0.01262 0.01869 0.13000 2.14222 0.11786 0.33528 0.92399 0.35091 1.24781
TABLE III
PITCH RATE ESTIMATOR ERRORS FOR THE VALIDATION SCENARIOS
SUM SQUARED ERRORS (SSE)
Neurons 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Scenario 1 0.87549 1.07204 0.77152 0.75686 0.62664 8.31579 1.07375 1.73602 1.60933 1.80456 4.34395
Scenario 2 1.30509 1.19663 1.06827 0.97039 0.92628 5.95501 1.15038 1.79250 2.21795 2.63000 6.52519
Scenario 3 3.09023 2.83352 2.80383 2.70440 2.74835 8.32024 2.88546 2.97336 3.03034 4.02907 6.08809
Scenario 4 0.64407 0.58858 0.46337 0.37710 0.34452 8.91346 0.50092 1.05716 1.20740 3.24782 4.86670
Scenario 5 1.78657 1.59820 1.35882 1.32644 1.15308 13.43923 1.87371 2.78344 2.85945 2.95253 7.94092
Average Error 1.54029 1.45779 1.29316 1.22704 1.15978 8.98874 1.49684 2.06850 2.18489 2.93280 5.95297
SD 0.96998 0.84925 0.90797 0.89468 0.93901 2.73477 0.91668 0.79678 0.78385 0.81640 1.42008
TABLE IV
ROLL RATE ESTIMATOR ERRORS FOR THE VALIDATION SCENARIOS
SUM SQUARED ERRORS (SSE)
Neurons 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Scenario 1 1.03861 1.71942 0.99188 1.26806 1.17937 1.23314 1.33951 1.06159 1.12756 1.03996 0.95751
Scenario 2 0.87189 0.71655 0.62950 0.74557 0.73817 0.80793 0.83962 0.90883 1.00083 0.75335 0.72139
Scenario 3 0.33534 0.48925 0.41012 0.44700 0.42922 0.43207 0.45478 0.64603 0.68607 0.56293 0.44613
Scenario 4 0.50070 0.92344 0.82084 1.07419 0.98542 1.01214 1.05378 1.36040 1.40734 1.21942 0.94279
Scenario 5 1.42533 1.46552 1.32818 1.53932 1.41908 1.58002 1.60261 1.20004 1.22841 1.27567 1.08864
Average Error 0.83437 1.06284 0.83610 1.01483 0.95025 1.01306 1.05806 1.03538 1.09004 0.97027 0.83129
SD 0.43380 0.51517 0.35028 0.42944 0.38405 0.43287 0.44369 0.27434 0.27036 0.30544 0.25250
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Fig. 5. Normalized yaw rate using (11) and the associated SSE. Results using
2 neurons in scenario 1.
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Fig. 6. Normalized pitch rate using (11) and the associated SSE. Results
using 6 neurons in scenario 4.
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Fig. 7. Normalized Pitch rate using (11) and the associated SSE. Results
using 6 neurons in scenario 3.
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Fig. 8. Normalized roll rate using (11) and the associated SSE. Results using
4 neurons in scenario 3.
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Fig. 9. Normalized roll rate using (11) and the associated SSE. Results using
4 neurons in scenario 5.
B. Pitch Rate Estimator
Table III presents the validation results for the pitch rate
estimators. The estimator using 6 neurons has the least SSE
among them. The output of this estimator on its best and worst
scenarios is presented in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 respectively. The
best scenario is scenario 4 and the worst is scenario 3.
As can be seen from Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, the output of the
pitch rate sensor seems to oscillate rapidly over certain time
frames. This is due to the aircraft being disturbed from its
equilibrium state. These disturbances could be initiated by
pilot control inputs, change in power settings and atmospheric
influences like gust and turbulence [32]. Since the scenarios
where simulated in turbulent free weather conditions, in this
case, the oscillations are caused by the control outputs from the
AI pilot in X-Plane. For a certain time frame, the oscillations
are neither increasing nor decreasing in magnitude (Fig. 7).
Once the aircraft is disturbed, it continues to oscillate without
a significant increase or decrease in magnitude. The aircraft
is said to be in a state of neutral dynamic stability [31], [33].
The magnitude and duration of these oscillations depends on
the aircraft’s aerodynamics and stability.
The estimator follows these oscillations but does not follow
the magnitude. To investigate this anomaly, the estimator
with 6 neurons was validated on the training data itself. The
estimator output followed all the training data points, except
the points with rapid oscillations. This leads to the conclusion
that the anomaly is due to the lack of inputs.
Additional inputs could help capture the aircraft’s aerody-
namics within the neural network, which would then help
to follow the magnitude of the sensor during the oscillatory
phase of the aircraft. Future work would focus on identifying
the inputs to the estimator to follow the magnitude of the
oscillatory phase.
C. Roll Rate Estimator
In Table IV the results for the roll rate estimators are
presented. As can be seen from the average SSE, there is a
close tie between neurons 2, 4 and 12. Using the standard
deviations of their SSE, the estimator with 12 neurons has the
best normal distribution among them with 3 being the worst.
However, it was decided to select the estimator with 4 neurons,
keeping in line with the low neuron count of the previous gyro
sensor estimators.
The output of this estimator on its best and worst scenarios
is presented in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively. The best scenario
is scenario 3 and the worst is scenario 5.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fault tolerant flight control system (FTFCS) can increase
the endurance of an aircraft in case of failures. As part of the
FTFCS, the sensor failure detection, identification and accom-
modation (SFDIA) scheme, must detect any faulty sensor and
replace it with a reliable estimate.
The neuron by neuron (NBN) learning algorithm is an im-
proved version of the Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algorithm.
This algorithm is combined with the fully connected cascade
(FCC) neural network to develop the sensor estimators for the
pitch, roll and yaw rate gyros of an aircraft. These estimators
can be used in any SFDIA scheme to provide the failure
accommodation (FA).
The results show that the proposed algorithm and neural
network architecture can produce good estimates of the sensor
measurements, with as little as 2 neurons (see yaw rate results
in Section VI). The pitch and roll rate estimators, were able to
produce good estimates with just 6 and 4 neurons respectively;
in comparison to the SFDIA scheme presented in [8]. In
the scheme presented in [8], the estimators are based on the
multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural network using 1 hidden
layer. They are trained using the extended back propagation
learning algorithm (EBPA). These estimators require 20, 30
and 18 neurons in their hidden layer, to produce reliable
pitch, roll and yaw rate estimates, respectively. This scheme,
presented in [8], also uses more inputs to its estimators,
compared to 3 inputs each to the pitch, roll and yaw rate
estimators, presented in this paper.
On-going research is aimed at using the NBN algorithm
with the FCC neural network architecture to develop a fully
FTFCS; incorporating a SFDIA scheme and a actuator failure
detection, identification and accommodation (AFDIA) scheme.
Future work also aims to identify additional inputs that can
solve the limitation of the pitch estimator.
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Sensor Failure Detection, Identification and
Accommodation Using Fully Connected Cascade
Neural Network
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Abstract—Modern control systems rely heavily on their sensors
for reliable operation. Failure of a sensor could destabilize the
system, which could have serious consequences to the system’s
operations. Therefore there is a need to detect and accommodate
such failures, especially if the system in question is of a safety
critical application. In this paper, a sensor failure detection,
identification and accommodation (SFDIA) scheme is presented.
This scheme is based on the fully connected cascade (FCC) neural
network (NN) architecture. The NN is trained using the neuron by
neuron (NBN) learning algorithm. This NN architecture is chosen
because of its efficiency in terms of the number of neurons and
the number of inputs required to solve a problem. The SFDIA
scheme considers failures in pitch, roll and yaw rate gyro sensors
of an aircraft. A total of 105 experiments were conducted; out of
which, only one went undetected. The SFDIA scheme presented
here is efficient, compact and computationally less expensive, in
comparison to schemes using, for example, the popular multi-
layer perceptron (MLP) NN. These benefits are inherited from
the FCC NN architecture.
Index Terms—Sensors, neural networks, fault tolerance, failure
detection, analytical redundancy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensors are vital components of any control system. They
inform the controller about its environment and the state of the
system. With increasing safety, performance and automation
requirements, control systems are increasingly sophisticated
and are heavily reliant on their sensors. However, sensors are
often considered as the weak link in these systems [1], [2].
Any sensor failure could degrade the system’s performance
and possibly lead to total system failure. The impact of the
failure depends on the application domain. In safety critical
applications, any failure could result in damage to property
or environment and in worst case scenario, result in loss
of life. Therefore sensor failure detection, identification and
accommodation (SFDIA) is an important area of research in
the safety critical systems domain.
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An aircraft system is a good example of a safety critical
system. Sensor failures are particularly important to an aircraft,
due to their role in the feedback control loop. If measurements
from a faulty sensor enter the control loop, it can lead to closed
loop instability which can eventually result in undesirable, or
worst, unrecoverable flight conditions [3], [4]. Therefore these
systems must have robust sensor fault tolerance mechanisms.
This paper presents a neural network (NN) based SFDIA
scheme, with an aircraft system as the application domain.
Neural networks have been used in various applications,
including fault diagnosis and detection [5]–[11]. The popular
architecture for NN based applications is the multi-layer per-
ceptron (MLP) NN [12]–[14]. However, the scheme presented
here is based on the fully connected cascade (FCC) NN
architecture. This architecture is selected due to its ability
to solve a problem with a small number of neurons [13],
[15]–[17]. It should be noted that this paper is based on the
research presented by the authors in [18]. In [18], FCC NN
based aircraft pitch, roll and yaw rate sensor estimators are
developed. These estimators are utilized by the SFDIA scheme
presented here.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a
brief review of the SFDIA methods detailed in the literature.
Section III provides an overview of the FCC NN architecture
and also presents the settings used for this research. The
outline of the SFDIA scheme developed is discussed in
Section IV. The sensor suite used to collect data for this
research is briefly described in Section V. The FCC NN based
sensor estimator development process presented in [18] is
summarized in Section VI. In Section VII, the failure types
considered is discussed. The experimental results are presented
in Section VIII and summarized in Section IX. And finally,
Section X, concludes the paper.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF SFDIA METHODS
The state of the art practice for fault detection, identification
and accommodation (FDIA) is to implement high levels of
hardware redundancy [3], [10], [19], [20]. For example, Airbus
A320/330/340/380 has triple or quadruple redundant actuation,
sensor and flight control systems [19]. In hardware redundancy
(see Fig. 1), identical sensors are used to measure the same
parameter. A voting scheme is then employed to detect and
identify any faulty sensor [4], [11], [19]. For example, in a
system with three redundant sensors, if the signal from one
sensor differs significantly from the remaining two sensors,
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the sensor is declared as faulty. Sensor failure accommodation
is achieved by replacing the faulty sensor with one of the two
remaining sensors.
Pitch (q) 
Voting 
Scheme 
Flight Controller 
Fault Free 
Measurement 
Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 
Fig. 1. Block diagram of hardware redundancy
However, for small aircraft’s like UAVs, this method has
serious implications in terms of cost, power and weight. Due
to these implications, analytical redundancy has become a far
more appealing approach for SFDIA.
Generally, in analytical redundancy (see Fig. 2), a model of
the monitored system is used to generate signals that would
otherwise be generated by redundant hardware. In its simplest
form, the difference between the model estimate and the
measured reading is used to generate an error residual. This
residual is then monitored to detect and identify faults [11].
Threshold Logic 
Fault Free 
Measurement 
Flight Controller 
Sensor Sensor Model 
Fig. 2. Block diagram of analytical redundancy
In the literature, early works on analytical redundancy are
mostly based on observers and Kalman filters [4], [10], [11],
[20]–[22]. These techniques relied on the linear time invariant
mathematical model of the systems. In an aircraft system, the
assumption that the system is linear, is not often valid through-
out the entirety of the flight envelope [22], [23]. Therefore,
these techniques might perform inadequately, in the non-linear
regions of the flight envelope. In addition, these techniques
can suffer from modeling discrepancies between real and
mathematical model of the system [24]. Recent literature, has
seen efforts been made to address these issues, especially with
the linearity assumption of the Kalman filters [25]. Several
versions of the Kalman filter has been developed and applied
to various fault tolerance and state estimation problems in non-
linear systems [7], [24], [26]–[30].
Over the past two decades, there has been an increasing
interest in the application of NN for SFDIA schemes [3], [10],
[21], [24], [31]–[33]. This is mainly due to their innate ability
to model both linear and non-linear systems [5], [34]. Unlike
the Kalman filters, they do not require a detailed mathematical
description of the system. They develop a structure based
on training data instead. In addition, they can also be made
to adapt on-line, whilst the system is in use; in order to
adapt to the dynamic conditions of the environment and the
system dynamics. On-line adaptation is provided by the on-
line learning algorithm.
Example applications of NN based SFDIA schemes include,
an SFDIA scheme for the space shuttle main engine using
the auto-associative MLP NN, presented in [33]. This NN
architecture has also been used for fault detection in intelligent
sensors [8], [31]. The authors of [10] developed a SFDIA
scheme using the hetero-associative MLP NN. This scheme
was evaluated on the pitch, roll and yaw rate gyro sensors.
Samy, Postlethwaite and Gu proposed a SFDIA scheme using
the radial basis function (RBF) NN in [3] and [11].
In this paper, a SFDIA scheme using the FCC NN [13]
is presented. This NN is trained using the neuron by neuron
(NBN) learning algorithm [13]. In an SFDIA scheme, once
a sensor failure is detected and identified (FDI), the faulty
sensor reading is replaced with a reliable estimate, a process
known as failure accommodation (FA). SFDIA schemes based
on NN replaces the faulty sensor reading with a NN generated
estimate. It other words, the NN works as the estimator.
III. NEURAL NETWORK
A. Fully Connected Cascade Neural Network
In the literature, the MLP NN architecture is the popular
choice for NN applications [12]–[14]. This architecture how-
ever is neither powerful nor efficient, in comparison to other
architectures with connections across layers [13], [15], [17],
[35].
The FCC NN architecture, presented in Fig. 3, allows
connections across layers. Compared to the popular MLP
architecture, this architecture is compact and efficient as it
requires less neurons to solve a problem. For example Table I,
which is adapted from [15], compares the two architecture to
solve the parity-n problem. This is a common benchmarking
problem for neural networks [13].
n3
n1
n2
Ϊͳ 
Fig. 3. FCC Neural Network Architecture
As can be seen from Table I, to solve a parity-7 problem,
the MLP architecture requires 8 neurons compared to 3 by
the FCC. The FCC architecture is capable of solving a parity
63 problem with just 6 neurons, compared to 64 by the MLP.
With increasing number of neurons, the computational expense
increases due to an increase in the number of network weights.
In Table I, to solve the parity-31 problem, the MLP archi-
tecture with 32 neurons has 1024 weights; whereas the FCC
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF FCC AND MLP ARCHITECTURE TO SOLVE
PARITY-N PROBLEM
Parity Architecture No. Neurons No. Weights
3 MLP 4 16
FCC 2 9
7 MLP 8 64
FCC 3 27
15 MLP 15 256
FCC 4 70
31 MLP 32 1024
FCC 5 170
63 MLP 64 4096
FCC 6 399
Note: This table is adapted from [15]. The MLP architecture is made of
1 hidden layer.
architecture with just 5 neurons has 170 weights. The FCC
architecture requires significantly low number of weights and
neurons compared to MLP due to its unique architecture. It is
clear from Table I, that a signification saving in computation
expense can be made, if a system based on MLP is updated
to use the FCC architecture. Based on these results, the FCC
NN is chosen for use as the NN based sensor estimator.
B. Training Algorithm
To train the FCC NN based sensors estimators, the NBN
learning algorithm is used. The NBN algorithm is an improved
version of the second order Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) algo-
rithm [15]–[17]. Using the NBN algorithm, the weights are
updated as follows:
Wn+1 =Wn − (Q+ µI)−1g (1)
where Wn+1 is the new weights vector, Wn is the previous
weights vector, Q is the quasi-Hessian matrix, g is the gradient
vector and µ is the combination coefficient.
In comparison to the popular error back propagation (EBP)
training algorithm, this algorithm can not only train fast, but
also efficiently, with small number of neurons within the NN
[13], [15]–[17], [35]–[38].
C. Neural Network Settings
The neural networks are initialized with random weights in
the range of +1.5 to −1.5. The activation function used by
the neurons is the bipolar sigmoid [39], defined as follows:
Outj =
2
1 + e−netj
− 1 (2)
where netj is the sum of the weighted inputs to neuron j
and Outj is the output of neuron j. This activation function
produces an output in the range of +1 to −1.
To match the output range of the neurons, the sensor
measurements that should be the output of the estimators are
normalized using [40]:
xn = (b− a)× xo − xmin
xmax − xmin + a (3)
where xn is the normalized value and xo is the value to be
normalized. a and b are the minimum and maximum value of
the range to be normalized to, which in this case is +1 to −1.
xmax and xmin are the maximum and minimum values of the
range from which xo is normalized. This range is set to be
+10 to −10.
The initial value of combination coefficient (µ), used in the
weights update rule of the NBN algorithm, is set to 0.01. The
factor by which to increase or decrease this value of µ is 10.
IV. SFDIA OUTLINE
For every sensor considered, there is a NN based sensor
estimator. As the name suggest, the output of this estimator
is the sensor measurement it is estimating. Also associated
with each sensors, is a fault alarm signal (FA), which could
either be ‘0’ or ‘1’: where FA = 1 indicates a fault and
FA = 0 if otherwise. Failure detection (FD) is performed by
evaluating the residual between each sensor and its associated
NN estimate. If the residual exceeds a certain threshold, the
failure alarm for that sensor is triggered (FA = 1). Failure
identification (FI) is performed by identifying which sensor
fault alarm is triggered. Once the failed sensor is identified, it
remains in the failed state throughout the process.
In addition, the proposed scheme consists of a fault switch
(FS) for every sensor. The inputs to the fault switch are the
fault alarm signal (FA), sensor output and estimator output.
This switch is controlled by the FA signal. In fault free
conditions (FA = 0), the output of FS is the sensor output.
However in the event of failure (FA = 1), the FS switches
to the estimator output. The block diagram of the SFDIA
scheme for the pitch rate sensor is presented in Fig. 4. Note
that the SFDIA scheme and the experiments presented here,
only addresses single sensor failure at a time. However, this
scheme could be extended to address multiple sensor failures
(simultaneously or in series), similar to the research presented
in [11].
Roll Sensor 
NN Roll 
Estimate 
Residual 
Evaluation 
Fault 
Switch 
Fault Signal Fault Free 
Roll Rate 
Pitch 
Sensor 
NN Pitch 
Estimate 
Residual 
Evaluation 
Fault  
Switch 
 Fault   Signal 
Fault Free Pitch 
Rate 
Fig. 4. SFDIA scheme layout for pitch rate sensor
V. THE SENSOR SUITE
The SFDIA scheme is applied to an aircraft’s sensor suite.
To test the functionality of the SFDIA scheme, flight data
(which includes sensor readings) is collected from the X-Plane
flight simulator [41]. This simulator is known for its realistic
flight simulations, due to which its professional version is
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certified by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) for
pilot training [42], [43]. The aircraft model used for the
simulations is the Cessna 172SP. This aircraft is flown by the
artificial intelligence (AI) pilot in X-Plane.
For this research, it is assumed that the aircraft is equipped
with six inertial sensors without any hardware redundancy.
The inertial sensors are three gyroscopes (gyros) and three
accelerometers. They are mounted along the x, y and z axis
of the aircraft. These sensors are essential components of
the attitude/heading reference system (AHRS) and the inertial
navigation system (INS) found in modern aircraft [44], [45].
The outputs of these sensors are as follows:
1. Gyros: pitch (q), roll (p) and yaw (r) rates.
2. Accelerometers: accelerations along the x (ax), y (ay) and
z (az) axis.
VI. ESTIMATOR DEVELOPMENT
A. Estimator NN Inputs, Outputs and Structure
In total three estimators are developed, one each for the
pitch, roll and yaw rate gyros. The inputs to the estimators
are measurements from other sensors, excluding the one it
is estimating. In addition, commanded control outputs by the
flight control computer is also used as inputs. These inputs
are taken at the current sample time t. Inputs to each of these
estimators and their respected outputs are presented in Table II.
These inputs are chosen because they can have an effect or
cause an effect on the parameter that the sensor is measuring.
TABLE II
INPUTS TO THE SENSOR ESTIMATORS [18]
Sensor Estimator Inputs
Pitch (q) az - Normal Acceleration
ax - Longitudnal Acceleration
δE - Elevator Demand
Roll (p) r - Yaw Rate
δA - Aileron Demand
δR - Rudder Demand
Yaw (r) ay - Lateral Acceleration
δA - Aileron Demand
δR - Rudder Demand
The relationship between the measured accelerations and
the gyro rates are as follows [46]:
ax = U˙ − rV + qW + gx
ay = V˙ − pW + rU + gy (4)
az = W˙ − qU + pV + gz
where (U, V,W ) and (gx, gy, gz) are the velocity and gravi-
tational acceleration components respectively, along the X, Y
and Z axes, given in body fixed reference frame. Other input
relationships to the outputs are indicated in [47].
B. Estimator Training and Validation Data
Using the X-Plane simulator, six different flight scenarios
are recorded to train and evaluate the FCC NN based SFDIA
scheme. Out of the 6, 1 is chosen at random to train the NN
based estimators for each of the sensors; and the remaining 5
are used to validate the estimators. The results of the training
and validation process are presented in [18]. The 5 validation
scenarios are used again to evaluate the SFDIA scheme.
In the simulations, the aircraft takes off from different
airports to capture different maneuvers performed by the AI
pilot in X-Plane. The maneuvers include, take-off, straight
flight and randomly changing flight heading. The flight data
contains various sensor readings and control inputs, recorded
every second. Although in a practical system, sensor readings
are updated at a higher frequency; recording the flight data at
every second allows the training data to capture more dynamic
flight characteristics between each training pattern. This helps
to prevent the estimator NN from over-fitting to less dynamic
training data.
C. Estimator Development Summary
The development process of the NN based sensor estimators
is presented in [18]. The process can be summarized into the
following steps:
1. Estimator Training: The aim of the estimator development
process is to develop and select the best sensor estimator
in terms of size and error. In this step, for each sensor
considered, estimators with 2 to 12 neurons are trained
offline (batch learning). The training data is extracted from
the training data scenario described in the previous sub-
section. The estimators are trained until the Sum Squared
Error (SSE) of the epoch is ≤ 0.01 or a maximum of 101
epochs is reached.
2. Estimator Validation: In this step, the estimators with
varying number of neurons, trained for each sensor are
validated on the 5 flight scenarios. Each scenario has a
duration of 1500s, therefore containing 1500 patterns. The
performance of the estimator on the scenario is assessed
by calculating the total Sum Squared Error (SSE) of all
the patterns in the scenario. The best estimator for a sensor
is then selected by calculating the average and the standard
deviation of the SSE for all the scenarios.
The results of the best number of neurons for the estimators
are presented in Table III.
TABLE III
STRUCTURE OF THE SENSOR ESTIMATORS [18]
Sensor Estimator No. Neurons
Pitch 6
Roll 4
Yaw 2
D. Estimator Size Comparison
The SFDIA scheme presented here is computationally less
expensive in comparison to that of [10] and [11]. This is due to
the low neuron count and number of inputs to each estimators
when compared against [10] and [11]. For example, Table IV
compares the parameters used in this SFDIA scheme with the
NN based sensor estimators presented in [10] and [11].
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The estimators in [10] are based on the MLP NN using 1
hidden layer. As can be seen from the table, the estimators
in [10] require 20, 30 and 18 neurons for the pitch, roll and
yaw rate sensors, respectively. In comparison, the FCC NN
based estimators require 6, 4 and 2 neurons for the pitch, roll
and yaw rate sensors, respectively. In addition, the estimators
in [10] have considerably higher number of inputs compared
to the estimators presented here. This is due to the use of
historical values (previous time (t) instances) as inputs to these
estimators [10].
In [11], the SFDIA scheme was developed for the pitch
rate (q), normal acceleration (az) and angle of attack (α)
sensors. Therefore only the pitch rate (q) sensor is compared
in Table IV. This SFDIA scheme [11] is based on the extended
minimum resource allocating radial basis function (EMRAN
RBF) NN. Using the EMRAN algorithm, the number of
neurons can vary between 0 and 10, based on the performance
of the estimator. Since no information on the average number
of neurons is presented in [11], the maximum value of 10
is considered for comparison. This is 4 additional neurons
compared to the FCC NN based estimators.
TABLE IV
COMPARISONS OF THE SENSOR ESTIMATOR NEURAL NETWORKS
Sensor Parameters MLP a FCC EMRAN RBF b
Pitch (q) No. Neurons 20 6 10
No. Input Variables 4 3 4
Input Patternc 5 1 1
Total Inputsd 20 3 4
Roll (p) No. Neurons 30 4 -
No. Input Variables 6 3 -
Input Patternc 5 1 -
Total Inputsd 30 3 -
Yaw (r) No. Neurons 18 2 -
No. Input Variables 6 3 -
Input Patternc 5 1 -
Total Inputd 30 3 -
a Ref [10]. The estimator architecture consist of 1 hidden layer.
b Ref [11]. No. of neurons represent the maximum value.
c No. of time (t) instances.
d No. of time instances (t) × No. of input variables.
VII. SENSOR FAILURE EXPERIMENTS
A. Failure Detection and Identification Experiment Setup
The X-Plane 9 flight simulator does not support simulation
of sensor faults. Therefore, faults have to be introduced man-
ually once the flight data for a simulation is collected. The 5
scenarios used to validate the NN based estimators (see VI-B),
are used to evaluate the SFDIA scheme. Faults are introduced
manually at random locations into these 5 scenarios. Note
that although, the flight data contains data collected during
the take-off, straight flight and flight heading changes, faults
are not introduced during the take-off phase.
For every fault type considered, the faults are simulated on
each of the scenarios for every sensor. This would allow the
examination of the performance of the SFDIA scheme for each
of the fault type for every sensor. The fault types considered
in this research are discussed in the following subsection.
B. Sensor Failure Types
Sensors can fail in several ways. Some failures are specific
to a sensor, while others are general. The signal from a sensor
could be described as follows [1], [22], [48]:
xt = st + nt + ft (5)
where at time t, x is the signal from the sensor, s is the useful
signal, n is the noise and f is the sensor failure. The sensor
data collected from X-Plane consists of s + n value. The f
signal is injected manually for each fault type. In this research,
the following fault types are considered [1], [4], [49], [50]:
• Stuck constant bias failure: At a given time, the sensor
output gets stuck and outputs a constant bias b.
xt = b (6)
• Additive (drift) failure: This type of failure is very com-
mon. They are usually caused due to temperature changes
or calibration problems. In this fault, a constant term (drift
value) is added to the sensor output. Additive fault can
be modeled using the following equation [4], [22], [49]:
ft =

0 t < tf
A(t− tf )/TR tf ≤ t < tf + TR
A t ≥ tf + TR
(7)
where tf is the time when the fault is introduced, TR is
the duration of the ramp and A is the fault magnitude.
The magnitude A of the additive fault can either be large
or small. Depending on the duration of the ramp (TR),
the fault can be step (TR ≈ 0s), soft (TR = 4s) or hard
(TR = 1s) [11], [49].
In this research, the output of the gyro sensors are assumed
to be in the range of +10 deg/s to −10 deg/s. In case of
the additive fault type, large and small magnitude faults are
modeled using A = 3 deg/s and A = 1.5 deg/s, respectively.
In total, seven failure cases are considered, which can be
summarized as follows:
1. Constant Bias
2. Hard Additive Large (TR = 1 s , A = 3 deg/s)
3. Hard Additive Small (TR = 1 s , A = 1.5 deg/s)
4. Soft Additive Large (TR = 4 s , A = 3 deg/s)
5. Soft Additive Small (TR = 4 s , A = 1.5 deg/s)
6. Step Additive Large (TR = 0 s , A = 3 deg/s)
7. Step Additive Small (TR = 0 s , A = 1.5 deg/s)
In the next subsection, the technique to generate the sensor
residual is discussed.
C. Residual Generation Technique
As described earlier, the SFDIA scheme presented here uses
residuals (d) to detect and identify sensor failures. Generally,
residuals are generated by squaring the difference between
the real sensor measurement and the measurement from its
model [11]. This is as shown in (8). In (8), d is the residual
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at time t where, x is the real sensor measurement and x is the
estimator (model) measurement at time t.
dt = (xt − xt)2 (8)
Failure is detected when the residual d goes over a threshold
τ . Ideally the sensor measurement and the estimator output
must be equal, therefore generating a residual d = 0 and d 6= 0
in case of failure. When the residual d crosses τ , the failure
alarm is triggered. In this ideal condition, τ should be kept
close to 0 for quick detection (τ ≈ 0).
However, in a practical system, the sensor measurements are
not equal to the estimator (model) output due to sensor noise
and modeling inaccuracies. This means that the residual d is
not equal to zero in fault free conditions. Due to this reason, in
the absence of any faults, a false alarm (FA = 1) could occur
frequently when threshold τ ≈ 0. This could be resolved by
raising the value of τ , however this risks the non detection of
faults. Therefore, there is a need to have a balance between
false alarms and fault detection.
In the SFDIA scheme proposed in this research, the residual
d is generated using a sliding window mechanism [11]. In this
mechanism (see Fig. 5), a window of size n data points keeps
moving (sliding) with time. The window calculates the moving
average of the n residuals generated using (8). The result of
the sliding average window is then weighted to produce the
current residual [11]. The residual generation mechanism can
therefore be described as follows:
Dt =
$
n
t∑
i=t−n−1
(xi − xi)2 (9)
where D is the residual at time instant t and $ is the
weight. Notice how (8) is substituted in (9). The sliding
average window filters the residuals using (8) from noise and
modeling inaccuracies. The weight allows the magnification
of the residuals and a high fault threshold τ . In this research,
the size of the sliding window is set to 5 (n = 5) and the
weight is set to 40 ($ = 40). For the pitch, roll and yaw rate
sensors, the threshold is set to τ = 0.8, τ = 0.8 and τ = 0.2,
respectively.
In the next section, the results of the sensor failure de-
tection and identification for accommodation experiments are
presented.
n 
n 
Time 
t t - 1 t - n + 1 t - n 
Fig. 5. Sliding average window at time t
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Yaw Sensor Failures
The results for the yaw rate sensor failure detection time
are presented in Table V. Generally, large magnitude faults
are quicker to detect, in comparison to the small magnitude
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Fig. 6. Yaw sensor hard fault simulation of large magnitude. This result is
from scenario 1 where the fault occurs at 400s.
faults. The greater the magnitude of the fault, the sooner the
residual generated using (9) will cross the threshold τ . This
observation is reflected in the results presented in Table V,
which compares the results for a sudden step fault of large and
small magnitude. On average, the step fault of large magnitude
is detected instantaneously compared to an average of 0.8s in
sample time for small magnitude step fault.
Similar results can be observed with the hard additive type
faults with a ramp duration of TR = 1s (Section VII-B).
Although the detection time is affected by the magnitude
of the fault, it is also affected by the transient phase (ramp
duration TR) of the developing fault. Due to this, the detection
time for hard faults is greater than step type additive faults.
In Fig. 6, the signals associated with the yaw rate sensor
during the occurrence of hard fault of large magnitude is
presented. Notice the fast response of the fault signal FA after
the occurrence of the fault. The time of fault is marked by a
green line running across the three plots.
In comparison to the step and hard additive type faults, soft
faults have the longest detection time. These faults have the
highest ramp duration (TR = 4s) amongst the three types of
additive faults. On average, the detection time for soft faults
of large magnitude is 2.6s, in comparison to an average of
4s (sample time) for small magnitude fault. In the case of the
constant bias fault, the average detection time is 1.6s.
TABLE V
YAW FDI RESULTS
Detection Time for Fault Types in Sample Time
Scn. Bias Hard Step Soft
- - L S L S L S
1 1 1 1 0 0 2 3
2 1 1 2 0 1 3 5
3 1 1 2 0 1 2 3
4 2 1 3 0 2 3 5
5 3 1 2 0 0 3 4
Avg. 1.6 1 2 0 0.8 2.6 4
−: No Fault Detected, Threshold (τ ): 0.2, Scn: Scenario, L: Large, S: Small
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B. Pitch Sensor Failures
The results for the pitch rate sensor failure detection time
are presented in Table VI. The results reflect the observations
made in the yaw rate sensor results. Large magnitude faults
are quick to detect and additive faults with a ramp duration
TR > 0s takes a longer time to detect. On average, the
hard additive faults with large magnitude are detected in
1.4s sample time. In comparison, the hard faults with small
magnitude are detected in average of 3s sample time.
Compared to the hard faults, the soft additive faults take an
average of 3s and 5.2s in sample time, for large and small
magnitude respectively. Notice that the average detection time
of soft faults is longer compared to hard faults. This is because
the ramp duration is greater for soft faults, which is set at
TR = 4s, instead of TR = 1s for hard faults. The step fault
type has the lowest average of the additive fault types due to
the zero ramp duration (TR = 0). Step faults with small and
large magnitude have an average of 0.8s and 2.6s respectively.
The constant bias fault type has an average of 0.8s.
In Fig. 7, the signals associated with the pitch rate sensor
during the occurrence of step fault is presented. It shows the
response of various signals during the occurrence of step fault
of small magnitude. Notice how the residual gradually crosses
the fault threshold τ and triggers the fault alarm FA.
Comparing Table V and Table VI shows how the average
detection time for the pitch rate sensor is greater compared
to the yaw rate sensor, especially for the additive fault types.
This is due to the higher fault residual threshold τ used for
the pitch rate sensor. In comparison to the yaw rate sensor,
the pitch rate estimator has a higher modeling error, therefore
requiring a higher value for τ . The threshold τ is set to 0.8
for the pitch sensor whereas for the yaw sensor, τ = 0.2.
TABLE VI
PITCH FDI REULTS
Detection Time for Fault Types in Sample Time
Scn. Bias Hard Step Soft
- - L S L S L S
1 1 2 5 1 4 4 7
2 1 1 3 1 3 4 7
3 1 1 1 0 0 1 2
4 1 2 4 1 2 4 7
5 0 1 2 1 4 2 3
Avg. 0.8 1.4 3 0.8 2.6 3 5.2
− : No Fault Detected, Threshold (τ ) = 0.8, Scn: Scenario, L : Large, S : Small
C. Roll Sensor Failures
In Table VII, the results for the roll rate sensor failure
detection are presented. Similar to the pitch rate sensors, τ
is set at a higher value: τ = 0.8. This is to accommodate the
difference between the estimator value and the sensor value.
The least detection time is taken by the constant bias fault
type with an average of 1s in sample time. For hard fault types,
the average is 2s and 4.6s in sample time for large and small
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Fig. 7. Pitch sensor step fault simulation of small magnitude. This result is
from scenario 1 where the fault occurs at 300s.
magnitude respectively. As expected, the higher the residual
threshold, the longer the fault detection time.
The soft fault types take the most amount of time to be
detected. For large magnitude soft faults, the average detection
time is 4s in sample time. The average detection time is even
higher for small magnitude soft faults, with an average of 7s in
sample time. These results are considerably higher compared
to the detection time in the yaw rate sensor. The longer
detection time is caused by the higher residual threshold.
In case of the step type faults, the average is at 1.2s in
sample time for large magnitude. However for the small mag-
nitude, the average is at 3.75s with a fault going undetected
in scenario 1. The fault went undetected because the residual
failed to trigger the threshold, as can be seen in Fig. 8. This
could be solved by reducing the threshold τ , but risk false
fault detection. Future work would consider additional inputs
to the roll rate estimator to improve the estimate, and therefore
improve the chances for detection.
TABLE VII
ROLL FDI RESULTS
Detection Time for Fault Types in Sample Time
Scn. Bias Hard Step Soft
- - L S L S L S
1 1 2 5 2 − 4 7
2 1 2 4 1 4 4 7
3 1 2 4 1 3 4 7
4 1 2 5 1 4 4 7
5 1 2 5 1 4 4 7
Avg. 1 2 4.6 1.2 3.75 4 7
−: No Fault Detected, Threshold (τ ): 0.8, Scn: Scenario, L: Large, S: Small
IX. RESULTS SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
The FCC NN based SFDIA scheme is evaluated for fail-
ures in pitch, roll and yaw rate gyro sensors. Each sensor
is manually injected with seven different faults at random
locations on five different flight scenarios. The observations
of the experiments can be summarized as follows:
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Fig. 8. Roll sensor step fault simulation of small magnitude. This result is
from scenario 1 where the fault occurs at 150s.
• Sudden fault types like constant bias, hard additive, step
additive are quicker to detect than faults that develop over
time (e.g. soft additive faults).
• Faults with large magnitude are more easily detected than
faults with small magnitude.
• Higher fault residual threshold to accommodate sensor
estimator modeling errors and noise can increase the fault
detection time.
These observations are consistent across the three gyro
sensors. All faults were detected by the presented SFDIA
scheme, except for one in roll rate sensor. This undetected
fault is a step fault with small magnitude. In this case, the
fault went undetected because the residual failed to trigger
the threshold. However, out of the 105 failure cases evaluated,
only one went undetected.
The FDI results presented here can be compared to the SF-
DIA scheme presented in [11]. The SFDIA scheme presented
in [11] is based on the extended minimum resource allocating
radial basis function (EMRAN-RBF) NN. With their SFDIA
scheme, pitch rate faults were detected in 1.24s, 1s and 1.86s
for hard, step and soft faults respectively. In comparison, the
SFDIA scheme presented here, detected the large magnitude
(A = 3 deg/s) faults in an average time of 1.4s, 0.8s and 3s
for hard, step and soft faults respectively.
The results are fairly comparable, except for the case of soft
failure, where the presented SFDIA scheme took 1.14s longer.
This difference in performance can be accounted for by the fact
that the SFDIA scheme presented in [11] uses a sampling time
of 20ms, compared to the 1s sampling time used in the scheme
presented here. The higher the sampling frequency, the quicker
the faults are detected. Besides the sampling frequency, the
SFDIA scheme presented here just uses 3 inputs compared to
4 inputs in [11].
One of the drawbacks of the presented SFDIA scheme is the
fixed threshold based detection mechanism. Selecting a fixed
fault threshold is a challenging task especially, in a dynamic
system which is susceptible to noise and modeling inaccuracy.
If the threshold is too high, the fault might take longer to
be detected or worse, go undetected. Having a low threshold
on the other hand might increase the rate of false alarms.
The sliding averaging window mechanism does help reduce
the effect of noise and modeling inaccuracy. However, if the
dynamics of the system changes in the future, the thresholds
would have to be evaluated and fixed again.
An alternative to the fixed threshold based detection mech-
anism is an adaptive threshold. In this mechanism, the fault
threshold adapts to the changes in the system dynamics with
time. Such a mechanism, as presented in the [7] and [51],
would increase the robustness of the SFDIA scheme.
X. CONCLUSION
Sensors are an important part of any control system. A
failure in a sensor could degrade the system’s performance and
can destabilize the system’s operation. Therefore it is impor-
tant for a system to have the ability to detect and accommodate
sensor failures to maintain its reliability; especially in safety
critical applications.
An aircraft can be considered as a safety critical system,
where any failure can result in loss of life and significant
damage to environment or property. This research investigates
the development of a fault tolerant sensor system, with the
aircraft as the example application.
In this paper, a neural network (NN) based sensor failure
detection, identification and accommodation (SFDIA) scheme
is presented. This scheme uses the fully connected cascade
(FCC) NN architecture that was trained using the neuron by
neuron (NBN) learning algorithm. As evident from Table I,
this architecture is more efficient than the popular multi-layer
perceptron (MLP) NN architecture. It requires less number of
neurons to solve a problem compared to the MLP architecture.
Therefore savings can be made in terms of computational
expense, by using the FCC architecture instead of the MLP,
for any NN based application.
The SFDIA scheme presented here addresses failures in the
pitch, roll and yaw rate sensors. In total, seven sensor failure
types are considered for each sensor. The FCC NN based
sensor estimators can replicate a sensor’s measurements with
as little as two neurons; and out of the 105 failure experiments,
only one fault went undetected.
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